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This thesis argues that the Basel Accords have been stretched beyond their original 
scope, which was to promote regulatory convergence amongst internationally-active 
banks.  It is here argued that the current form of the Basel Accords, having been 
promulgated as a transnational regulatory law by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, is not appropriate in order to have an effective transnational regulatory 
standard.  The change in scope of the Basel Accords along the years has resulted in 
various recursive cycles such that one cannot argue that these standards have since 
“settled”. 
Whilst the Basel Accords are generally considered as the main regulatory standard for 
banks (by national regulatory authorities and the industry), different jurisdictions have 
applied these standards to different types of entities, giving rise to regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities.  Furthermore, certain jurisdictions may have incentives to allow for 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities as this may allow them to be more competitive than 
other jurisdictions. 
This thesis continues by arguing that whilst the Basel Accords seek to provide regulation 
to cater for risks which banks have, the said Basel Accords ignore the fact that banks in 
different jurisdictions may be subject to varying levels of risk depending on whether 
these banks operate in pro-creditor or pro-debtor jurisdictions1. 
This thesis refers to the Cape Town Convention and argues that this can be used as a 




                                                     
1 Wood Philip R., Regulation of International Finance in “The Law and Practice of International 
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Preamble:  A Note on “BREXIT” 
On the 29 March 2017 the United Kingdom (“UK”) formally commenced the process of 
withdrawing from the European Union (“EU”) in accordance with Article 50 of the 
Treaty on European Union (with this process being referred to as “BREXIT”), meaning 
that the UK will be withdrawing from the EU on the 29 March 2019.   
While it seems that there will be no immediate and apparent effects of BREXIT on the 
contents of this thesis, the long-term effects will most probably continue to enhance the 
arguments made throughout this thesis. 
The main problems discussed below arise due to a lack of regulatory convergence across 
different jurisdictions, and also as a result of a lack of harmonisation of laws on security 
interests and insolvency.  Over the past years the EU has sought to have further 
regulatory convergence amongst its member states, and the problem of regulatory 
arbitrage within EU member states has been reduced and will continue to be minimised 
as further regulatory convergence takes place. 
As the UK withdraws from the EU, however, the probability will be that UK laws will not 
continue to be fully harmonised with EU laws, and the UK will possibly continue to 
develop as a very important actor in the Basel Accords’ process, acting out of self-
interest, and competing with other jurisdictions or economic groupings (including the 
EU).  As differences continue to arise from the way in which the Basel Accords and other 
national laws are implemented, the possibility for regulatory arbitrage may continue to 















Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1  Research Problem 
Though states adopt different approaches to law, have varying linguistic styles, and have 
dissimilar legal and non-legal backgrounds, they nevertheless seek to work together 
where this can result in positive benefits for all.  Transnational law has therefore 
emerged as a way through which common solutions are sought for common problems 
which are best dealt with by having different jurisdictions adopting similar laws or 
regulations.  As legal systems develop and as different jurisdictions work together, this 
gives rise to a common understanding, allowing legislative texts and regulatory 
standards to have greater maturity and effectiveness, thereby drawing variances across 
different jurisdictions closer to each other.   
Throughout the years the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”) has tried to 
bring different banking regulators and supervisory authorities together and has sought 
to allow these different regulators and authorities to understand each other better and 
adopt similar regulatory standards.  However, though similar terms are today used by 
different national regulators, it will here be argued that there is yet to be a common 
understanding of what these same terms refer to2.  Furthermore it will be argued that in 
light of major differences across different jurisdictions other fundamental questions 
(such as what type of capital adequacy laws shadow banks should have, or whether any 
consideration should be given to the type of insolvency laws which a jurisdiction 
adopts), are discarded and not given any particular weight by the Basel Accords, 
notwithstanding the varying levels of risk which different states may be subject to as a 
result of these matters.  
It is proposed that the Basel Accords are yet to mature to a sufficient extent and are yet 
to reach a level of harmonisation and acceptance across jurisdictions which can lead to 
these international standards reaching their full potential.  The Basel Accords thus can 
be seen as a victim of their own success:  though they can be considered to be very 
successful and effective for what they originally set out to be (and when considering that 
their initial regulatory scope was limited to “internationally-active banks”), the Basel 
Accords are now viewed as the main regulatory standard for regulation of all banks 
                                                     
2 By way of example, and as will be discussed later on in this thesis, though the Basel Accords 
originally set out to regulate “internationally-active banks”, there is to-date no common 




around the world.  It is argued, however, that the framework on which the Basel Accords 
are based is too limited, such that it cannot be used as an effective regulatory standard 
for the regulation of all banks. 
This thesis will focus on the Basel Accords as constituting a form of “transnational 
regulatory law”.  This term will be analysed in further detail in Chapter 2, and it will be 
distinguished from the more generic term of “transnational law”.  For the purpose of this 
introduction, however, it suffices to say that the Basel Accords are a form of “regulation”, 
and for this purpose various concepts which have been used in analysing the role of 
“regulation” have been applied to the Basel Accords.  The regulation which is adopted 
here is however “transnational” in nature given that regulatory bodies which have 
promulgated these international standards do not act alone within a national 
framework, but have come together through transnational regulatory networks (and 
through the BCBS) in order to have one set of regulatory standards which are 
(supposedly) applied in the same way across borders. 
The main purpose of the BCBS (which is the transnational regulatory network which has 
promulgated the Basel Accords, and which includes national organisations with direct 
banking supervisory authority and central banks3) has been outlined in the Basel 
Committee Charter which establishes the BCBS, which states as follows: 
 1.  Mandate 
The BCBS is the primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of 
banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters.  Its 
mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks 
worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability4. 
The BCBS thus provides a forum in which different supervisory authorities and central 
banks come together in order to discuss prudential regulation of banks.  However, 
despite the good intentions of the BCBS, the Basel Accords have only been written by 
bankers for bankers, and there has been a lack of a proper legal (and economic) analysis 
of the effects of the prudential regulation established by these Accords.   
This thesis does not seek to adopt a banking, financial or accounting approach to these 
international standards.  Rather it seeks to look at the Basel Accords from a legal 
                                                     
3 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel Committee Charter’ (Updated 30 December 2016) 




perspective in order to highlight major problems which the current drafting of the Basel 
Accords gives rise to.  It will be argued that the Basel Accords ignore fundamental 
differences across jurisdictions leading to a lack of regulatory consistency, and giving 
rise to regulatory arbitrage possibilities.  Furthermore, financing parties established in 
different jurisdictions are subject to different levels of risk in light of domestic laws 
within which the Basel Accords operate.  The Convention on International Interests in 
Mobile Equipment (the “CTC” or the “Cape Town Convention”) is thus presented as an 
illustration of the limitations of the Basel Accords, and it will be argued that the Basel 
Accords should use the CTC as a model through which the limitations highlighted by this 
thesis are reduced significantly.   
1.2  Purpose of the Research and its Contribution to Existing 
Literature 
This thesis seeks to analyse the main concepts behind the Basel Accords from a legal 
perspective.  This approach seeks to contribute to existing literature in that the Basel 
Accords have been mainly analysed from a banking and finance perspective.  The Basel 
Accords regularly are described as a typical example of a “transnational law” or of a 
“transnational regulatory law”, yet the underlying assumptions behind this term (and the 
features which make the Basel Accords a transnational law or a transnational regulatory 
law) are not probed.    
Concepts from law and economics are also referred to in order to question whether the 
relevant actors have incentives to adopt, implement and enforce the Basel Accords in a 
consistent manner across jurisdictions.  For this purpose, the CTC is presented as an 
example of a transnational law which made use of economic analysis when this was 
being drafted5, given that this can be used as a model through which the problems 
mentioned throughout this thesis can be addressed by the drafters of the Basel Accords. 
The Basel Accords set out international standards for national regulatory bodies to 
adopt, and monitoring programmes have been implemented in order to ensure that the 
said standards are properly adopted across different jurisdictions.  However, the Basel 
Accords have been drafted by adopting a “one-size-fits-all” approach, and in the absence 
of any analysis as to whether different jurisdictions adopt different banking models; 
                                                     
5 Jeffrey Wool, Treaty Design, Implementation, and Compliance Benchmarking Economic Benefit – a 
Framework as Applied to the Cape Town Convention (Uniform Law Journal, Issue 4, 2012) 633 
(Wool 2012); Jeffrey Wool, Economic Analysis and Harmonised Modernisation of Private Law 
(Uniform Law Review, Vol 8, 2003-1/2, UNIDROIT, 2003) 389 (Wool 2003).   
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what the interests of states and of the industry are in different jurisdictions; and 
whether financing parties are subject to varying risks depending on the jurisdictions 
where they provide their services or otherwise.  This has recently been acknowledged 
by the European Parliament, which whilst noting that different jurisdictions adopt 
varying banking systems6, has recognised that a “one-size-fits-all” approach by the Basel 
Accords may be “ineffective and disproportionately burdensome, in particular for many 
smaller, domestically focused, less complex and interconnected banks, as well as their 
regulators and supervisors”7.   
This thesis therefore seeks to advance literature by undertaking an analysis of the 
differences in the types of entities to which the Basel Accords have been extended across 
different jurisdictions; applying certain economic concepts to the Basel Accords; and 
challenging the assumption that all entities to which the Basel Accords apply are subject 
to the same level of risk.  This is done in order to argue that risks which the Basel 
Accords sought to reduce may still be present notwithstanding the adoption of the Basel 
Accords in different jurisdictions.   
1.3  Research Methodology 
This thesis has reviewed relevant literature, and applied concepts from a number of 
different fields of law to the Basel Accords.  Consequently, it does not set out to provide a 
description of the contents of the Basel Accords8, but focuses on specific aspects of 
relevance to this thesis in order to analyse whether the underlying framework of the 
Basel Accords is appropriate for it to reach its stated aims and be applied consistently 
across different jurisdictions.     
Literature from transnational law and transnational regulatory law has been reviewed in 
order to be able to frame the Basel Accords in their correct setting and see what the 
main influences are in having a functioning transnational regulatory law.  This has 
primarily been done by considering authoritative authors on this subject-matter and 
                                                     
6 See by way of example:  European Parliament, Basel III Revision:  MEPs Want to Ensure the EU 
Banking Model is not Penalised (Press Release, 10 November 2016) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20161108IPR50512/20161108I
PR50512_en.pdf> accessed 16 April 2017. 
7 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 23 November 2016 on the Finalisation 
of Basel III (2016/2959(RSP) Recital H 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2016-
0439+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 20 April 2017.  
8 As a result this thesis does not set out to describe the three pillars of the Basel Accords, how 
regulatory capital is calculated, the liquidity requirements, and the leverage restrictions 
established by the Basel Accords. 
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applying key principles referred to by these authors to the Basel Accords.  In particular, 
this thesis has adopted Zumbansen’s methodological approach9 of considering the main 
actors, norms and processes in relation to the Basel Accords and as a result of which the 
Basel Accords have been promulgated and adopted throughout the years.  Authors such 
as Verdier10 and Avgouleas11 are also referred to when considering how the Basel 
Accords, as a transnational regulatory law operating through managed networks, make 
use of “soft-law” and the implications which this has on the way in which the Basel 
Accords are adopted and enforced across different jurisdictions.  Furthermore, 
Halliday’s12 recursivity theory is considered as a basis for the argument that the Basel 
Accords are still undergoing iterative cycles, and consequently are yet to be settled. 
                                                     
9 Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving (Comparative Research in Law & Political 
Economy, Research Paper No 27/2011, 2011) 
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=clpe> 
accessed 10 January 2015; Peer Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law:  Legal 
Theory, Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism (Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 
Vol 21, Summer 2012) 
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1758&context=scholarly_
works> accessed 12 December 2016 (Zumbansen 2012); Peer Zumbansen, Lochner Disembedded:  
The Anxieties of Law in a Global Context (Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 20, Issue 
1, 2013) <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/520149> accessed 23 January 2017 (Zumbansen 2013); 
Peer Zumbansen, Where the Wild Things Are:  Journeys to Transnational Legal Orders, and Back 
(King’s College London Dickson Poon School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series:  Paper 
No 2016-11)  <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2723990> accessed 12 December 2016 (Zumbansen 
2016). 
10 Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits (Yale J.Int'l L., Vol. 
34, 2009) (Verdier 2009); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, ‘US Implementation of Basel II:  Lessons for 
Informal International Lawmaking’ in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel & Jan Wouters (eds), 
Informal International Lawmaking (OUP, 2012) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1879391> accessed 1 February 2017 
(Verdier 2012). 
11 Emilios Avgouleas, Rationales and Designs to Implement an Institutional Big Bang in the 
Governance of Global Finance (Seattle University Law Review, Vol. 36, 2013). 
12 Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Researching Transnational Legal Orders’ in Terence C. 
Halliday and Gregory Shaffer (eds.) Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, 
2015) 475; Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Introduction’ in Terence C. Halliday and 
Gregory Shaffer (eds.) Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 3 (Halliday 
and Shaffer Introduction); Terence C Halliday and Bruce G Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law:  
Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes 
(American Journal of Sociology, Vol 112 No 4, January 2007) 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507855?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents> accessed 12 
December 2016; Terence C Halliday, Recursivity of Global Normmaking:  A Sociolegal Agenda 
(Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2009, Vol 5) 263 
<http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131606> 
accessed 12 December 2016; Susan Block-Lieb and Terence C. Halliday, ‘Settling and 
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A comparative analysis of relevant banking laws and financial regulation of the UK, the 
wider EU and the United States of America (“US”) has also been undertaken in order to 
understand what the different terminology referred to throughout the Basel Accords 
means in different jurisdictions. Relatedly, laws implementing the Basel Accords in 
different jurisdictions (particularly the EU and the US) have also been referred to in 
order to understand the diverse ways in which the Basel Accords have been 
implemented in different jurisdictions.  The comparative analyses carried out in this 
regard consider both primary texts as well as secondary texts (including analyses done 
by the BCBS particularly when carrying out its Regulatory Consistency Assessment 
Programme13). 
On considering the varying interests which the main actors have in relation to the Basel 
Accords, reference has been made to concepts deriving from law and economics by 
referring to authors such as Cooter14.  This has been done in order to understand what 
impact the Basel Accords have on different players, and what sort of rational approach 
each of these actors would take on seeking to maximise their own utility.      
This thesis also considers varying laws on insolvency and laws which reduce credit risk 
in different jurisdictions. This analysis particularly considers the work of Wood15 who 
has sought to classify jurisdictions according to their pro-creditor or pro-debtor 
approach to law.  The varying positions adopted by different jurisdictions have been 
analysed in order to show that certain jurisdictions are much more pro-creditor than 
other pro-debtor jurisdictions, and in order to argue that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Concordance:  Two Cases in Global Commercial Law’ in Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer 
(eds.) Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 75. 
13 Bank for International Settlements, ‘RCAP:  Role, Remit and Methodology’ 
<https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_role.htm> accessed 14 June 2015. 
14 Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics (January 1998) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=111408> accessed 24 January 2016; 
Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory (Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 22, No. 1, Socio-
Legal Studies, March 1995) 50 (Cooter 1995); Robert Cooter and Jody S Kraus, The Measure of 
Law and Economics (August 2014) 
<http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=law_econ> 
accessed 25 March 2016. 
15 Wood (n 1); Philip R Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (Part I) (International 
Insolvency Review, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 1995) 94 (Wood 1995(I)); Philip R Wood, How to Compare 
Regulatory Regimes (Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2007) 332 (Wood 2007);  Philip R 
Wood, Predictions for the Future of Financial Law and Lawyers (Business Law International, Vol. 9, 
No. 3, September 2008) 234 (Wood 2008); Philip R Wood, Principles of International Insolvency 
(Part II) (International Insolvency Review, Vol 4, Issue 2, 1995) 109 (Wood 1995(II)). 
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the Basel Accords is not appropriate in light of the varying risks which may arise on 
financing entities, depending on the jurisdictions within which they operate. 
1.4  Chapter Outline 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will consider the main elements of the Basel 
Accords as a form of transnational regulatory law.  Distinctions will be drawn between 
transnational laws and transnational regulatory laws, and the thesis will also continue 
by considering the recursive cycles which have taken place in relation to the Basel 
Accords throughout the years.  
Chapter 3 will analyse the entities which the Basel Accords sought to regulate and the 
objectives which the Basel Accords had set out to achieve.  It will be shown that whilst 
the Basel Accords sought to regulate “internationally-active banks”, there is no definition 
as to what makes a bank “internationally-active”, and there neither is a definition as to 
what constitutes a “bank”.  Thus, whilst the Basel Accords have become the global 
standard for regulation of banks in general (and not just internationally-active banks), 
the lack of definitions has given rise to possibilities of regulatory arbitrage as different 
states have sought to apply the Basel Accords to different types of entities.  It also will be 
shown that throughout the years the regulatory objective of the Basel Accords has 
changed from that of achieving regulatory convergence, towards that of seeking to have 
global financial stability. 
Chapter 4 will argue that it is essential for the main actors to be involved in the adoption, 
implementation, functioning and enforcement of the Basel Accords in order to ensure 
the proper functioning of the Basel Accords, particularly in light of the different interests 
and incentives which different actors may have.  For this purpose this thesis will take 
insights from law and economics literature.  It will here consider the main actors as 
being:  the individual regulators from different states coming together in one 
international community; individual states acting alone on implementing and enforcing 
the Basel Accords at a national level; and the industry.   
The thesis will argue that the Basel Accords also lack legitimacy and accountability, with 
this being the result of the promoters of the Basel Accords failing to consider the 
interests of states (acting individually and considering their own self-interest rather 
than the interests of the international community) and of the industry.  Chapter 5 will 
demonstrate that the lack of consideration of the interests of the individual states and of 
the industry has given rise to regulatory arbitrage opportunities. 
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Chapter 6 will highlight important distinctions amongst different jurisdictions such that 
certain jurisdictions are considered to be much more pro-creditor than others, 
particularly in light of the differences in the laws on insolvency and on security interests 
of these jurisdictions.  Chapter 7 will seek to consider different techniques through 
which credit risk can be mitigated, and will continue by arguing that notwithstanding 
that the Basel Accords have sought to regulate banks in order to cater for the risks which 
they face, banks in different jurisdictions are subject to different levels of risk, depending 
on the jurisdictions within which they operate.  The thesis will therefore show that 
notwithstanding that there is one transnational regulatory law which seeks to establish 
the required capital adequacy limits which banks should hold as a buffer for the risks 
they face, the capital adequacy levels do not distinguish between the states in which the 
banks operate, and this notwithstanding that banks operating in pro-debtor jurisdictions 
are necessarily subject to higher risks than banks operating in pro-creditor jurisdictions. 
Chapter 8 will outline the main elements of the CTC16 and it will suggest that the CTC has 
been successful in dealing with each of the main problems discussed throughout this 
thesis.  Chapter 9 will conclude this thesis by making three proposals which seek to 
address the main problems discussed throughout the thesis, as follows: 
- It will be argued that the soft-law approach adopted by the Basel Accords should 
be supported by a binding text which will create legal rights and obligations 
under an international law framework, and which will also be able to provide 
clarity to inconsistencies which are highlighted by this thesis (including to which 
entities the Basel Accords should apply).  
- Once binding principles are agreed to, different jurisdictions should be allowed 
to interpret the Basel Accords freely and allow for regulatory competition within 
the framework of the binding principles which would have been agreed to.  This 
will ensure that national regulators take responsibility for the regulations which 
they adopt, whilst also giving flexibility to regulators to act when it becomes 
clear that risks increase as a result of regulatory arbitrage.  This would also allow 
regulators to reduce unnecessary social costs which the current framework 
seemingly encourages.   
- It will be argued that model laws on insolvency and security interests should also 
be promulgated, and with the Basel Accords being used to encourage states to 
                                                     
16 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, November 2001) 
(Cape Town Convention or CTC). 
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reduce risks to financing entities by providing a favourable regime for those 
financing entities operating in pro-creditor jurisdictions. 
 
 












Chapter 2:  The Basel Accords as a Transnational 
Regulatory Law  
2.1  The Basel Accords and Transnational Law 
The Basel Accords seek to regulate actions and actors which transcend national 
frontiers, and can therefore be classified as one of the typical examples of “transnational 
law” (or more specifically “transnational regulation”)17.  In light of increased 
globalisation, actors from different states have come together to regulate the banking 
industry, and these international standards have now been adopted by most states 
around the world.  Following the financial crisis, the Basel Accords have been even more 
focused towards the adoption of a macroprudential approach to regulation (particularly 
when seeking to focus on the reduction of systemic risks across the globe), thus 
rendering the Basel Accords, and their implementation, enforcement and supervision 
even “more transnational” in nature18. 
This Chapter will commence by giving a brief background to the Basel Accords.  The 
main features of transnational law (and more specifically transnational regulatory law) 
will then be analysed such that this Chapter will also consider different decision-making 
structures which may be used in promulgating, implementing and enforcing 
transnational laws and regulations.  This thesis will argue (in Chapter 9) that there 
needs to be a shift towards further regulatory competition in order to allow the Basel 
Accords to reach their current aims.   
This Chapter will also consider different influences to which transnational regulation 
and the national bodies which seek to implement it are subject, and which may limit the 
effectiveness of transnational regulatory laws such as the Basel Accords.  The recursive 
                                                     
17 Eleni Tsingou, ‘Transnational Governance Networks in the Regulation of Finance’ in Morten 
Ougaard and Anna Leander (eds), Business and Global Governance (Routledge, 2010) 139; Emilios 
Avgouleas, The Reform of ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ Bank – A New Regulatory Model for the Institutional 
Separation of ‘Casino’ from ‘Utility’ Banking (February 2010) 11 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552970> accessed 8 December 2014; Zumbansen (n 9) 3; For the 
purposes of this thesis one needs to keep in mind the special status of the European Union as a 
regional grouping within which further internal harmonisation has also been carried out.  
Therefore throughout discussions relating to the development of transnational laws and 
transnational regulatory laws, the European Union may at times need to be considered as one 
‘State’ acting in an international market.  Furthermore, where no unification or approximation of 
laws or regulations would have taken place within the EU, separate Member States will need to be 
considered individually as separate States. 
18 Andrew Baker, ‘Macroprudential Regulation’ in Daniel Mügge (ed), Europe and the Governance 
of Global Finance (Oxford University Press, 2014) 174 – 176.   
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processes which the Basel Accords have undergone throughout the years, and the extent 
to which one can argue that the Basel Accords have “settled” will also be considered in 
order to support the argument that the Basel Accords cannot be considered to have 
“settled” as yet. 
2.1.1 Background to the Basel Accords 
The main rationale behind capital adequacy regulation is that higher capital ratios lead 
to safer banks19.  Capital adequacy methodologies have long been considered as 
necessary regulatory tools to ensure that both abnormal claims on bank deposits as well 
as unexpected losses could be catered for.  Capital thus serves as a buffer against 
abnormal claims or unexpected losses, whilst also keeping the public’s confidence in 
banks high (with this being particularly important since banks can never immediately 
repay all deposits held with them to their customers, in light of the maturity 
transformation function which they carry out, making them particularly exposed to bank 
runs on a loss of confidence by the public)20.    
It has also been argued that, in the absence of regulatory requirements, banks would 
tend to combine low capital ratios with a strategy of excessive risk-taking21.  Padoa-
Schioppa argues that regulation is essential in order to ensure the maintenance of 
minimum capital requirements, whilst serving as a threshold which may lead to 
supervisory intrusion in the event of the deterioration of a bank’s capital position, with 
this being particularly important since scattered and uninformed depositors cannot 
induce more prudent management behaviour should there be the need22.  
Capital adequacy is seen as one of the main safeguards of depositors’ funds and of the 
banking system in general, coupled with other protections such as depositor insurance 
                                                     
19 One should here point out that the reasoning of having higher capital ratios as a safeguard does 
not necessarily apply just to banks.  All undertakings would be considered to be much safer if 
certain capital ratios were to be adhered to.  However regulatory focus was put particularly on 
banks, mainly in light of the possibility of banks leveraging themselves through deposits taken 
from the public, and also in light of the systemic risks which banks pose; Padoa-Schioppa 
Tommaso, Regulating finance: Balancing freedom and risk (OUP Catalogue, 2004) 7 – 9.   
20 Wood (n 1) 27.   
21 Padoa-Schioppa (n 19) 7 – 9; See also:  Tarullo Daniel K, Banking on Basel: the future of 
international financial regulation (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008) 17; It has 
been argued that banks in weak positions have much to gain from increased risk-taking since if a 
risk does not pay off, the most shareholders can lose is the capital they would have invested, 
whilst if the risk does pay off, the weak position would have been reverted, whilst shareholders 
would stand to benefit from the returns achieved from such risks, particularly since depositors 
would only be paid pre-stipulated interest rates. 
22 Padoa-Schioppa (n 19) 7 – 9. 
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(also known as “depositor guarantee schemes”), and having central banks acting as 
lenders of last resort.  The attraction of requiring specific amounts of capital to be kept 
by banks (as against the use of other safeguards of depositors’ funds) arises from the fact 
that this is not reliant on other banks or on the state since capital must be provided by 
the bank itself (or through arrangements it makes)23.  Furthermore capital adequacy acts 
as an ex-ante preventive measure, rather than an ex-post solution to a problem which 
would have already occurred.   
The development of the Basel Accords as a transnational system of regulation (through 
Basel I) was a response to the globalisation of banking, and particularly as a result of the 
increased provision of services across borders.  The main cause for concern in the 1980s 
was that Japanese banks started to provide their services in the US and in the UK, and 
with Japanese banks being subject to less stringent regulations and having much lower 
capital than banks established (and regulated) in these jurisdictions24.  Japanese banks 
were increasing their market share here since they were not subject to the same 
regulatory constraints which local banks faced, and the capital adequacy constraints 
which had been introduced in the US and in the UK, on banks taking deposits from the 
public (and which sought to minimise risks to the financial system) were thus being 
avoided25.  Thus, banks established and operating in these jurisdictions could not 
compete with Japanese banks as the latter had a competitive advantage in light of the 
less stringent regulations to which they were subject26.   
The developments in capital adequacy regulation in the US were gradual, and whilst 
regulatory monitoring of capital was present from the early years of the 20th century, 
this had not been set out as an explicit capital requirement.  In the late 1930s the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) shifted its emphasis to having a ratio of capital 
to total assets (as against having a ratio of capital to deposits as has had been in place 
from before the 1930s)27.  Formal minimum capital requirements however were only 
                                                     
23 See also:  Tarullo (n 21) 20 – 21.    
24 Barth James R., Caprio Gerard, and Levine Ross, Rethinking Bank Regulation:  Till Angels Govern 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) 64 – 65.   
25 Barth (n 24) 64 – 65.   
26 This also happened following the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, when various bank 
supervisors became concerned about the deterioration in the capital base of most of the main 
international banks.  American regulators were therefore under pressure to either close the 
doors to foreign international banks or alternatively lower the capital standards to the main 
western American banks in order to be able to compete with foreign banks.  These developments 
also took place following the dismantling of the Bretton Woods system and the Herstatt Bank 
failure in the early 1970s.  See also:  Padoa-Schioppa (n 19) 7 – 9; Tarullo (n 21) 32 – 35. 
27 Tarullo (n 21) 32 – 35. 
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imposed in the US in the 1980s, as the US Congress passed legislation in 1983 that 
required federal banking agencies to establish minimum capital levels of banks and bank 
holding companies, and the FDIC issued final regulations on risk-based capital 
requirements in 198528. 
Though other BCBS countries historically placed less emphasis on capital requirements 
than the US, as competitive pressures and other developments on banks in the rest of the 
world paralleled the effects on US banks, supervisors in other countries forming part of 
the BCBS also started to resort to capital adequacy regulation towards the end of the 
1970s and at the start of the 1980s29.  The EEC Banking Coordination Directive of 197730 
provided, inter alia, for the establishment of capital ratios for “observational purposes”, 
and by 1985, nine of the European countries with representation on the BCBS had 
already adopted some form of risk weighting in the capital ratios they established 
(whether as mandatory requirements or as supervisory guidelines), with Italy being the 
only country which had no specified capital ratios by the time31.  Similarly Japan also 
established ratios for supervisory guidance in 198632. 
Following pressure which had been applied by the US and the UK, the BCBS agreed to 
Basel I in 1988, and with this having been adopted by all members by 199233.  Basel II 
was agreed to in 2004, as this sought to deal with the evolving nature of banks and the 
one-size-fits-all approach which had been adopted by Basel I34.  Basel II was however 
never fully implemented as the financial crisis of 2008 led the BCBS to focus on agreeing 
to Basel III in 201035.  Though Basel III established 2019 as the target-date by when it 
should be adopted, over the past months there have also been discussions about 
                                                     
28 ibid 36 – 39.  
29 ibid 40 – 41.  
30 First Council Directive 77/780/EEC the coordination of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions 
[1977] OJ L 322/30.  
31 Tarullo (n 21) 41. 
32 ibid 41. 
33 ibid 45 – 55. 
34 Wood (n 1) 624. 
35 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III:  A Global Regulatory Framework for More 
Resilient Banks and Banking Systems (December 2010 (rev June 2011)) (Basel III, 2010); and 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III:  The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity 
Risk Monitoring Tools (January 2013) (Basel III, 2013; and with: (a) Basel III, 2010; (b) those 
elements of Basel II which have not been superseded; and (c) further texts which have since been 
adopted in relation to Basel III; collectively referred to as “Basel III”). 
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possible amendments to Basel III, with these amendments also being, at times, referred 
to as Basel IV36.   
Most of the standards adopted throughout the Basel regime along the years followed the 
US’ model, though negotiations between different states have characterized the texts of 
the Basel Accords.  Notwithstanding these various negotiations, there has been no 
proper consideration or economic analysis carried out in order to determine whether 
the international standards which have been adopted have the same meaning and 
whether they can yield the same results in different jurisdictions, as this seems to have 
been an underlying assumption which all actors took for granted throughout the years.  
2.1.2 Transnational Law  
This thesis adopts Zumbansen’s approach to “transnational law”, which he considers to 
be a “methodological approach”, and through which one can study the transformation of 
legal institutions in societies which are in a continuous process of evolution, and which 
“must be seen in the context of a vibrant interdisciplinary discourse about the status and 
role of law in an increasingly inchoate, globe-spanning web of regulatory regimes, actors, 
norms and processes”37.  He argues that in light of globalisation, the context of “law” 
moves from the “state” (which has traditionally been considered as the main “source” of 
law) to the “society”, which transgresses the concept of nations and states, and includes 
what Zumbansen refers to as the “world society”38.  In setting out his “methodological 
approach”,  Zumbansen also notes how considering the different actors, norms and 
processes “might offer possible translation and interaction categories to bridge different 
governance experiences and practise in a transnational context”39, and with this allowing 
the consideration of patterns of legal ordering in transnational societies40.  He states that 
considering “actors” allows one to view the various trajectories and conflicts relating to 
the “state, society, community, and organization”41.  A focus on “norms” gives rise to the 
consideration of historical and comparative perspectives, and the various genealogies 
and contestations relating to laws, rules, orders, legal pluralism, custom and social 
norms42.  Furthermore, the study of “processes”, allows the study of “dynamics of 
                                                     
36 Refer to Section 7.3.2 for a discussion on “Basel IV”. 
37 Zumbansen (n 9) 3; Zumbansen 2012 (n 9) 308.   
38 Zumbansen (n 9) 3, 4, 8; Verdier 2009 (n 10) 114 – 115; Zumbansen 2012 (n 9) 309.    
39 Zumbansen 2016 (n 9) 41.   
40 Zumbansen 2013 (n 9). 




institutional evolution in the complex interplay of norms and actors”43.  Thus Zumbansen 
argues that focusing on “actors, norms and processes” allows one to understand better 
the nature of “law” and legal orders as a result of transnational law44. 
Teubner, however, argues that in light of transnational legal pluralism, contemporary 
global societies “must be viewed as comprised of multiple norm systems”, with the result 
being “global law without a state”, whereby the various actors in transnational law 
networks and the industry players found therein “challenge the supremacy of state-based 
legal systems for pre-eminence in the production of social norms”45.  The role of the state 
in transnational law and regulation is relevant in this discussion as this thesis will be 
considering the different actors involved in the iterative processes of law-making 
through which the Basel Accords have been promulgated and continue to evolve.  It will 
be argued throughout this thesis that the role of the state has changed from being the 
sole source of “law” (when considering “law” in traditional national contexts), to that of 
an actor within a wider recursive process in the promulgation of transnational law and 
regulation, and with different states acting primarily out of self-interest, with this 
resulting in inconsistencies in the ways in which the Basel Accords are implemented and 
enforced throughout different jurisdictions.    
2.1.3 Theories of Development of Transnational Law  
It has been argued by Slaughter that transnational laws have proliferated in recent years 
in light of the globalisation of markets.  According to the “globalization theory”, as 
markets become more globalised, the need for harmonisation between laws of different 
jurisdictions starts to be considered as the natural solution in order to seek to eliminate 
problems of regulatory arbitrage46.  One can argue that this has also been one of the 
                                                     
43 ibid.  
44 ibid 60; See also:  Peer C Zumbansen, The Incurable Constitutional Itch:  Transnational Private 
Regulatory Governance and the Woes of Legitimacy (Osgoode Hall Law School, Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No 18/2014, Vol 10 No 6, 2014) 28 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2413160> accessed 23 January 2017.    
45 Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown:  The Regulatory Function of Private 
International Law in an Era of Globalization (Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 40, 
2002) 217. 
46 Slaughter has however referred to there being a “globalisation paradox” in considering 
transnational laws as a reply to globalisation, in that though globalisation creates global problems 
and issues, she considers that it is neither feasible nor desirable to have “world government” 
particularly in light of the lack of democratization and threats to individual freedoms which this 
may lead to.  She therefore sees transnational regulatory networks (as distinguished from 
transnational laws which are formulated by international institutions, as will be discussed in 
further detail throughout this Chapter) as providing an ideal framework through which issues 
created by globalisation can be addressed in a speedy, flexible and inclusive manner.  
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reasons why the Basel Accords developed – as banks started providing their services 
across borders in a more globalized world, differences in regulation (and competitive 
advantages which banks established in certain jurisdictions had) became even more 
evident and pronounced. 
An alternative proposition which has been put forward is that transnational laws 
develop in order to ensure the rule of law.  The “rule of law theory” has been embraced 
by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), 
and suggests that economic development requires a legal system which safeguards both 
contractual as well as property rights across borders, both with regard to substantive 
law, as well as with regard to the judicial administration of those same laws47.  Thus, 
whilst the globalization theory considers that transnational law develops as a result of 
increased economic activity between different jurisdictions, the rule of law theory sets 
out the establishment of transnational frameworks as being essential for there to be 
economic cooperation amongst transnational actors. 
On the other hand, Cranston argues that transnational laws have developed as a result of 
market forces, whereby jurisdictions seek to implement and adopt transnational laws in 
order to be looked at more favourably by potential investors (and particularly since the 
implementation of transnational laws generally result in such jurisdictions becoming 
more pro-creditor)48.  This has become an even more important consideration in recent 
years as credit rating agencies and international institutions have given value to the 
adoption of transnational laws by states, with positive reviews going to states which 
would have positively implemented transnational law and transnational regulatory laws.  
This has been an essential factor in the adoption of the Basel Accords, which has resulted 
in these international standards not being adopted only by those jurisdictions which 
have been involved in the drafting of these international standards, but also by many 
other jurisdictions across the globe.  This thesis will however argue that as a result of 
varying underlying laws, the same international standards will not necessarily give rise 
to the same effects and results in different jurisdictions.    
                                                                                                                                                        
Transnational regulatory networks generally depend on the members of the said network, being 
domestic regulatory agencies, to “harden” the soft laws which such transnational regulatory 
network would have produced; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University 
Press, 2004) 8 – 10.  See also:  Verdier 2009 (n 10) 115, 119 – 120; Annelise Riles, Managing 
Regulatory Arbitrage:  A Conflict of Laws Approach (Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 47, 
2014) 69.   
47 Ross Cranston, Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law (Texas International Law Journal, 
Vol. 42, 2007) 598 – 599, 607 – 610.  
48 ibid 599, 610 – 613.    
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It has also been noted by Black and Rouch that the process of convergence of 
international financial governance, and hence the development of transnational laws, 
has been most intense following periods of systemic stress and financial crises, as 
jurisdictions which would have been negatively affected by the crisis feel the need to 
regulate in order to limit the risks which would have lead to the crisis in the first place 
and to bring confidence back to their markets49.  Thus, as can be seen from the recent 
global financial crisis, there has been a surge in transnational law and regulation 
particularly as a result of various institutions operating across borders, and with 
benefits being seen in different states cooperating together in order to limit the risks 
arising from such transnational firms and institutions50.   It is also clear that Basel III was 
promulgated as the BCBS’ response to the 2007 – 2008 global financial crisis. 
2.1.4 Different Strands of Transnational Law 
One can distinguish between three strands of transnational law:  lex mercatoria; 
transnational law arising under the auspices of international institutions; and 
transnational regulatory laws which are developed through transnational regulatory 
networks.  Whilst a review of the relevant literature shows that this has focused on 
“transnational law” generally, this thesis will argue the importance of distinguishing 
between “transnational law” and “transnational regulatory law”.  Transnational law 
which has developed as “lex mercatoria” is also mentioned for sake of completeness. 
Identifying the distinctions between different strands of transnational law is important 
as this will allow this thesis to frame the Basel Accords in their specific context.  As will 
be seen in Section 2.1.4.3, the nature of the Basel Accords is such that they can be 
considered to be regulatory laws which are promulgated through transnational 
networks.  Given that the Basel Accords “regulate”, the legitimacy which these 
international standards have will be very different to that of the lex mercatoria, or even 
transnational laws (adopted through international institutions).  It will be shown that 
each of these strands has different characteristics, both in the way in which they are 
promulgated and also in the way in which they are adopted by the relevant actors, 
enforced, and put into practice.   
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Transnational laws have taken various forms and consist of more formal methods, such 
as Treaties, international Conventions, and Model Laws, with these methods typically 
being established through international law systems and under the auspices of 
international institutions; as well as more informal methods which are adopted through 
soft-law arrangements, such as international standards, coordination groups, and even 
public-private sector partnerships, with these soft-laws being typically formulated 
through transnational regulatory networks51.  The success or otherwise of transnational 
laws has been varied, and the success of transnational law instruments has depended 
quite heavily on either states being under international peer pressure to adopt specific 
transnational laws into their own laws, or alternatively on the perceived positive 
receptability by potential users of such laws.  Nevertheless it has been noted by Verdier 
that “while it may be rational for states to act through informal networks and agreements 
in certain circumstances, this does not mean that the results constitute an optimal 
regulatory outcome from a collective standpoint”52. 
2.1.4.1 Lex Mercatoria 
Possibly the first type of “transnational law” which has been adopted throughout the 
years is the “lex mercatoria” which found prominence in the Middle Ages.  As traders 
visited different civilizations, they established their own laws through customary 
practices of trade, and with these laws becoming recognised in international trade and 
across borders53.  The lex mercatoria re-appeared and once again found its place in 
international trade law after the second world war, and was given further impetus after 
the “London Colloquium on the New Sources of the Law of International Trade” held at 
King’s College, London, in September 196254.   
An important feature of the lex mercatoria is that these laws are allowed to operate 
without the need of underlying national laws55.  Lex mercatoria is therefore considered 
to regulate the relationship of traders between each other, and therefore are, of their 
nature, a system of private law regulating contractual terms between similar entities.  
The main focal point of the lex mercatoria is that “the international community of 
merchants creates its own law through decentralized ‘autonomous’ law-making 
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processes”56.  Today this continues to operate in international trade, including through 
the formalization of international commercial practices, and with the possibility of 
disputes being resolved through international arbitration.    
2.1.4.2 Transnational Law Developed under the Auspices of International 
Institutions   
The proliferation of transnational laws has been driven particularly by international 
institutions such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”), the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(“UNIDROIT”), the World Bank, and others57, with the aim of replacing the various rules 
found in different legal systems, with one unified law which can also be made use of by 
different jurisdictions58.  Transnational laws seek to achieve uniformity through two 
different methods – either through the establishment of rules which private parties can 
refer to in their private contracts, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or 
alternatively through the establishment of Treaties and with states then subscribing or 
acceding to such Treaties and ensuring that the said transnational laws which would 
have been agreed to are adopted into their own national laws59.   
On subscribing or acceding to a Treaty, states may make specific declarations should 
they elect to depart from the agreed text60.  Though contracting states will be bound, 
internationally, by a Treaty, the Constitutional laws of that same state will then 
determine whether the Treaty takes the force of national law immediately, without there 
being the need of an implementing law (also referred to as “monism”), or whether 
national legislation would be needed in order for the provisions thereof to take effect 
(also referred to as “dualism”)61.   
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From an international law perspective it is assumed that an international treaty which 
will be subscribed to or acceded by a state will obtain primacy over other conflicting 
national laws, thus having the same Treaty being applied consistently throughout all the 
states which would be a party thereto62.  Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties states that, “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failures to perform a treaty”63.  This is enhanced by the fact that in 
many states, Treaties are considered as being amongst the “highest legal norms”, thus 
enhancing the primacy element of Treaties64.   
Treaties, “increasingly, are based on sui generis concepts derived from the instrument 
itself” and not from any particular national law65.  This helps to reduce variances in 
underlying national laws within which these Treaties must operate, as their 
interpretation need not rely on underlying concepts of national law66.  This is 
complemented by the principle of international law known as the “autonomous 
interpretation principle” which requires that terms of a Treaty are interpreted just 
within the context of that Treaty itself, without referring to national law concepts67.  This 
principle is generally reflected in Treaties themselves and is also supported by national 
legislation and case law68. 
The development of international institutions through which transnational laws are 
promulgated has however given rise to “regulatory gaps” on the international scene, 
with this being considered as the main inhibiting factor towards the development of 
transnational laws69.  Financial governance also has become heavily reliant upon what 
has been described as a “complex network of regional and global legal and political 
groupings”, which itself depends upon the interaction amongst international institutions 
and any transnational regulatory networks which may have been established70.  
Furthermore, as Quaglia emphasises, the development of transnational financial services 
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laws has been due to “the interaction between institutions and rulemaking processes 
across multiple arenas” and the “‘accommodation’ or ‘coexistence’ of their outputs”71.   
The presence of international institutions has helped the development of a form of 
transnational financial governance following the financial crisis, since, as Black argues, 
“markets tend not to wait for perfection, but to work with what they have”72.  This has 
meant that following the financial crisis, institutions such as the IMF and the BCBS (the 
nature of which is actually of a transnational regulatory network, as will be discussed in 
further detail below) have aimed to establish the relevant laws needed to deal with 
problems the global financial crisis exposed.  Following the financial crisis there also has 
been further organisation and interplay between these standard-setting bodies73.  
Furthermore, regional groupings such as the EU, have also taken initiatives in 
international or regional standard setting, and harmonisation of laws and mutual 
recognition of laws74.  On the other hand, however, notwithstanding the development of 
these international institutions, there also have been conflicting policy dynamics with 
the internationalisation of law being challenged by pressures for unilateralism by both 
individual states (such as through Brexit) and by regional groupings generally (such as 
the EU)75. 
2.1.4.3 Transnational Regulatory Laws and Transnational Regulatory Networks  
A review of the literature reveals an additional focus within transnational legal 
scholarship, that is described as “transnational regulatory law,” which considers the 
function and role of transnational regulatory networks.  The Basel Accords may be 
viewed as a primary example of a transnational regulatory law which has been 
promulgated by transnational regulatory networks, and which has developed as a result 
of having national regulators negotiate with each other in order to solve common 
problems, with this being hailed as allowing a “democratic shift from “hierarchies to 
networks””76. 
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Transnational regulatory networks such as the BCBS and the International Organization 
for Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) hold no legal personality or status, other than that 
conferred on the specific organisation by the host country where such organization is 
formed, and hence are not considered to be bodies which have a specific status under 
international law77.  Though the BCBS is attached to the Bank for International 
Settlements (“BIS’”), which is an international institution, it is not an official organ 
thereof, and is only composed of members from Central Banks and banking supervisory 
authorities from the states forming part of the said Committee78.  
Here, national regulatory agencies negotiate directly with regulatory agencies from 
other jurisdictions in order to solve common problems which traditional international 
institutions cannot address (particularly since adoption and implementation of any such 
standards will need to take place through these same regulatory agencies)79.  
Furthermore, regulatory networks such as the BCBS do not have any formal monitoring, 
review or enforcement mechanisms in place80.   
Thus, in transnational regulatory networks it is not states which come together to 
cooperate with each other, but different “national regulatory agencies”81.  Furthermore 
these national regulatory agencies are usually faced with similar problems, and they 
typically have much more in common with each other, rather than with other public 
sector officials in their home jurisdictions82.  As will be discussed below, as states 
become “actors” in the promulgation of transnational regulation, states themselves 
cannot be considered to have monist interests, but different players in a particular state 
may have varying interests depending on the role they play within the state.   
According to Slaughter, these regulatory networks “are not “inter-state” organizations; 
they are not formed by treaty or even executive agreement; they have no place on the 
landscape of the international legal system”83.  Thus these national regulatory agencies 
negotiate with their counterparts, who face similar issues, whilst sharing best practices 
and seeking common solutions to common problems, away from domestic political 
pressures which might otherwise hinder the actual promulgation of certain rules which 
might be controversial should they have been promulgated on a national plain (though 
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as argued by Verdier in reality these domestic regulatory agencies do not operate as 
freely as argued by other authors and still continue to be subject to domestic political 
pressures)84.   
Membership in transnational regulatory networks is typically selective, and decisions 
are usually taken through the attainment of consensus by the participating members85.  
They also typically operate through the adoption of international standards which take 
the form of “soft law”, and therefore do not establish Treaties, which would create legal 
obligations between states86.  Furthermore they usually neither provide for supervision 
and enforcement mechanisms, nor for conflict resolution procedures, which would 
typically be found in formal treaties and institutions87.  It has been stated that states 
therefore prefer liaising with each other through transnational regulatory networks, 
such as the BCBS, rather than through international institutions, for matters such as 
banking regulation88. 
One must also consider that similar to national regulatory agencies, as transnational 
regulatory networks are established, these networks need to justify their existence and 
promote their usefulness in order for them to survive.  Therefore bodies such as the 
BCBS have had to respond to international situations such as the global financial crisis in 
order to continue to justify their existence particularly in light of the failure of the 
international standards which they had established.  These bodies have their own 
political motivations of ensuring their relevance on the international plain, also in light 
of arguments against their legitimacy, which will be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 4.  Failing to act may therefore render these transnational regulatory bodies 
irrelevant, with the possibility also of being made “scapegoats” for events such as the 
global financial crisis. 
Transnational regulatory laws differ from the other types of transnational law discussed 
previously.  Transnational regulatory laws are “regulatory” in nature and they therefore 
typically impose limitations and restrictions on private parties, whilst being only “soft 
laws”.  Hence, issues such as “legitimacy” and “accountability” of transnational regulatory 
networks play a much bigger role here than in other types of transnational laws.  
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Transnational regulatory laws are also dependent upon national regulators to give effect 
to the regulations which would have been agreed to at a transnational level, by 
hardening the soft laws which would have been established by the transnational 
regulatory networks.  As will be discussed later on in this Chapter, the national 
regulators which are tasked with implementing and enforcing transnational regulatory 
laws also may be subject to regulatory capture (and have along the years also been 
criticized for lacking legitimacy and accountability)89.  
 “Soft laws” in transnational regulatory network theory have been considered to be an 
effective solution to issues which arise across borders90.  The advantages seen in having 
transnational regulatory networks operating through “soft law” are that as states need to 
“harden” these laws according to their own particular needs, fewer costs are incurred in 
promulgating these laws, as soft laws are considered to be more flexible than an 
imposition of one “hard” law made applicable to all states (since otherwise one hard law 
would have to cater for all permutations and combinations of national laws)91.  
Furthermore, soft-laws have been preferred in this context, as there is seen to be less 
loss of sovereignty by states given that these soft-laws require “hardening” by national 
regulatory agencies92.  “Soft laws” established by transnational regulatory laws may be 
“hardened” through judicial or legislative recognition at a national level, or they may also 
become directly applicable through laws promulgated by regional groupings such as the 
EU (which, by way of example, applied the Basel III provisions through the promulgation 
of the Capital Requirements Regulation (“CRR”), which is directly applicable in each of 
the member states of the EU)93. 
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States tend to prefer resorting to transnational regulatory networks and soft law, over 
formal laws which may take the form of Treaties governed by international law, where 
there is uncertainty and the need for flexibility in adopting global standards, such as is 
the case with the Basel Accords94.  Given that there is less of a formal commitment (when 
compared to transnational laws such as Treaties), states may be more willing to adopt 
principles through soft-law in order to have flexibility in adopting the said principles and 
without having to rely on formal ratification procedures for implementation95.  
Furthermore, reputational costs for not strictly complying with the particular standards 
are much lower than those emanating from instruments of international law96.    
Soft-laws do not give rise to binding legal obligations between states and are only 
created with the expectation that they “would be given some indirect legal effect through 
related binding obligations under either international or domestic law”97 (and with this 
also having been recognised by the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties98).  “Soft-
law” has been defined by what “it is not”, as it is considered to be “not legally binding”, 
“not in treaty form”, and does “not belong to the category of customary law”, and 
therefore at times certain legal scholars have even rejected the idea of referring to “soft 
law” as “law”99. 
Brummer observes that soft-law does not “express any special solemnity of commitment” 
in the same way as hard law does (through the Vienna Convention on the law of 
Treaties), and is considered to be “devoid of any legal obligation, imposes few defection 
costs and enables what can be described as “cheap” exit from commitments”100.  
                                                                                                                                                        
as regards the Leverage Ratio, the Net Stable Funding Ratio, Requirements for Own Funds and 
Eligible Liabilities, Counterparty Credit Risk, Market Risk, Exposures to Central Counterparties; 
Exposures to Collective Investment Undertakings, Large Exposures, Reporting and Disclosure 
Requirements and Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 – Presidency Compromise 
(Interinstitutional File 2016/0360 (COD), 6614/18, Brussels, 6 March 2018) 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6614-2018-INIT/en/pdf> accessed 4 May 
2018 (CRR II).    
94 Verdier 2009 (n 10) 167. 
95 ibid.  
96 ibid. 
97 Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation (Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 32, 2009) 889 
– 890.  
98 ibid 906. 
99 Sylvia I Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Antto Vihma, Comparing the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of 
Global Hard and Soft Law:  An Analytical Framework (Regulation & Governance, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 
2009) 402 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2009.01062.x/abstract> 
accessed 2 March 2016.  
100 Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn’t) (The Georgetown 
Law Journal, Vol 99, 2011) 271.   
42 
 
Nevertheless, he notes that international financial regulation developed through soft law 
is “often buttressed by a range of reputational, institutional, and market disciplines that 
render it more coercive than traditional theories of international law predict”101, such that 
soft law may be “‘harder’ than traditional public international law anticipates”102.  This 
thesis however argues that this is not the case with the Basel Accords which continue to 
be subject to substantial differences across jurisdictions in both its scope and effect. 
Furthermore, this thesis will argue that one of the main problems of international 
standards and international rules such as those set out by the Basel Accords is that there 
is a lack of uniformity of interpretation and application due to differences which arise in 
the legal frameworks of different jurisdictions (also referred to as “domestic 
embeddedness” or “cultural embeddedness” throughout this thesis).  These issues arise 
even when considering Treaties (and which consist of transnational law established by 
international institutions), but are much more limited there, given the application of the 
“primary principle” and the “autonomous interpretation principle”103.  When seeking to 
achieve uniformity through transnational regulatory laws through the use of soft law, 
domestic and cultural embeddedness become much more of a problem, given that the 
particular transnational regulatory law (such as the Basel Accords), needs to operate 
within different national law frameworks, and with different rules of interpretation 
being applied across different jurisdictions. 
Though it has been argued that the main advantage of using soft-law is that states may 
adopt varying texts according to their own circumstances and requirements, and as 
these circumstances and requirements change from time to time (without the need for 
formal amendments to be agreed to by other states), it is here argued that the use of 
soft-law in the Basel Accords is somewhat paradoxical.  Both Basel II and Basel III have 
each been drafted in a way which is not simply based on “principles” (as had been the 
case with Basel I), but they have both laid out very detailed provisions which national 
regulators are expected to follow without being subject to significant variations in the 
way they are adopted.  This means that whilst the drafting style adopted is such that 
there should be no room for interpretation in the way in which the Basel Accords are to 
be adopted, national regulators still retain discretion in practice, given that the Basel 
Accords are only adopted through soft-law.  Consequently, notwithstanding the very 
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detailed international standards which have been agreed to transnationally, national 
regulators are still free to depart from the Basel Accords (and with this thesis also 
arguing that states may also have incentives in departing from the provisions of the 
Basel Accords).  This has also given rise to the possibility of regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities to the industry as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.    
2.2  Transnational Regulatory Bodies and Decision-Making 
Structures  
This foregoing Section has considered three different categories of “transnational law”, 
and has identified the Basel Accords as a “transnational regulatory law” which is 
formulated through “transnational regulatory networks”.  This Section will analyse the 
main influences on transnational regulatory networks.  This will be done by considering 
the ways in which transnational networks operate and how entities in these networks 
liaise amongst themselves, and also the various influences which affect the decision-
making of these networks and their participants.  This thesis will argue that in order to 
reduce regulatory arbitrage opportunities there needs to be a further shift towards 
allowing regulatory competition to take place amongst different states, but with this 
subject to certain binding principles which would prevent there being a “race-to-the-
bottom”.  Finally, whilst this Section will consider a number of matters which influence 
the ways in which national regulatory agencies act, Part IV of this thesis will also argue 
that the Basel Accords cannot have the same effect in different jurisdictions due to 
differences in national laws and national preferences. 
2.2.1 Transnational Regulatory Bodies and Structures of Interaction 
Institutional structures and transnational regulatory bodies play a significant role in the 
development of transnational laws and regulations, and this can also be said in relation 
to the development of the Basel Accords.   
Black has identified four main structures through which regulatory bodies interact 
across jurisdictions, and which she refers to as “institutional structures for control” 
(which may apply to both “international institutions” as well as “transnational regulatory 
bodies”), with these institutional structures being organized through “hierarchy”, 
“community”, “markets/ competition”, and “managed networks”104.  She notes how 
international institutions, such as the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) are seeking to use 
each of “hierarchy”, “community” and “managed networks” in order to reach their goals, 
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whilst on the other hand, the EU (as an economic bloc) is using “hierarchy” (though 
Slaughter has been of the view that “the European Union has pioneered “regulation by 
networks””)105.  Black also explains that the financial crisis has shown the limits of the 
“markets/ competition” approach and that “there is little faith in the idea that 
coordination can be achieved through the “invisible hand” of the self interests of 
participants”106.   
As will be argued below, whilst the BCBS works through a system of managed networks, 
there have been elements of each of the different structures of interaction.   Each of these 
four structures will be described in further detail, together with the extent to which 
these structures have been relevant in the formulation of the Basel Accords throughout 
the years.  This thesis will argue that whilst each of these four different structures has 
played its part in the development of the Basel Accords, further importance needs to be 
given to markets/ competition in order to increase the legitimacy of the Basel Accords 
and allow national regulators to apply transnational standards within varying contexts 
at a national level. 
2.2.1.1 Hierarchy amongst Regulatory Bodies 
“Hierarchy” refers to an organisational structure through which different regulatory 
bodies are subordinate to each other, with promulgation and enforcement of rules 
taking place through top-down institutional and control structures107.  Following the 
financial crisis there has been a further shift towards hierarchical regulation, with 
international institutions and transnational regulatory networks seeking to obtain 
further power for themselves108.  Black however has been critical of this top-down 
approach particularly in light of the further rigidities which this system continues to 
introduce109. 
While an element of hierarchy is present in the BCBS in that it is this entity which 
establishes the relevant standards to be followed, the functions which it carries out are 
effected in the spirit of network management strategies and of regulatory cooperation.  
Whilst an element of hierarchy does exist in the promulgation of the Basel Accords, this 
is not as explicit as it would be in the context of other international institutions.  
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Nevertheless, as transnational regulatory networks become more formalised and take 
up greater roles and responsibilities, the hierarchical element tends to increase. 
2.2.1.2 Community and Regulatory Cooperation 
In “community” or “regulatory cooperation”, regulatory agencies from different 
jurisdictions converge with a view to cooperating amongst themselves, and harmonising 
their regulations, thereby resulting in different jurisdictions adopting roughly similar 
regulatory standards110.  In a system where regulatory systems are harmonised across 
different jurisdictions, states do not compete with each other, but they work together in 
order to achieve a common goal, therefore seeking to eliminate competitive advantages 
which states may have over each other111.  It has been argued that regulatory 
cooperation is essential when regulating international banking activities, particularly in 
light of the cross-border activities undertaken by international financial entities, which 
may generate transnational externalities112. 
Regulatory cooperation assumes that states will prefer the safety and soundness of the 
financial system over competition between states which may lead to a “race-to-the-
bottom”.  This would result in industry players having limited incentives to move from 
one jurisdiction from another, given that each jurisdiction would be adopting 
substantially the same standards and would be working together in order to enforce 
common standards113. 
Regulatory cooperation assumes that regulators acting in cooperation know what the 
optimum level of regulation for the market is114.  There is also a risk that a harmonised 
system of regulation results in higher regulatory demands by regulators given the lack of 
competition between different jurisdictions (though Pan argues that savings are also 
made by the industry and by the regulators in that they do not need to expend time and 
money to understand the different systems which would otherwise be in place)115.  
Regulatory cooperation typically has developed through the adoption of national laws 
which were “uploaded” to the international community, giving a first-mover advantage 
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to those jurisdictions with “strong” laws.116.  Quaglia has argued that since rules on 
capital adequacy were already present in the US prior to the adoption of Basel I, this 
allowed the US to “upload” their laws to the international community, whilst Basel III 
was influenced by both US and EU laws117.  This suggests that regulatory cooperation 
may also be influenced by national laws of participants in regulatory cooperation.   
States or their regulatory agencies here act together, either voluntarily (through 
common interests, co-operation, and capacity building) or alternatively through peer 
pressure being put on certain states, by other states or entities118.  Black however 
recognises that community systems based on peer pressure and peer support are less 
likely to be successful when participants have conflicting goals, objectives and interests, 
and have incentives to compete against each other119.   
It is argued throughout this thesis that given that states act out of self-interest, they may 
have adopted the Basel Accords throughout the years only as a result of peer pressure 
being exerted upon them by other states or by international bodies (and not out of a 
desire to enter into a regulatory cooperative framework), and with this also resulting in 
“cosmetic compliance” with the international standards.  By way of example, the US and 
the UK originally had pushed for the adoption of the Basel Accords by other jurisdictions, 
only due to the competitive disadvantage which they had when compared to Japanese 
banks120 (and after this the US did not fully adopt Basel II121).  On the other hand, Japan 
only adopted the Basel Accords out of peer pressure (as was also the case with a number 
of other emerging jurisdictions)122.  Furthermore, Continental jurisdictions have adopted 
capital adequacy regulations which are based on an Anglo-Saxon system of banking, and 
which are fundamentally different to those found in a Continental system123.  Moreover, 
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Basel III was only agreed to by the international community as something needed to be 
seen as having been done following the global financial crisis124. 
2.2.1.3 Managed Networks  
The development of transnational regulatory networks continues to play an important 
role in developing facilitative law allowing cross-border economic activity to operate 
within a defined structure which can be adopted across borders125.  The BCBS is 
probably one of the best examples as to how managed networks work.    
“Network management strategies” occur when parties seek to establish procedures 
which would facilitate concerted actions, by establishing processes which encourage 
negotiations towards consensus126.  Black describes this process as involving127:  
creating a governance mechanism for the network which establishes agendas 
rather than common goals; creates communications channels; makes ad hoc 
arrangements to support collective action; brokers solutions by bringing problems, 
solutions and parties together; promotes favourable conditions for joint action; or 
manages conflicts through mediation and arbitration. 
Attempts at harmonisation through transnational regulatory networks, such as in the 
BCBS, have also been viewed as being a product of a “transnational policy community of 
expert actors”, whereby national regulatory agencies from different jurisdictions (as 
against states), form into transnational regulatory networks and transnational 
regulatory agencies, in light of having a similar mindset and due to having been subject 
to similar issues and problems at a national level128.  Thus, regulatory agencies push 
forward and encourage transnational cooperation due to the similarities between them, 
rather than due to the similarities which may exist between the states they represent. 
Transnational regulatory networks also contain elements of liberal internationalism, 
particularly in light of these networks developing against a backdrop of neoliberal 
economic practice129.  Wai explains that liberal internationalism contains three distinct 
sets of policy objectives:  the economic objective of facilitating international commerce; 
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the political objective of increasing interstate cooperation; and the moral objective of 
avoiding parochialism and promoting non-discrimination130.  Adopting a policy of liberal 
internationalism results in jurisdictions gearing their policies towards long-term 
cooperative benefits, towards the general good of all states which adopt such measures, 
as against a policy of short-termism where states compete against each other with the 
potential of having a “race to the bottom”131.  On the other hand, however, one of the 
main criticisms of liberal internationalist policy is that this frequently adopts a “technical 
and necessitarian approach, which fails to recognize that societies have alternative 
strategies in adapting national laws to the challenges of global society”132.  This results in 
global reform which would typically be “simplistic” and which would have been entered 
into in light of global conditions at the time, or because of the perceived need to promote 
an international system133.   
As detailed in Section 2.1.4.3, the BCBS is primarily a transnational regulatory network 
which provides a framework through which national regulatory agencies meet to discuss 
the main issues they would be facing and possible solutions to their problems.  The BCBS 
thus allows for continuous dialogue amongst its members, with the establishment of a 
so-called “communication channel”, whereby the agenda of each member can be 
discussed with counterparts from different states.  However, the way in which 
agreement or “consensus” is reached, throughout negotiations on the Basel Accords, 
seems to have various elements of Habermas’ “non-rational” debate, which Black 
describes as follows134: 
... a discourse which is not differentiated by different illocutionary meanings of 
‘ought’ but which is characterized by conflict and lack of consensus, with no clear 
priority of value emerging.  In such situations, discourse takes the form of 
bargaining and compromise, of balancing of interests, where agreement is reached 
but is accepted by the parties for their own different reasons.  The outcome is not 
due to the force of the better argument but to the material or power differences 
between the parties, and achieved through threats and promises that rob the 
shared use of language of its illocutionary binding force. 
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This mainly arises as states continue to have their own individual interests at heart, 
which also include gaining competitive economic advantages over other states which 
form part of the same managed network. 
2.2.1.4 Markets and Regulatory Competition 
“Regulatory competition” suggests that markets are left to operate freely, with each state 
acting out of self-interest in setting up its regulations, and with financial entities and 
capital moving freely between these same states135.  Assuming rational choices are made 
financial entities will establish themselves or move to those states where there exists the 
optimum mix between sufficient regulatory protection and where the burden of 
regulatory compliance is reasonable but not excessive, thus leading to efficient markets 
and efficient regulation136.  This system encourages regulatory agencies to modify and 
tweak their regulations in accordance with feedback received from the market, in order 
to ensure that their system provides a competitive edge over that of other 
jurisdictions137.  Regulatory competition therefore requires regulators to innovate in 
order to ensure that appropriate and adequate regulation can regulate ever-changing 
markets without being too burdensome138. 
In order for regulatory competition to work perfectly, market participants need to have 
complete information as to the attributes of the laws and regulations of different 
jurisdictions, and have the necessary skills to evaluate such laws and regulations and 
their appropriateness for their particular needs139.  Regulators, on the other hand, would 
also need to have sufficient resources in order to engage in a competitive environment, 
both to keep abreast with developments carried out by regulated entities, as well as in 
order to understand the regulatory responses of other jurisdictions140.  The social costs 
of regulatory competition may be high, though the “winners” in a competitive 
environment would stand to gain as investment moves from one state to another.   
In the long run, regulatory competition would lead to the most efficient form of 
regulation, as private entities move towards jurisdictions which have more efficient 
regulation, as jurisdictions amend their laws in order to catch up with jurisdictions 
which would have a competitive edge over them, and as those jurisdictions which do not 
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provide a sufficient level of regulation face the wrath of the market (as in the financial 
crisis).   
It has been argued that the establishment of transnational regulatory standards by the 
Basel Accords inhibits regulatory competition, thus hindering efficient regulation141.  
Harmonization through international standards results in regulation being inflexible 
such that it cannot be responsive to market changes, rendering it inefficient142.  
However, though regulatory competition is not the main recognised method of 
interaction between states in the BCBS, it still takes place tacitly.  Pan has highlighted 
how “[t]o the extent national regulators operate independently of one another, they will 
always face competitive pressure and must be prepared to implement regulatory strategies 
that make their markets more attractive”143, and that even during times of crisis, 
“financial market participants are mobile and have choices”144.  If a state manages to be 
competitive, whilst also ensuring the safety and soundness of the financial system, then 
this will “have great benefits for a country, including, among other things, lower cost of 
capital for businesses, greater opportunities for investors, tax revenue for government, and 
job creation in the financial and related industries”145.  Regulation has a role to play in 
making a jurisdiction more competitive and states must consider “how to attract 
financial activity”146, particularly since they stand to benefit if they manage to provide a 
competitive environment when compared to competing jurisdictions147. 
When considering transnational regulation such as the Basel Accords, jurisdictions tend 
to compete with one another by implementing variants of transnational regulation, 
resulting in partial or only superficial adoption of transnational regulation.  This will 
allow it to have the benefit of both worlds, since it will be able to proclaim that it would 
have implemented the relevant international standards, whilst at the same time 
providing ways and means through which the provisions of those same international 
standards could be watered down in order to provide competitive advantages over other 
states.  Avgouleas has explained that the endorsement or otherwise of a particular 
regulatory standard by regulators will vary, since whilst some regulators may view the 
need to implement certain stringent regulatory standards in order to show their 
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commitment to a sound regulatory system, other regulatory agencies may be more 
prone towards implementing lower regulatory standards in order to seek to obtain a 
competitive edge against their competitors148.  
Tietje and Lehmann argue, however, that though harmonisation should be further 
pursued, “regulatory competition based on a sound international framework of 
cooperation and coordination is central for successful financial regulation and 
supervision”149.  They argue that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all which will apply to all 
states and which will be perfectly adopted by all states, particularly in light of the 
“domestic embeddedness” of financial products and markets150.  These authors argue that 
there always needs to be an equilibrium between strengthening regulation and 
supervision on the one hand, and the essential freedom of financial markets on the 
other151.  Similarly, this thesis argues that since states still seek to act out of self-interest, 
and still tacitly adopt a competitive approach, it would be desirable for regulatory 
competition to be embraced by states and for the regulatory framework to recognise 
this, particularly since a regulatory competitive framework would give rise to flexible 
regimes and efficient regulation.   
The main criticism towards having a regulatory competitive environment is that it is 
claimed that this may lead to a “race to the bottom”152.  This may also be due to the fact 
that given the ease of movement of industry players from one jurisdiction to another, 
this can generate pressure on individual jurisdictions to lower domestic regulatory 
standards, as industry players threaten to move to other jurisdictions if their requests 
are not taken on board, knowing that this may negatively impact investment and 
employment in that particular jurisdiction153.  Furthermore, states are disincentivised 
from introducing stricter laws and regulations since this may similarly lead to outflows 
of business to other jurisdictions154.  Thus, as states tweak their laws in order to keep or 
obtain a competitive edge over competing states, this may turn into a vicious cycle 
where states act in response to each other’s acts leading them to ignore the main focus of 
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regulation, which should be that of ensuring the safety and soundness of the financial 
system155.   
On the other hand, however, Pan argues that the risk of regulatory agencies discarding 
their responsibilities in order to provide for a competitive environment (and hence 
leading to a “race to the bottom”) is exaggerated156.  He argues that this is also due to the 
fact that financial entities do not exist alone in the financial industry, and both 
consumers of financial services as well as investors seek regulation in order to give them 
confidence in the instruments they will be consuming and investing in respectively157.   
2.2.2  Influences on Transnational Regulatory Bodies   
Notwithstanding the above decision-making structures, there also are other factors 
which play an important role in both the promulgation of transnational laws and 
transnational regulatory laws as well as the settling of such laws, which influences may 
affect each of the decision-making structures considered in Section 2.2.1.  The three 
influences considered here are those of hegemony; regulatory capture; and domestic or 
cultural embeddedness.  
2.2.2.1 Hegemony  
A review of the relevant literature shows that hegemony is considered as being one of 
the main pre-conditions for international harmonisation of laws and international 
cooperation to take place, with regulatory cooperation and consequent harmonisation 
only taking place where this would be favourable to hegemonic jurisdictions158.  Verdier 
noted that in transnational regulatory networks, national regulators typically adopt 
stances which reflect or further their own national interests, notwithstanding that 
transnational networks should be used to establish solutions to common problems 
across borders159.  Though hegemonic influences may be present whether the structures 
of interaction adopted are hierarchical, cooperative, competitive or whether regulatory 
networks are used, the main effect of hegemonic influences can be seen in cooperative 
environments and when managed networks are used.  When states resort to regulatory 
competition each state acts independently from another, whilst competing on regulation 
by responding to regulation introduced by other states.    
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When hegemonic influences are present (particularly in transnational regulatory 
networks), rules are primarily proposed by hegemonic jurisdictions in light of their 
domestic preferences or aims notwithstanding that these might be framed as being 
beneficial for the whole transnational network160.  It has therefore been suggested that 
cooperation in transnational regulatory networks often leads to conflicts between states, 
as new standards are bound to have distributive consequences, and it has therefore been 
recognised that conflicts would generally tend to be resolved in favour of developed 
countries which would typically be members of such networks161.  Quaglia has 
recognised that as transnational regulatory agencies form in order to work towards 
harmonisation, international rules or standards will lead to winners and losers, with the 
former having competitive advantages162. 
When considering the Basel Accords, one should note that the US and the UK were both 
eager to introduce capital requirements as from the 1980s, particularly in light of their 
concern about competitive equity in light of the expansion of Japanese banks, with 
hegemonic influences therefore clearly being present in the development of the Basel 
Accords163.  On the other hand, it has also been argued that whilst Basel I was 
particularly influenced by the US and the UK, Basel III was more balanced between the 
interests of the US as against those of Continental Europe, possibly also in light of the 
increased unification of laws between members of the EU (particularly following the 
financial crisis)164.  Nevertheless the Basel Accords have also been considered to have 
been introduced through what is at times referred to as “regulatory imperialism”, given 
that they were agreed to by developed countries, and with these international standards 
then also affecting other jurisdictions which would not have been involved in the 
promulgation of these standards165.   
2.2.2.2 Regulatory Capture   
Another element which impacts the actions of states and their national regulators is that 
of regulatory capture, with this being present irrespective of the structures of 
interaction adopted. Regulatory capture occurs when private entities push for and lobby 
in favour of harmonisation in order to pursue their own self-interests166.  Regulatory 
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capture (at times also referred to as “agency capture”) has been defined as “favorable 
treatment of the regulated by the regulator”167.    
Lobbying by private entities may encourage regulators to act according to the interests 
of these private parties, and with these private interests also possibly encouraging 
harmonisation of laws in light of cross-border operations which they may have.  
Regulatory capture also suggests that in light of ongoing dealings between private 
entities and regulators, the latter may seek to promote solutions to the problems faced 
by the industry as regulators and private parties understand each other better.  This has 
however been criticised by authors who have been of the view that the sources of both 
“power” and “preferences” on the global stage are held by domestic regulatory 
institutions rather than with the industry and that regulatory capture can therefore only 
have limited application in transnational laws and transnational regulatory laws168.  
Nevertheless Quaglia has shown that private interests and lobbying have also played a 
part in both the formulation of Basel I as well as in Basel III, with banks seeking to 
influence laws in order to rectify competitive disadvantages they might have had169.  
Furthermore, Tsingou has explained that Basel II “can be interpreted as the perfect 
example of regulatory and supervisory capture”170. 
Regulatory capture has at times been criticised in light of seemingly paving the way for 
deregulation or less strict interpretation of certain regulatory requirements, as 
happened in the US prior to the financial crisis, particularly when top posts of regulatory 
agencies were given to people coming from the industry (though such persons are many 
times lauded for their ability to understand the industry and how this works)171.  On the 
other hand, regulatory capture may also have positive influences in enhancing an 
agency’s legitimacy, particularly when regulators develop a feeling of “affinity” with the 
regulated in light of finding themselves in common circumstances with the regulated, 
possibly sharing a common background and a similar outlook172.     
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2.2.2.3 Domestic Preferences, Domestic Embeddedness and Cultural Embeddedness 
Transnational regulatory laws are agreed to at an international or transnational level 
and need to be implemented into national laws by national regulatory agencies in order 
to be given effect.  It is therefore argued that the preferences of national regulatory 
agencies, as well as the particular legal framework within which they operate (and 
within which the transnational regulatory laws will need to be implemented) will 
influence the results which transnational regulatory laws will have in different 
jurisdictions.  Domestic preferences are also bound to affect the ways in which 
international standards are implemented, interpreted and enforced notwithstanding the 
different structures of interaction adopted at a transnational level.   
Thus, Riles has argued that though the intention of transnational regulatory bodies and 
members thereof is to displace national laws by global financial laws, this is far from 
what happens in reality173.  She notes that as states commit to revise their national laws 
and regulations in order to comply with international standards, a number of issues 
remain unresolved and subject to implementation by national regulators using their own 
discretion174.  Furthermore, she also argues that laws and regulations promulgated at a 
national level often ignore the way in which these are to fit in with transnational 
regulatory laws which may have been promulgated by international institutions or by 
transnational regulatory networks175.     
Therefore, an important consideration for transnational regulatory laws to be properly 
adopted and enforced across jurisdictions, is that transnational regulatory laws need to 
be in synchronization with the agendas of the different national regulators which would 
be tasked with adopting, implementing and enforcing such regulatory laws.  This has 
also been noted by Hyoung-Kyu who argues that “cosmetic compliance” or “compliance 
failure” is more likely to take place when a particular international regulatory standard 
is low on a national regulator’s agenda, whilst full compliance is more likely to be high 
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when the national regulator’s agenda resonates with that of the international regulatory 
standard176.    
The problem of “cosmetic compliance” or “compliance failure” can also be assimilated 
with concepts applied by Black when discussing “New Institutionalism” and the limited 
extent to which law affects decision-making in scenarios where laws are given effect to 
through regulation which would have been introduced by regulators at a national 
level177.  In Black’s view the influence of “law” in such circumstances is limited, as the 
specific preference of regulators becomes very important given that they determine how 
to apply specific laws according to their preferences.  The concepts put forward by Black 
become very relevant also when considering transnational regulatory laws, as 
transnational regulatory laws are only soft-law in nature, and national regulators are 
tasked with implementing and enforcing transnational regulatory laws.  Therefore, in 
the same way as with regulation (within a nation state), regulators will also adopt 
transnational regulatory laws according to their own preferences and requirements, and 
according to the standards they consider appropriate.      
In order to seek to eliminate preferences of national regulators, the Basel Accords, have, 
since the adoption of Basel II and Basel III, become very detailed and prescriptive as they 
seek to ensure the streamlining of rules178.  The presumption adopted by the drafters of 
the Basel Accords thus seems to have been that detailed rules are essential in order for 
there to be a uniform playing-field and for uniform adoption across jurisdictions.  
Nevertheless, this has resulted in states being involved in heavy negotiations leading up 
to both Basel II and Basel III, as the states involved in the drafting of these standards 
sought to adopt their national preferences in the texts which were agreed to179.  
Needless to say, however, both individual states as well as the industry have still 
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managed to find ways through which the prescriptive requirements arising from the 
Basel Accords can be avoided, such as through the adoption of alternative financing 
mechanisms (as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3), and by only having 
cosmetic compliance with the Basel Accords.   
Furthermore, as new requirements have been added to the Basel Accords in order to 
cater for the specificities of certain states, regulators of other states which may not have 
had the same concerns, or which may have even been of a different view to the states 
promoting certain amendments, may not have the necessary incentives to promote the 
implementation of the agreed texts.  Black has highlighted that180:  
[t]here can be as many detailed rules as lawyers want to write, but if those 
responsible for enforcing them do not understand the activity that they are 
regulating, nor the rules that are in place, then it does not matter what form the 
rules take, they will be un-enforced.   
Thus, despite the very detailed rules established in the Basel Accords, national 
regulators were given the task of implementing these “soft” rules, and providing national 
regulatory oversight over the industry, notwithstanding that certain aspects of these 
transnational regulatory laws may not be in their national regulatory interest.    
When considering transnational regulatory laws, and particularly the Basel Accords, it is 
important to keep in mind the main backdrop of political intervention which influenced 
the negotiations on the text of the Basel Accords181, and with these influences also being 
present on implementing and enforcing these international standards.  Verdier has 
argued that transnational regulatory networks are “[f]ar from being removed from 
domestic politics, regulators are tied to them by multiple channels of accountability and 
incentives structures that generally outweigh their loyalty to global interests”182.  He 
therefore contends that this does not imply that transnational regulatory networks 
cannot pursue collective aims, but, rather one should recognise that these transnational 
regulatory networks are also subject to clashes of state interests which may hinder 
international cooperation183.  Hyoung-Kyu similarly states that even when states are 
willing to comply with international standards such as the Basel Accords, “actual 
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compliance outcomes, are affected by other domestic factors as well, and involuntary 
compliance failure can as a result sometimes arise”184. 
Furthermore, and notwithstanding the adoption of transnational laws (and hence also 
transnational regulatory laws such as the Basel Accords), the proper functioning of a law 
will need to be seen also in conjunction with a number of social factors which will 
influence the implementation of any such law (also referred to as “domestic 
embeddedness”)185.  Cranston observes that insofar as reforms do not take into account 
the proper context, “the workings of the law will not be properly understood, and efforts at 
reform will be misguided”186.  Problems may not necessarily lie in established law or 
procedures, but, rather, these may arise in the way a law is enforced or how this 
operates in practice187.  Similarly, Ferran has also argued that national preferences still 
remain even within the EU, notwithstanding the continuous harmonisation process of 
laws, such that this continues to affect further harmonisation of financial regulation188.  
The success of transnational laws and transnational regulatory laws will therefore 
depend on the resonance which such laws find with the legal principles operating at 
national levels189. 
The differences between different states, and how realistically possible it is to transplant 
law into different states has been the subject of diverging views, with authors such as 
Kahn-Freund arguing that though possible, it is very difficult for law to be transplanted, 
and with other authors, such as Watson arguing that legal transplantation can readily be 
made190.  Cranston, therefore argues that ultimately, as commercial activity is bound to 
go on, transnational laws can be implemented by different states, though the issue 
remains as to whether this becomes a “living law” or otherwise191.  He states that 
transnational laws are bound to change through their use, once these transnational laws 
are interpreted and applied at a national level, in conjunction with other laws aside 
which they would have to operate192. 
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Domestic embeddedness193 invariably limits the possibility of there being complete 
harmonization of transnational laws or transnational regulatory laws.  Even in the 
context of transnational laws such as Treaties, where the principle of primacy of such 
Treaties, as well as the autonomous interpretation principle play a fundamental role, 
differences as a result of domestic embeddedness arise.  Domestic preferences have also 
been discussed by Havel and Mulligan who have similarly argued that Treaties are still 
subject to varying interpretations at national level, particularly where Treaties, such as 
the CTC, reach “many discrete areas of what has heretofore been the preserve of local rules 
within national legal systems, such as registration, priority rules, bankruptcy and 
enforcement remedies”194.  They therefore argue that the “empirical reality is that the 
integration process is never seamless” and that “[v]essels of legal uniformity like the CTC 
instead crash against the shores of national legal systems, emerging less than perfectly 
intact”195.  Treaties may thus still be subject to “progressive ‘renationalization’” 
particularly since the behaviour of domestic actors becomes responsible for the 
interpretation and enforcement of the said Treaties196.    
Wool and Jonovic have identified four main circumstances under which Treaties may not 
obtain primacy over national law, from a practical perspective, essentially being:  due to 
insufficient implementation action; due to the operation of adverse hierarchical rules 
(such as lex posteriori or lex specialis); when issues of public law arise; as well as when 
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there might exist conflicts between Treaties and Constitutional laws197.  They however 
also argue that assuming primacy of Treaties is a simplistic assessment, particularly as 
Treaties become more complex instruments and move into areas of law such as those of 
property rights, insolvency and dispute resolution198.  Therefore, as these issues arise in 
the more formal structure of Treaties, they are bound to be even more marked and cause 
further issues in transnational regulatory laws which are only bound together by “soft 
laws”. 
Apart from domestic preferences giving rise to undesirable influences affecting the 
different structures of interaction seen above, constraints in the implementation of 
transnational regulatory laws also arise due to intrinsic differences in national laws 
which may hinder the achievement of similar results even in the event that the same 
transnational regulatory laws were to be applied in the same way across borders.  Two 
main restrictions on the Basel Accords achieving the same results in different 
jurisdictions (which will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7), are the varying laws on 
security interests and the laws on insolvency which different jurisdictions adopt.  
Though much has been written about the need of transnational laws to operate within 
contexts of national rules, it probably still comes as no surprise that the proponents of 
the Basel regime have just sought to omit any reference to the insolvency laws of 
underlying jurisdictions, and the impacts that these may have on industry participants.  
This may be due to the fact that harmonisation of insolvency laws have at most only 
relied on conflict of law measures (such as EC Regulation 1346/2000 (the “Insolvency 
Regulation”) and Regulation 2015/848 on Insolvency Proceedings (the “Recast 
Insolvency Regulation”))199, with harmonisation of insolvency laws between 
jurisdictions only being considered as something which “can only every be a very long-
term project”, and which would require “detailed legal reform at a domestic level” given 
that differences between different states reflect “deep-seated cultural divergences”200. 
2.3  The Theory of Recursivity 
The main focus of the above sections of this Chapter has been the way in which 
transnational laws and transnational regulatory laws come into being, the ways in which 
entities forming part of transnational institutions and transnational regulatory networks 
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interact, and the different influences which may exist on transnational regulatory 
networks.  Transnational legal orders are however also subject to iterative cycles of 
change, of settling and unsettling, and of alignment and misalignment, up till the point 
when there is settling and concordance in and amongst each of the transnational, 
national and local spheres201. 
When considering transnational regulatory laws, such as the Basel Accords, one must 
also consider the settling process and the ways through which these transnational 
instruments are adopted in different jurisdictions.  This process will necessarily be 
affected by the “influences” referred to above (i.e. hegemony, regulatory capture, and 
domestic embeddedness).   The settling process may however vary from one jurisdiction 
to another and may also vary according to the particular transnational instrument which 
would be in the process of being adopted.   
Halliday and Shaffer have considered the recursive process through which “legal norms 
are developed, conveyed and settled transnationally, integrating both bottom-up and top-
down analyses”202.  Halliday and Carruthers have shown how globalization has led to the 
following cycles203: recursive cycles of lawmaking at the national level; iterative cycles of 
norm making at the global level; and cycles at the intersection of the processes which 
take place at the national and at the global level, where the national experiences 
influence global norm making, and where global norms influence or constrain national 
lawmaking.  Having considered the development of the Basel Accords throughout the 
years in Section 2.1.1, this thesis adopts the recursivity theory in order to analyse the 
settling (or otherwise) of the Basel Accords within different states.   
Halliday and Carruthers have identified “four mechanisms that drive recursive processes 
and that shape patterns of settlement of transnational legal norms in national and local 
settings”204.   They argue that these mechanisms “drive forward these cycles of reform 
until the inherent tensions within them are resolved and normmaking settles”205.  These 
four mechanisms are “the indeterminacy of law, contradictions, diagnostic struggles, and 
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actor mismatch”206.  They consider that the recursive process starts off through 
“diagnostic struggles”, whereby actors facing a particular problem seek other actors in 
order to work together towards a common solution207.  They note how these actors may 
be in competition with or have differing views from other actors who may contest their 
diagnosis or who may diagnose the problem in competing ways208.  Those actors who 
diagnose the problem differently from the prevailing view, will probably be excluded 
from the formulation of the particular transnational law, but will probably resist its 
implementation at later stages209. 
These authors continue by noting that there will also be “actor mismatch”, as certain 
actors who “wield power in the national and local implementation of transnational legal 
norms” do not necessarily manage to wield the same power at a global level210.  Halliday 
and Shaffer therefore note how211:  
if domestic actors integral to the implementation of a transnational legal norm are 
not represented in domestic lawmaking, they will be less invested in the law’s 
implementation and may effectively veto it in practice, potentially triggering a new 
cycle of legal normmaking to resolve the differences. 
The third mechanism referred to by Halliday and Carruthers which drives recursive 
cycles, is that of “contradictions”, whereby legal norms which may have been negotiated 
at the transnational level may contain “unresolved ideological clashes”, which might also 
give rise to “institutional contradictions”, as the solution adopted at a transnational level 
might result from conflicting ideologies which might have been poorly resolved at the 
transnational level, with parties therefore possibly agreeing to only partial or temporary 
solutions212.  This lack of clarification leads to the possibility of different interpretations 
being adopted, leading to inconsistencies and ambiguities, such that different actors may 
adopt varying approaches on the implementation and enforcement of the particular law, 
and with these contradictions still needing to be clarified through further recursive 
cycles213. 
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Lastly, the norms created at the transnational level might be “indeterminate”, as a result 
of the linguistic limits, the costs which might be involved in seeking to create detailed 
laws which cater for all scenarios, or possibly “because actors decide to gloss over 
differences with vague language to conclude an agreement”214.  These internal 
contradictions therefore lead to differences in implementation across jurisdictions, 
“undermining the aims of a TLO’s promoters”215.  This indeterminacy is bound to lead to 
recursive cycles as those actors who would not have been part of the drafting process 
(or who would not have been successful in promoting their views) try to adopt 
interpretations which suit them, whilst the promoters of the same text seek to amend 
national laws in order to seek to reach their original aims216.   
Halliday and Shaffer note how as a result of transnational recursivity theory one can see 
how “black letter law seldom is implemented as its designers intended, and frequently it is 
resisted, subverted, or neutralized in practice.  It helps explain not only the existence of the 
gaps but also how they expand or close over time”217.  Recursivity theory thus stipulates 
that legal change occurs through “repeated iterations” which take place transnationally, 
nationally and locally218.  Halliday and Carruthers note how cycles are particularly 
driven by ambiguity and by actors who would have been excluded from the governing 
statutory law within which change occurs – as these factors create resistance to the 
established global norms, recursive cycles take place until contradictions are resolved, 
consensus is reached, settling occurs, or an underlying cause fades away219.  
Furthermore recursive cycles may also be triggered by economic, political and social 
contradictions which may produce disturbances or triggering events220.  Recursivity 
therefore “is located at the nexus of endogenous and exogenous exchanges between nation-
states and international organizations”, with the recursive episodes being “a significant 
site for the mediation of exchanges between the global and the national”221. 
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2.3.1 Identifying the Actors in the Basel Accords’ Recursive Process 
When considering transnational regulatory laws such as the Basel Accords, particular 
importance needs to be given to the “actors” which are establishing the transnational 
regulatory law, and which need to help in its settling process.  Though actors include 
states, international professional associations, epistemic communities, transnational 
advocacy networks, social movements, transnational economic interest groups, non-
governmental organizations, and possibly also religious groups222, the three main actors 
which are involved in the Basel Accords’ recursive process, are the national regulators 
which come together to form an “international community”, individual nation states 
(acting alone), and the industry.  It will be argued that a transnational regulatory law 
such as the Basel Accords will only be successful, effective and considered to be 
legitimate, if each of these three actors would have bought-in to what the particular 
transnational regulatory law would be trying to achieve.  Verdier has noted how these 
three actors (referred to by Verdier as “regulators, banks, and politicians”) have been in a 
“protracted war” on the implementation of the Basel Accords (with Verdier’s main focus 
being on Basel II)223. 
Of particular interest, however, is the role of nation states.  When considering “law” 
generally, and before the importance which is now being given to transnational law and 
transnational regulation, the state had been considered as the sole source of law.  On the 
other hand, however, on considering transnational law and transnational regulatory law, 
the role of the state changes from being the sole source of law, to being one of the main 
actors,  and with states also acting out of self-interest224.  Raustiala has therefore argued 
that one needs to go beyond the considerations provided by Goldsmith and Posner 
(through their rational choice theory) as one needs to drop the “state-as-unitary-actor 
assumption” in favour of “a more realistic and complex understanding of the state and its 
component parts”225. 
Whilst “[n]ation-states remain central”226 to transnational legal orders, “they do not 
define the territorial boundaries of legal ordering”227, and therefore states find 
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themselves needing to consider also the interests of the international community, the 
industry, and of other states which also consider their self-interest in the formulation of 
a particular transnational legal order.  Nation states, however remain “central to 
lawmaking, law recognition, and law enforcement”228, notwithstanding its “fragmentation 
and disaggregation…in its constituent branches and agencies”229.  Halliday has also noted 
that “[s]tates are primary actors in global normmaking” when considering the recursivity 
process230.  Thus, Halliday and Shaffer both consider that there is a “remarkable 
decentring of the state and its reconsideration as a crucial legal-political actor in a 
regulatory space marked by an interaction in between different levels of norm-making”231. 
Furthermore, the interests within a state cannot automatically be considered to be 
monist, but there may be various conflicting interests within a state itself.  Lyngen 
explains that different public officials might have varying goals notwithstanding that 
they emanate from the same state, with the following being some of the goals which 
different public officials might have:  promotion of investor confidence, financial 
stability, international competitiveness of the particular state’s financial sector, and 
pleasing of the different constituents (which might also include financial sector and 
consumer interest groups)232. 
When considering “states” and the various interests which arise therefrom, this thesis 
considers the interests of “states” as consisting of the prevailing view which results in 
the state of affairs of the state at a particular moment in time.  It is therefore here 
assumed that if a jurisdiction would only have adopted the Basel Accords “cosmetically”, 
or “partially”, then the prevailing interests in that current state would have led to such 
limited adoption.  In accordance with the recursivity model, this prevailing view would 
have only come as a result of various iterative cycles within the nation state itself, and 
may also be subject to change from time to time233.  As will be discussed in further detail 
in the next Section, each actor acts out of self-interest, leading to the Basel Accords to 
continue to be in a continuous recursive process, without there yet being proper 
“settling”.  
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2.3.2 Actors Acting out of Self-Interest 
Lyngen argued that regulatory coordination through transnational regulatory networks, 
as in the case of the Basel Accords will have a “distributive effect, with some states gaining 
at the expense of others”234.  She notes that as a result of the differences in the financial 
sectors of different jurisdictions, implementation of the Basel Accords in different states 
will give rise to “distinct costs of implementation for each state and implications for the 
international competitiveness and profitability of that state’s regulated sector”235.  Thus, 
whilst certain states stand to benefit from a global regulatory standard, others will face 
“a disproportionate amount of the costs”, and states which may have had a competitive 
advantage over other states may stand to lose such competitive advantage236.   
As a result, Lyngen argues that the regulatory discretion afforded in the Basel Accords, 
though required in light of differences in the domestic regulated sectors, and also 
required in order to encourage adoption of the Basel Accords, “creates opportunities for 
regulators to establish rules that favor their state’s institutions”237.  This distributive effect 
has also been highlighted by Brummer when considering the elements of soft law in 
international financial regulation238.  Brummer thus notes how “[o]ne rule may have, in 
short, significant positive effects in one country, whereas in another, the implications may 
be far from beneficial”, whilst going on to list “capital adequacy” as the “possible canonical 
example” of this239.  He also argues that coordination in transnational law and regulation 
is only likely to arise where members have high incentives to cooperate and where 
adjustment costs are small240. 
Zumbansen has also noted how one can clearly see parallels between the “interests” at 
stake (in both national and international contexts), and the loss of coherence, unity and 
universality of the Rule of Law within a globalized framework241.  He therefore argues 
that when considering transnational law as a methodological approach one should “start 
asking (again) the hard question as to who does what how and in whose interests”242. 
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Throughout this thesis it is argued that each of the different actors, as identified above, 
act out of self-interest, and it is therefore essential in order for there to be concordance 
in the way in which the Basel Accords are adopted, implemented, and enforced for the 
interests of each of the actors to be taken into consideration, therefore also resulting in 
the transnational regulatory network also being considered as “legitimate” in the eyes of 
each of these actors.  This is also in accordance with the analysis made by Block-Lieb and 
Halliday who argue that concordance within a transnational legal order takes place more 
quickly when “it sequences from the “bottom up” or with the “bottom” fully engaged in 
reform efforts occurring at the “top” transnational or international circles”243.  Shaffer has 
also noted how self-interest can lead to the acceptance or rejection of transnational legal 
norms, and that as a result of self-interest transnational legal norms may be used or 
changed for purposes that were not contemplated by the promoters of those 
transnational norms244.   
Part III of this thesis argues that one of the major flaws of the Basel Accords has been the 
lack of economic analysis by its drafters.  This is due to the assumption which seems to 
have been adopted by the “international community” that transnational regulatory 
standards can be applied uniformly across borders, notwithstanding the distributive 
effects which such transnational regulatory standards may have on states, and 
notwithstanding the costs which may be incurred by the industry as a result of such 
transnational regulatory standards. 
This thesis also endorses Brummer’s view (with this being discussed in further detail in 
Part III) that as financing entities act out of self-interest, they increasingly move from 
one jurisdiction to another in order to arbitrage strict regulations across different 
jurisdictions.  Brummer also notes how regulators compete with one another to attract 
capital, with this possibly even leading to dismantling of efficient regulations in hope of 
attracting firms245.  He thus criticizes the use of soft law for international financial 
regulation, as he says that “[a]ssuming countries follow policies that promote the interests 
of their domestic firms, soft law should provide little utility as a means of making credible 
commitments”246.  He continues by stating that when “collaboration results in a win for 
some parties and a loss for others, international legal theory predicts that parties will 
                                                     
243 Block-Lieb and Halliday (n 12) 101.  
244 Shaffer (n 201) 256. 
245 Brummer (n 100) 267 – 268. 
246 ibid 271.  
68 
 
defect from their commitments because they are informal”247.  It is therefore here argued 
that a soft-law approach cannot work in a situation where the different actors act out of 
self-interest and where the interests of these actors vary (such as in the case of 
regulations which are just perceived as imposing costs on the industry). 
Given the regulatory nature of the Basel Accords, one also can compare the development 
of the Basel Accords as a transnational regulatory law, with the development of 
transnational tax law, given that both impose costs on the industry and without there 
being any direct benefits which accrue to the industry as a result of such costs and 
constraints.  Genschel and Rixen have noted how double tax relief gave rise to tax 
competition amongst jurisdictions, allowing the industry to arbitrage the system, and 
leading to national governments seeking to be competitive through low-tax strategies248.  
Though the self-interest element of different actors is possibly much more evident when 
analyzing international tax systems, this thesis argues that self-interest becomes an 
essential consideration where the particular transnational law or transnational 
regulation only imposes “costs” upon one of the actors249. 
As a result of the recursive process, when states resist or reject the insertion of global 
norms in their domestic regimes, they compel the global normmakers to alter the 
transnational norms (unless the global norms agreed to are to be retained but without 
having the desired effect and without being able to reach their stated aims), particularly 
since transnational norms are most effective when they are adopted consistently across 
jurisdictions250. 
2.3.3 Settlement and Institutionalization of the Basel Accords 
A transnational legal order becomes institutionalized when “legal norms and practices 
converge to guide actors over what norms apply in given situations”, and the “ultimate test 
                                                     
247 ibid.  
248 Philipp Genschel and Thomas Rixen, ‘Settling and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order of 
International Taxation’ in Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer (eds.) Transnational Legal 
Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 154.  
249 This can easily be compared and contrasted with different types of transnational law which 
have developed from the “bottom” upwards, such as the ISDA Master Agreement, and the FIDIC 
standard agreements, which provided benefits, rather than costs, to the industry.  The 
transnational instruments such as the ISDA Master Agreement and the FIDIC standard 
agreements can predominantly be classified as ‘private’ forms of transnational instruments, 
whilst transnational regulatory laws such as the Basel Accords have a predominantly ‘public’ 
nature.  See also Zumbansen 2016 (n 9) regarding the classification of private and public 
transnational law instruments and the application of the distinction between private and public 
transnational law instruments. 
250 Halliday (n 12) 273. 
69 
 
of successful institutionalization…occurs when actors behave according to a set of legal 
norms that they simply take for granted as being appropriate in a particular situation”251.  
Settling is considered to take place at three different levels:  transnational settling; 
national settling; and local settling252.  However, settling at one level may not necessarily 
be in concordance with the way in which legal norms might have settled at a different 
level, and settled legal norms at the transnational level may vary substantially from legal 
norms which would have been settled at the national or at the local level253. 
Block-Lieb and Halliday consider “legal meaning” to be stabilised and “legal norms” to be 
“settled” “when the affected actors can predict each other’s conduct and advice pertaining 
to the legal norms”254, and that this takes place when there is a combination of one or 
more of the following255:   
(1) stakeholders know which norms apply to them in given situations and accept 
the scope of those norms; and (2) the meanings and reach of the norms become 
stabilized for the great majority of those engaged with them for most relevant 
behaviour most of the time”.    
They also argue that settling and concordance is less likely to occur when, inter alia, 
“actors developing the norms do not represent the interests of all powerful stakeholders”, 
as well as when “the norms are so ambiguous, inconsistent, or excessively complicated that 
their meanings fail to guide action with any determinacy”256.  As will be discussed in 
further detail below, both of these elements are evident when considering the Basel 
Accords. 
When considering the status of the Basel Accords, one can argue that though the Basel 
Accords were first established in 1988 there is yet to be proper settling of these 
international standards.  Basel III, agreed to in December 2010 can be considered to be 
the “third iteration” of the Basel Accords257.  It has however been noted that 
implementation of the Basel Accords in different nation states “has always been 
contentious, with variations in state-level adoption”258.  This thesis argues that this has 
been due to ambiguity of terms in the agreed texts of the Basel Accords (as will be 
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discussed in further detail in Chapter 3); the self-interest of the different actors leading 
to lack of legitimacy of the Basel Accords and incentives to use regulatory arbitrage (as 
will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5); as well as the domestic embeddedness problems 
and differences arising from the national laws within which the Basel Accords operate 
(as will be discussed in further detail in Part IV of this thesis).  This can also be seen from 
the continuous revisions of the Basel Accords (and the long periods within which nation 
states are to comply with the agreed texts), together with the limited impact which the 
Basel Accords had on the 2008 financial crisis.   
Helleiner has also noted how members of the G20 and of the FSB are “facing a growing 
number of questions” as to whether the standards adopted by the Basel III will be 
implemented or otherwise, and that “[m]any commitments made under Basel III are also 
controversial in Europe and the United States, and it is far from clear whether they will be 
introduced in full by the final deadline of 2019”259.  He has also noted how developing 
countries “refused to implement” Basel II, “implementing them partially or engaged only in 
“mock compliance””, and that the implementation challenges facing Basel III are “even 
more severe”260. 
2.4  Conclusion 
After providing a brief background to the development of the Basel Accords, Part II of 
this thesis has classified the Basel Accords as a “transnational regulatory law” which has 
been formulated through “transnational regulatory networks”. 
The different types of decision-making structures which can be adopted by transnational 
regulatory networks have been considered, and it is argued that whilst the BCBS 
primarily partakes from regulatory cooperation and network management strategies, 
national regulatory agencies continue to adopt regulatory competitive stances.  This 
arises due to a mismatch in the self-interest of the main actors, which have been 
identified as the BCBS (through which national regulators and supervisors come 
together in order to form one international community), the individual nation states 
acting out of their own self-interest, and the industry. 
Part III of this thesis will analyse further how a lack of economic analysis in drafting, 
adopting, implementing and enforcing the Basel Accords has continued to give rise to 
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further regulatory competition as a result of the self-interest of the individual nation 
states and of the industry, with this also giving rise to regulatory arbitrage, which limits 
the effectiveness of the Basel Accords.  Hence, this thesis argues that one should 
recognize that regulatory competition is bound to continue to take place amongst states, 
and national regulators should therefore be handed over the responsibility to make sure 
that national laws and the industry do not abuse of the regulatory framework.  It will 
therefore be argued that certain binding principles should move away from the soft-law 
approach adopted, towards the use of a binding Treaty which creates obligations 
between states, and which will ensure that a minimum standard can be established 
between different national regulators.  This can however be coupled with regulatory 
competition on the finer details, which will also allow efficient regulation to be adopted. 
This Part II further notes that transnational regulatory networks and regulatory 
agencies are subject to three main influences, consisting of hegemony, regulatory 
capture, and domestic and cultural embeddedness and domestic preferences.  Part IV of 
the thesis will also refer to domestic embeddedness, but this will be seen in a different 
light – whereas this Part II considers domestic embeddedness as affecting national 
regulators in their decision-making, and particularly when forming part of a 
transnational regulatory network, Part IV will argue that differences in the underlying 
laws will still give rise to differences in the results of transnational regulatory laws, such 
as the Basel Accords, due to the underlying laws within which these transnational 
regulatory laws are meant to operate.  Therefore whilst domestic embeddedness is here 
considered as an “influence” on the decision-making and approach adopted by national 
regulators (and when forming part of a transnational regulatory network), Part IV also 
considers domestic embeddedness as being a limitation on the transplantation of 
transnational regulatory laws within local regulatory frameworks. 
Finally, this Chapter has also argued that the Basel Accords are yet to “settle” at each of 
the transnational, national and local frameworks, and with iterative cycles continuously 
taking place.  This can however also be seen as a consequence of the Basel Accords and 
the BCBS ignoring the interests of the industry as well as of states which act in a 
regulatory competitive environment, such that there will continue to be tensions 
between what the BCBS seeks to set out as a transnational regulatory law, and how this 
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Chapter 3:  Applicability of the Basel Accords and the 
Objectives of the Basel Accords  
After having considered the Basel Accords as a form of transnational regulatory law this 
Chapter will consider various differences which apply in the way in which the Basel 
Accords have been implemented in different jurisdictions.  In particular, this Chapter 
will show that although the Basel Accords seek to regulate “internationally-active banks”, 
there exist differences across jurisdictions both as to what the term “bank” and the term 
“internationally-active” mean.    
This Chapter will further consider how different jurisdictions have widened the scope of 
the Basel Accords by applying these standards to different types of entities (namely to all 
types of banks, and investment firms), and that the current regulations are neither 
catering for continuous changes to entities which form part of the banking system, nor 
extended to entities which provide services which may have the same economic function 
as those provided by banks (shadow banks).  Given that the terminology of the Basel 
Accords always referred to “internationally-active banks”, the different ways in which the 
Basel Accords have been implemented across jurisdictions have never been challenged, 
and hence continue to act as a limitation on the Basel Accords (to the extent that the 
Basel Accords are to be considered as the main regulatory standard for most banks, and 
not just for internationally-active banks).   
This Chapter will also argue that the stated aims of the Basel Accords have changed 
along the years, such that though initially the Basel Accords sought to have an 
international standard which would help with having regulatory convergence across 
different jurisdictions, this is no longer the main aim of the BCBS, with the main focus 
now being on the “soundness and stability of the international banking system”.  In fact, 
Chapters 4 and 5 will argue that the lack of consistency and regulatory convergence 
highlighted throughout this Chapter has given rise to regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
to the industry (such as by shifting their activities to unregulated entities), and with this, 
in turn, still posing a problem towards the soundness and stability of the international 
banking system.  
3.1 Varying definitions of “Banks” 
Though the Basel Accords are now considered to be the main regulatory standard for 
most banks in most jurisdictions, there is no common definition as to which entities 
these international standards are to apply.  Whilst some jurisdictions have extended the 
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Basel Accords to all banks (and investment firms), others have only applied these 
international standards to “internationally-active banks”, as required by the Basel 
Accords.  
Basel I identified its scope of application as setting standards of regulation for “banks 
undertaking international business”261.  It also continued by specifying that “the agreed 
framework is designed to establish minimum levels of capital for internationally active 
banks...[emphasis added]”262.  One of its main objectives therefore was that of reaching a 
“high degree of consistency in its application to banks in different countries with a view to 
diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality among international banks 
[emphasis added]” 263. 
Similarly Basel II also referred solely to “internationally active banks”264: 
The fundamental objective of the Committee’s work to revise the 1988 Accord has 
been to develop a framework that would further strengthen the soundness and 
stability of the international banking system while maintaining sufficient 
consistency that capital adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of 
competitive inequality among internationally active banks [emphasis added]. 
Thus, though Basel II introduced much more detailed rules than Basel I, its scope of 
application was still specifically focused, stating that “[t]his Framework will be applied on 
a consolidated basis to internationally active banks...[emphasis added]”265.  This “Scope 
of Application” remained unchanged by Basel III, which simply stated that the scope of 
application as set out in the Basel II framework will continue to be followed266. 
It is clear that throughout the different texts of the Basel Accords the main focus has 
always been that of applying common regulatory standards to banks operating across 
borders, also referred to as “internationally-active banks”.  Regulatory convergence 
                                                     
261 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards (July 1988) 2 para. 4 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf > accessed 21 
September 2014 (Basel I). 
262 See also:  Basel I (n 261) 2 para. 7. 
263 Basel I (n 261) 1 para. 3. 
264 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards:  A revised framework (Comprehensive Version, June 2006) 2 para. 4.  
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf> accessed 21 September 2014 (Basel II). 
265 ibid 7 para. 20.   
266 Basel III, 2010 (n 35) 11 para. 47. 
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between internationally-active banks was therefore considered as necessary in order to 
ensure a level playing field between these banks267.    
Though the Basel Accords refer to “internationally-active banks”, this term is not defined 
in the Basel Accords notwithstanding that the Accords refer to “banks” and 
“internationally-active banks” on numerous occasions throughout the different texts and 
in their scope of application.  This gives rise to definitional issues, as different states 
adopt differing definitions of a “bank” (with differences also arising within the EU, on 
there being incongruences between national law definitions and those adopted in EU 
legislative texts).  Furthermore, the Basel Accords neither provide definitions as to what 
makes a bank “internationally-active” or otherwise. 
The only instance where the Basel Accords seem to indicate what activities a “bank” 
should carry out can be found in Basel II, on establishing the “Standardized Approach” 
(by cross-reference to Annex 8 of Basel II).  The banking activities referred to here are 
divided into eight business lines, consisting of268:  Corporate Finance; Trading and Sales; 
Retail Banking; Commercial Banking; Payment and Settlement; Agency Services; Asset 
Management; and Retail Brokerage.  These business lines are however only referred to 
in order to allow the calculation of the relevant capital charges of a bank using the 
Standardised approach, and do not provide a specific definition of a “bank”.  
Furthermore, the said “business lines” are very wide terms, and there is no requirement 
for a bank to carry out all or only some of these business lines in order to be considered 
as a “bank”. 
What constitutes a “bank” and what makes a bank “internationally-active” for the 
purposes of the Basel Accords therefore remains unclear.  Furthermore, apart from the 
varying definition of “banks” across different jurisdictions, the entities to which capital 
adequacy regulation (following on the Basel Accords) has been applied to in different 
jurisdictions has also varied significantly.  Given that the Basel Accords still refer to 
“internationally-active banks” the BCBS seemingly ignore the activities of entities which 
are not classified as “banks” (notwithstanding that they may provide similar activities); 
whilst neither are they concerned about banks which do not have an “international” 
element (even though major jurisdictions have applied the capital adequacy regulations 
as deriving from the Basel Accords to all banks, whether internationally-active or 
otherwise).  
                                                     
267 Basel I (n 261) 1 para. 3; Basel II (n 264) 7 para. 20; Barth and others (n 24) 28 – 40;  
268 Basel II (n 264) 146.   
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Capital adequacy rules have historically been considered to be essential in light of the 
intrinsic nature of banking, whereby banks “create” money by acting as an intermediary 
between those who require safe-keeping of their money, and those who need to borrow 
money (also referred to as “maturity transformation”)269.  This means that banks are 
never liquid enough to be able to satisfy all their depositors on demand, due to loans 
which a bank would have granted270.  Furthermore, banks may also be negatively 
affected by the failure or troubles of other banks in light of the widespread 
interconnectedness of the banking system, thereby also giving rise to systemic risk271.  
This makes banks subject to bank runs should there be a loss of confidence in the said 
bank or in the banking system.  Nevertheless, there has been no effort by the promoters 
of the Basel Accords to consider whether all entities which undertake liquidity and 
maturity transformation, and which may as a result also give rise to systemic risks, 
should be subject to the Basel Accords or otherwise.  
This thesis will proceed by considering the different definitions of what constitutes a 
“bank” in the UK, the EU and the US.  These jurisdictions have been selected in light of 
their leading roles in the financial services industry, and also in light of the particular 
influences they have had in the promulgation and development of the Basel Accords.  As 
will be seen below, the main element forming the basis of all the available definitions 
which have been considered is that in order for the definition of “bank” to apply, there 
need to be “deposits” or “other repayable funds” taken from the public.  This distinguishes 
a “bank” from other institutions which might be providing similar services to banks.   
3.1.1 United Kingdom  
In the UK, there is no generally applicable functional definition that distinguishes 
“banks” from other types of financial institutions272.  Different statutes define the term 
“bank” differently according to their specific regulatory purpose273.  In the absence of a 
consistent basic definition of a “bank”, the Courts have sought to construct its meaning 
by establishing the following three essential principles: 
(i) The meaning of “banking business” can change from time to time; 
                                                     
269 Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital (Harvard Business Law Review, Vol. 4, 2014) 13 – 
14.  
270 ibid. 
271 ibid 14.   
272 E.P. Ellinger, E. Lomnicka, C. Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (OUP, July 2011) 79.  
273 ibid.  
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(ii) A financial institution that is regarded as engaging in “banking business” in 
one jurisdiction is not necessarily considered as doing so elsewhere; and 
(iii) An institution’s reputation may be important when determining whether it is 
a “bank”274. 
Traditionally the meaning of “banking business” referred to the acceptance of money on 
deposit from members of the public, who thereby became customers of the bank, and the 
relending or reinvesting of those funds by the bank in order to make a profit275.    
In United Dominions Trust v. Kirkwood276 the Court further specified that engaging in 
lending does not by itself make an institution a “bank”, and though the acceptance of 
deposits remains a necessary condition of an institution qualifying as a “bank”, this 
activity is not considered to be a sufficient condition:  an entity cannot qualify as a “bank” 
at common law unless it opens, on behalf of customers, current accounts operable by 
cheque and into which customers can pay cheques and other effects for collection 
(though it has been recognised that this definition may need to be updated to take into 
consideration more modern methods of payments which banks make use of)277.  Lord 
Denning MR thus stated that278: 
There are therefore, two characteristics usually found in banks today:  (i) They 
accept money from, and collect cheques for, their customers and place them to their 
credit; (ii) They honour cheques or orders drawn on them by their customers when 
presented for payment and debit their customers accordingly.  These two 
characteristics carry with them also a third, namely:  (iii) They keep current 
accounts, or something of that nature, in their books in which the credits and debits 
are entered. 
Furthermore, a bank should also normally possess the qualities of stability, soundness 
and probity, whilst evidence of an entity’s reputation as a bank may also be relevant in 
considering whether an institution is a “bank” or otherwise279.  Lord Denning continued 
by stating “[i]n case of doubt, it is, I think, permissible to look at the reputation of the firm 
                                                     
274 ibid 80 – 81.   
275 ibid 81.   
276 [1966] 2 Q.B. 431. 
277 Ellinger and others (n 272) 82 – 83.   
278 United Dominions Trust Ltd (n 276) 447.   
279 Ellinger and others (n 272) 84.   
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amongst ordinary intelligent commercial men.  If they recognise it as carrying on the 
business of banking, that should turn the scale” 280. 
Apart from the common law definition of “banks” which has been adopted by Courts in 
the UK, the CRR has introduced a common definition of “credit institutions” throughout 
the EU, with this therefore also applying within the UK.  This definition is considered in 
further detail in Section 3.1.2 below, and as will be seen there is still insufficient detail in 
order for there to be proper harmonization of what this definition actually means.  
Though different definitions of “banks” or of “credit institutions” apply in the UK 
(according to the specific statute one would be referring to), when considering the 
prudential requirements set out by the Basel Accords, one should consider the 
definitions adopted by the CRR discussed below given that this is the regulation 
(together with the Capital Requirements Directive IV (“CRD IV”)) which implements the 
Basel Accords within the EU281.     
3.1.2 European Union 
Apart from adopting the Basel Accords in the EU, the CRD IV and the CRR establish the 
prudential regulatory requirements for credit institutions and investment firms 
throughout the EU. 
The CRR establishes definitions for both “credit institutions” and “investment firms” (with 
these definitions being applicable to both the CRD IV and the CRR).  Article 4 of the CRR 
defines a “credit institution” as “an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or 
other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account”.  There 
                                                     
280 United Dominions Trust Ltd (n 276) 454.  
281 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to the activity 
of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text 
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Directive 2013/36/EU as regards Exempted Entities, Financial Holding Companies, Mixed Financial 
Holding Companies, Remuneration, Supervisory Measures and Powers and Capital Conservation 
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exist no definitions, however, as to what constitutes a “deposit”, “other repayable fund”, 
“grants credits” or “from the public”, throughout the CRR282.  Different EU member states 
have therefore adopted varying approaches to how these terms are to be interpreted. 
The European Banking Authority (“EBA”) has recognised that there are differences 
between the definition of “credit institutions” which has been adopted at EU level and the 
different definitions which have been adopted at national level by different member 
states283.  Though the EBA has stated that “[i]n light of the weight placed on this term the 
EBA notes that it is of considerable importance that it is interpreted in a uniform manner 
across the Union”, it has, at this stage, only acknowledged this problem and has not put 
forward a solution on how these divergences are to be rectified284.  It has however urged 
the Commission to give consideration to a possible clarification to the definition of 
“credit institution” in light of the incongruences between the laws of the different EU 
member states285.  
Differences therefore clearly exist between EU law definitions and definitions adopted in 
national legislative texts.  As seen above, one can neither assume that the term “credit 
institution” or “bank” has the same meaning within a particular jurisdiction, given that, 
for example, the test in the UK common law for an entity to be considered as a “bank” is 
more onerous than that required at EU level, such that the taking of deposits and 
granting of loans, which is the requisite emanating from EU regulations, has been 
considered as an insufficient test by English Courts when considering the definition of 
“banks” in relation to specific statutes.    
Furthermore, one should also be aware that not all financial activities carried out by 
banks necessitate being licensed as a “credit institution”, given that one only requires this 
licence if the said entity accepts “deposits or other repayable funds from the public”, and 
“grants credits for its own account”.  By way of example, payment institutions regulated 
                                                     
282 European Banking Authority, Report to the European Commission on the perimeter of credit 
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<https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/534414/2014+11+27+-+EBA+Report+-
+Credit+institutions.pdf> accessed 4 December 2014.  
283 European Banking Authority, Opinion of the European Banking Authority on Matters Relating to 
the Perimeter of Credit Institutions (EBA/Op/2014/12, 27 November 2014) 
<https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-
12+%28Opinion+on+perimeter+of+credit+institution%29.pdf> accessed 4 December 2014 (EBA 
Opinion Relating to the Perimeter of Credit Institutions);  See also:  European Banking Authority 
(n 282).    




by the second Payment Services Directive286 are not considered to be “credit institutions” 
notwithstanding that the activities they carry out are similar to certain activities carried 
out by banks and are also listed in the “business lines” of credit institutions in the Basel 
Accords (on dealing with capital charges in the Standardised approach, as seen above), 
with payment institutions still being subject to certain risks faced by banks (such as 
“herstatt” risk287).  Furthermore activities of other financial institutions, such as 
factoring, leasing and hire purchases are generally only regulated at a national level, and 
the type of licence needed to carry out these activities varies between one member state 
and another. 
3.1.3 United States 
Defining a “bank” in the US has also proved problematic, particularly in light of the wide 
functions carried out by banks.  In 1988, Pollard288 stated that:  
[f]or years, laymen and legal practitioners understood what a bank was; today, 
even the definition of bank is subject to intense debate, particularly when 
distinguishing a bank from the many other depository and nondepository providers 
of financial services.   
Pollard continued by stating289: 
... depository institutions are but one sector of financial service providers.  
Insurance companies, mortgage companies, finance companies, diversified holding 
companies, mutual funds, securities firms, foreign banks and other foreign 
institutions operating in the United States, automobile companies, and retailers all 
provide various forms of consumer and commercial financial products. 
Though historically the definition of “bank” in the US implied there being “a place for the 
deposit of money, as that is the most obvious purpose of such an institution290,” the term 
“bank” itself has become blurred and is mostly used as a generic term.  One should also 
                                                     
286 Directive 2015/2366/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services 
in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and 
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note, however, that similar to the UK, various statutes in the US have also sought to 
define a “bank” for the particular statutory purposes of those same specific statutes291. 
Therefore, in US regulation, the main classification of financial institutions refers to 
“depository institutions” and “nondepository institutions” (with the latter also referred to 
as “nonbanks”)292.  The four major types of financial depository institutions in the US are:  
commercial banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks and credit unions293.  
The function of commercial banks is typically that of providing retail banking, whereby 
short-term business credit is provided, together with deposit (including time and 
savings) accounts, carrying out of fiduciary activities, as well as providing consumer 
loans and mortgage loans294.  Savings and loan associations specialise in residential real 
estate lending and home finance, whilst savings banks specialise in consumer loans, 
including home finance295.  Credit unions provide personal and consumer loans to 
individuals who have a “common bond”, such as through employment, or some social or 
labour organisation296. 
On the other hand, nondepository institutions do not accept deposits from the public 
and include securities firms, mutual funds, insurance companies, consumer finance, 
leasing and mortgage companies, and lending and finance subsidiaries of major 
industrial companies297.   
Nondepository institutions and depository institutions may also be affiliated with each 
other through a financial holding company298 (though these are subject to restrictions 
introduced by Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act299 as will be discussed in further detail in Section 3.3)300.  However, given 
that these institutions do not accept deposits, they are subject to less regulation, and are 
generally regulated at state level rather than at a federal level in the US.  These 
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institutions are generally not subject to the same type of capital requirements applicable 
to depository institutions, and the main focus of regulation on these entities is mainly in 
the form of state licensing and oversight, with the main focus being on consumer 
protection301. 
3.2 Banks, Investment Firms and Shadow Banks 
Though the promoters of the Basel Accords sought to apply the Basel Accords to 
“internationally-active banks”, no definition has been given as to what the terms 
“internationally-active” and “bank” mean.  As seen above there neither is a clear 
definition across borders as to what the term “bank” means, and as will be seen in 
Section 3.4, there have also been inconsistencies in that jurisdictions such as the EU 
extended the Basel Accords not only to all banks, but also to “investment firms”. On the 
other hand, the Basel Accords have not been extended to entities which provide similar 
activities to those of a bank (referred to as “shadow banks”). 
Given the different types of entities which will be considered below (namely banks, 
investment firms, and shadow banks), a brief commentary as to what the main 
differences between these entities are, is warranted.  Reference is generally made to EU 
law given that throughout this thesis the EU is considered as the main example as to 
where the provisions of the Basel Accords have been extended to investment firms. 
3.2.1  Distinguishing between banks, investment firms, and shadow banks 
In the EU, the general rule established by CRD IV and the CRR302 is that firms classified as 
“investment firms” under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”)303, 
will also be considered as “investment firms” for the purposes of the CRD IV and the CRR 
                                                     
301 ibid.   
302 Article 4 of the CRR defines “investment firm” as:  a person as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) 
of Directive 2004/39/EC,  which is subject to the requirements imposed by that Directive, excluding 
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the ancillary service referred to in point (1) of Section B of Annex 1 to Directive 2004/39/EC, which 
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Section A of Annex 1 to that Directive, and which are not permitted to hold money or securities 
belonging to their clients and which for that reason may not at any time place themselves in debt 
with those clients.  
303 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC [2004] 
OJ L 145 (MiFID).  This has since been recast as Directive 2014/65/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU [2014] OJ L 173 (MiFID II). 
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subject to a few exceptions304, and that wherever clients’ assets are held by a firm, or 
where a firm deals on own account, then that firm would be classified as an “investment 
firm” for the purposes of the CRD IV and the CRR, and would hence be subject to the 
provisions thereof.  The term “investment firm” is generally defined by MiFID as “any 
legal person whose regular occupation or business is the provision of one or more 
investment services to third parties and/or the performance of one or more investment 
activities on a professional basis”305. 
Within the EU context, one should also distinguish between “investment firms” and 
“alternative investment fund managers” (“AIFMs” and also referred to as “hedge fund 
managers”), given that the latter may or may not be classified as “investment firms” for 
the purposes of MiFID, depending on the type of activities they carry out.  Firms cannot 
be classified as both “investment firms” under MiFID, and as “Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers” in terms of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“AIFMD”) at 
the same time306.  However, an AIFM may be authorised to perform certain MiFID 
services, in terms of the AIFMD (and not in terms of MiFID) and in such case, an AIFM 
which performs both AIFM activities and permitted additional MiFID activities will be 
required to comply with certain capital requirements established by the CRD IV307. 
Alternative investment funds (“AIFs” also referred to as “hedge funds”) are asset pools 
managed by an AIFM, which provide similar functions to banks (and can be referred to 
within the wider term of “shadow banking”) but these are not subject to the same 
regulatory restrictions as banks.  They are primarily distinguished from other 
investment vehicles and mutual funds in that hedge funds are those investment funds 
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<http://uk.practicallaw.com/1-503-9737?q=capital+requirements+regulation#a575183> 
accessed 15 December 2014.  
84 
 
which fall out of the regulatory scope of mutual fund regulation308.  Therefore, from a 
legal perspective, hedge funds (and other shadow banks generally) are not regulated, 
though following the global financial crisis AIFMs have been subject to very limited 
regulation through the provisions of the AIFMD in the EU (and with similar restrictions 
also being applied by the Dodd-Frank Act in the US).   
Defining what a “hedge fund” is has proved problematic such that IOSCO proved unable 
to establish a definitional term of a “hedge fund” and noted that “each jurisdiction has 
views on what a hedge fund is”309.  Furthermore, the FSB has defined “shadow banking” as 
“credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking 
system”310.  Similarly the EBA has defined “shadow banking entities” as entities that311: 
a. carry out credit intermediation activities, defined as bank-like activities 
involving maturity transformation, liquidity transformation, leverage, credit risk 
transfer or similar activities; and 
b. are neither within the scope of prudential consolidation nor subject to solo 
prudential requirements under specified EU legislation (or equivalent third country 
legal frameworks).  Entities referred to in Article 2(5) and Article 9(2) of Directive 
2013/36/EU, as well as other entities as defined in the guidelines (‘excluded 
undertakings’), are also not to be regarded as shadow banking entities. 
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Based Finance:  Its Contributions and Emerging Issues (Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional 
Paper 18, May 2016) 8 <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occasional-
paper-18.pdf> accessed 13 April 2017. 
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The EBA has provided the following examples of what may constitute a shadow banking 
entity:  money market funds; special purpose vehicles engaged in securitisation 
transactions; securities and derivatives dealers, as well as companies engaged in 
factoring, leasing or hire purchase312.  It has also clarified that all funds would be 
considered to be “shadow banking entities” except if they are non-Money Market Funds 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (“UCITS”), AIFs with 
limited leverage, or any third country funds which are subject to UCITS equivalent 
requirements313.   
Therefore shadow banks and hedge funds (or AIFs) are generally defined by simply 
referring to all funds which are not regulated314.  This all-embracing terminology has 
been considered to be fundamental in order to encapsulate all forms of shadow banks 
given that they are typically too diverse in nature with their main common factor 
generally being linked to the type of returns which they seek to deliver315.      
3.2.2  Extending Capital Adequacy Laws to Investment Firms 
The rationale for capital adequacy restrictions being necessarily mandated for banks but 
not for other firms (by the BCBS, and consequently in certain jurisdictions implementing 
the Basel Accords) has traditionally been that banks have been considered to pose much 
greater systemic risks than investment firms316.  This argument has been put forward 
since banks hold deposits (from the public at large), which makes them vulnerable to 
loss of confidence by the public at large317.   
Investment firms do not hold deposits from the public (though they do hold client funds) 
and it has therefore been argued that they do not create risks to public funds318.  
Furthermore, investment firms are generally funded by banks or through capital 
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markets, rather than through deposits obtained directly from the public319.  Therefore, 
once investment firms enter the realm of insolvency, they should be able to realise their 
assets in a much quicker way than banks320.  Moreover, whilst banks typically provide 
for long-term and medium-term financing, investment firms typically have shorter-term 
contracts (such as underwriting commitments)321. 
Another significant difference between banks and investment firms also arises in the 
way in which each of these entities holds clients’ funds.  Whilst banks pool deposits they 
receive in order to grant credit to their customers (as part of the credit intermediation 
function they carry out), investment firms are typically required to separate client assets 
from their own assets, resulting in there being further protection of clients’ funds in 
investment firms322. 
Thus, prior to the global financial crisis it was argued that prudential regulation of 
investment firms should be restricted to ensuring an orderly wind-down or transfer of 
an investment firm’s business and the protection of client’s assets in the event of an 
insolvency of an investment firm323.  Wood therefore stated that the focus in regulating 
investment firms should be on “non-capital financial requirements”, such as requiring 
professional indemnity insurance and the segregation and holding of client monies and 
securities on trust, rather than on capital requirements324.   
Though the traditional view has been that banks are systemically more important than 
investment firms, particularly due to banks providing liquidity to the economy, and due 
to being inter-connected with other banks325, in recent years and particularly following 
the recent global financial crisis, investment firms have also been recognised as having 
become essential providers of liquidity, whilst having also continued to be even further 
intermingled with banks.  Furthermore, there has since also been the rise of other “non-
banks”, particularly shadow banks which have further complemented banks in the 
services they provide. 
Nevertheless, different jurisdictions have adopted diverging positions (as will be seen in 
Section 3.4) leaving investment firms in different jurisdictions subject to different types 
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of laws, thereby giving rise to regulatory arbitrage opportunities between different 
states and allowing for the possibility of transfer of risk from the regulated to the 
unregulated sectors.  The US have adopted the reasoning that in light of the intrinsic 
differences between banks and investment firms, capital adequacy restrictions should be 
applied only to “banks” (and non-banks which would have become systemically 
important).  On the other hand, in the EU greater emphasis has been placed on the need 
to have a level playing field and competitive equity between different providers of 
finance, thus extending the provisions of the laws implementing the Basel Accords to 
“investment firms”.   
3.2.3  Extending Capital Adequacy Laws to Shadow Banks 
Whereas towards the end of the twentieth century one could still identify various 
distinctions between “banks” and “non-banks”, and though the risks between the two 
were still considered as being completely separate and distinct, the global financial crisis 
has led to the growth of non-banks and the shadow banking industry, resulting in 
further intermingling between the two.  Consequently, most of the arguments which 
used to be brought in favour of distinguishing between banks and non-banks when 
applying financial regulation have either been disproved by the global financial crisis, or 
alternatively can no longer be said to apply in light of the growth of these non-banks326. 
Though many entities engage with hedge funds in financial activities that are similar to 
banking activities, Basel III is generally not extended to shadow banks and hedge funds 
(both in the EU and other jurisdictions such as the US) notwithstanding the arguments 
for the need for there to be competitive equity which the EU had put forward on 
extending capital adequacy regulation to investment firms327.   
Whilst it has been argued that shadow banks (and more specifically hedge funds) should 
be treated as banks and regulated as such, with capital adequacy requirements being 
extended to hedge funds too, others remain in favour of distinguishing between the 
two328.  The proponents of distinguishing regulation between banks and shadow banks 
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state that whilst banks are barely subject to private monitoring, as banks’ creditors are 
usually weak creditors (when compared to the bank) who typically do not require 
security interests from the bank, hedge funds generally deal with prime brokers which 
ensure effective monitoring and supervision of hedge funds (as their creditors), thereby 
acting as an effective method of supervision329.   
Heremans and Pacces have observed that “the adoption of very complex and sophisticated 
financial innovations in the quest for profit has determined structural shifts in the financial 
intermediation process” and that as a result “the core of traditional banking 
intermediation has declined significantly”330.  Other financial intermediaries, such as 
institutional investors, hedge funds, private equity funds, and new specialized 
investment vehicles have become new sources of financial intermediation, and that as a 
result, “financial risks are transferred from the highly regulated banking sector to non-
regulated intermediaries, thereby becoming more difficult to monitor”331.  Banks continue 
to be exposed to risks arising from the financial system as when the stability of non-
banking institutions is “shaken”, investors tend to resort to banks in light of them being 
“regulated” and considered to be of a higher quality than non-banking entities, thereby 
putting a strain on banks which may lead to systemic risks and effects332.  Furthermore, 
non-banks are considered to be more risky than banks as they cannot rely on Central 
Banks as a lender of last resort and are therefore more akin to failure in the event of 
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regulations banks face (i.e. as against shadow banks) and whether shadow banks can provide this 
function in light of them not being subject to the stringent regulations which banks are subject to.  
See:  International Monetary Fund, The Future of Finance – Session 3:  Expanding Role of Nonbanks 
(Seminar moderated by Vitor Constâncio and addressed by Chitra Ramkrishna, Nouriel Roubini, 
Lord Adair Turner, and Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus,  International Monetary Fund, World Bank 
Group, 2014 Annual Meetings, Washington D.C., October 10-12) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/POS_Meetings/SeminarDetails.aspx?SeminarId=15> accessed 7 
August 2015; European Banking Authority, Guidelines:  Limits on Exposures to Shadow Banking 
Entities Which Carry Out Banking Activities Outside a Regulated Framework Under Article 395(2) of 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (EBA/GL/2015/20, 14 December 2015) 5, 12 
<http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1310259/EBA-GL-2015-
20+GL+on+Limits+to+Exposures+to+Shadow+Banking+Entities.pdf> accessed 24 December 
2015. 
329 Engert (n 308) 344.   
330 Dirk Heremans and Alessio M Pacces, Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets (Rotterdam 
Institute of Law and Economics Working Paper Series No. 2011/04) 4 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1914461> accessed 24 January 2016.    
331 Meyer (n 97) 4.  
332 Heremans and Pacces (n 330) 4.   
89 
 
illiquidity as their only remedy is to resort to debt in order to increase their liquidity and 
satisfy panicking investors333. 
It has also been argued that many of the regulatory complications in the AIFMD and 
Dodd-Frank Act could be avoided through the introduction of a charge for banks’ lending 
exposures to hedge funds, since this would minimise systemic risk in the lending 
practice of banks to hedge funds334.  This proposal has been adopted by the BCBS and 
will be discussed in further detail in Section 5.4 below.  
3.3 The Evolution of the Structure of Banks:  Separation of Retail 
and Commercial Banking from Investment Banking Activities 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned definitions of “banks” one should also be aware of 
the evolving structure of banks, particularly in light of the applicable laws and 
regulations to banks and to alternative methods of financing.  As will be explained below, 
the capital requirements arising out of the Basel Accords, have, along the years, been 
extended also to investment firms in a number of jurisdictions (including in the EU 
through the applicability of the CRR).  This is however not a common approach, and 
there still are other important jurisdictions (such as the US) where the extension of the 
Basel Accords to investment firms is much more limited.   
This comes against a backdrop of a marked shift from bank financing to alternative 
methods of financing, such as through shadow banks, investment firms and specialised 
investment banks, which have continued to expand in light of regulatory restrictions 
which limit proprietary trading activities by banks.  As regulatory reforms have sought 
to separate retail and commercial banking from investment banking activities, there has 
been a further increase in financing activities being carried out by investment firms and 
non-banks, with the latter entities generally being able to benefit from less regulation 
than banks (particularly by being able to make use of differences in the laws and 
regulations of different jurisdictions)335.   
This demonstrates that though depositors’ funds held with banks may be better 
protected in light of the reforms which split retail banking from proprietary trading, the 
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risks which arise from proprietary trading are now being passed on to less regulated 
entities.  Even so, banks (and hence depositors’ funds), may still not be completely free 
from these risks given that banks also rely on shadow banks to manage credit risk (such 
as through credit default swaps), and will therefore remain exposed to proprietary 
trading risks nonetheless336. 
The relevance of this discussion is that as the investment banking arm of banks is being 
segregated into new or separate entities, these entities may now be more properly 
classified as “investment firms” or “nonbanks” given that they may no longer take or rely 
on deposits or other repayable funds from the public.  Thus, this may mean that 
investment banking activities may start falling out of the regulatory scope of those 
jurisdictions where the Basel Accords’ implementing laws are not extended to 
“investment firms”. 
A brief description of the reforms which are taking place in this context will follow. 
3.3.1 European Union  
A number of jurisdictions, including the UK and Germany, have sought to separate retail 
banking activities from investment banking activities, notwithstanding the vast 
differences in the banking culture of these states and the existence of universal banks, or 
otherwise, in these jurisdictions along the years337.   
Following the recent global financial crisis, a reform of the universal banking model in 
the UK was proposed by various commentators and bodies in the industry, such as the 
Governor of the Bank of England338, the Future of Banking Commission339, and others340, 
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resulting in the appointment of the Independent Commission on Banking, which 
published its final report and its recommendations in September 2011341.  These 
recommendations included the imposition of a ring-fencing requirement for the retail 
activity of banks, with a view to isolating those banking activities where continuous 
provision of service is vital to the economy and to banks’ customers342.  Thus the 
Independent Commission on Banking proposed that retail banking activities should be 
carried out in a separate subsidiary, in order to ensure legal, economic and operational 
separation from the rest of the banking group343.  The recommendations of the 
Independent Commission on Banking were formally adopted and enacted by the 
Financial Services (Banking Reform Act) of 2013344.  Therefore, as from 1st January 2019, 
UK banking groups with significant retail and small and medium-sized enterprise 
banking operations will be required to “ring-fence” certain deposit-taking activities for 
retail and small and medium-sized enterprise depositors in a legal entity that will not be 
permitted to carry on certain specified wholesale and investment banking activities345. 
Similarly, other major financial jurisdictions in the EU have adopted a similar approach 
by requiring retail banking activities to be carried out by separate subsidiaries from 
other subsidiaries carrying out proprietary trading activities.  In Germany this ring-
fencing requirement has been introduced by the Act on Ringfencing and Recovery and 
Resolution Planning for Credit Institutions and Financial Groups, enacted on 7 June 
2013346.  Similarly, in France this has been required by Loi no. 2013-672 du 26 juillet 
2013 de séparation et de régulation des activités bancaires347. 
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The EU has also been establishing its own proposals for legislation in order to separate 
proprietary trading and other significant trading activities from retail and commercial 
banking348.  This separation was proposed by the High-level Expert Group on reforming 
the structure of the EU banking sector (the “Liikanen Report”), and has currently resulted 
in a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Structural Measures Improving the Resilience of EU Credit Institutions349.  This proposal 
goes one step further than the ring-fencing structures which have been proposed in 
national frameworks, since the current version of the proposed legislation will impose 
an outright ban of engaging in proprietary trading and other trading activities on own 
account, with this being extended to the whole group of entities to which a credit 
institution forms part350.  
3.3.2 United States 
In the US, the separation of retail and commercial banking from investment banking has 
varied greatly along the years with the Glass-Steagall Act being introduced in 1933 in 
order to separate commercial banking from investment banking351.   
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Following the recent global financial crisis, proprietary trading was blamed as being one 
of the reasons for the crisis, resulting in the “Volcker Rule” being promulgated, and with 
this being based on concepts which are similar to those of the Glass-Steagall Act352.  This 
was introduced by Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which prohibits proprietary 
trading (or acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in 
or sponsoring a hedge fund or private equity fund, subject to certain exceptions) by 
banking entities353.    
3.4 Applicability of the Basel Accords 
Whilst the Basel Accords fail to provide clarity regarding the granular activities which 
should be regulated, the scope of their application specifically refers to the regulation of 
“internationally-active banks”.  However, as seen above, different jurisdictions have 
different interpretations as to what constitutes a “bank”.  Furthermore some 
jurisdictions have sought to extend the applicability of the Basel Accords to institutions 
other than “internationally-active banks”.  This Section therefore considers the entities to 
which the Basel Accords have been extended across different jurisdictions.   
It can be argued that, whilst the applicability of the Basel Accords to internationally-
active banks was essential in order to ensure that lighter-regulated banks did not impact 
banks in other jurisdictions, the importance of the Basel Accords arises since the Basel 
Accords have been applied to a much wider list of institutions than originally envisaged, 
and have become a global standard of how banks are regulated (irrespective of the size 
of the particular bank, the activities which it carries out, and whether it operates 
internationally or otherwise).  Therefore a transnational regulatory law which was 
meant to apply to a very specific type of entity has thrived in the absence of other 
regulation being put in place, notwithstanding that no proper economic analysis was 
carried out in order to ascertain whether the Basel Accords could provide an adequate 
framework for the regulation of all banks (and other entities such as investment firms). 
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It is thus also somewhat ironic that whilst the Basel Accords regulate “internationally-
active banks”, the BCBS has had to issue further standards which specifically apply to 
“globally systemic important banks” (at times also referred to as “G-SIBs”)354. 
3.4.1 European Union 
Article 1 of the CRR specifically states that the scope of application of the regulations 
established by the CRR is to “institutions”.  An “institution” has been defined in Article 4 
of the CRR as being “a credit institution or an investment firm”355.  Therefore, in the EU, 
the transposition of the Basel requirements to national legislation refers to all credit 
institutions (banks), with this being extended also to investment firms356.  The position 
adopted by the EU has remained consistent throughout the years, with Council Directive 
93/6/EEC357 and the EU Directive 2006/49/EC358 (which had adopted the Basel I and 
the Basel II Accords respectively) also having been applicable to all credit institutions 
and investment firms without distinction. 
The EU therefore does not distinguish between banks and investment firms on 
considering the applicability of the Basel Accords, and it neither distinguishes as to 
whether these entities are internationally-active or otherwise, and it merely applies this 
regime to all banks and investment firms irrespective of their focus, activities, size or the 
potential systemic risk they may pose to the economy at large.  The rationale for this has 
been stated as follows359: 
… while the Basel capital adequacy agreements apply to “internationally active 
banks”, in the EU it has always applied to all banks (more than 8.300) as well as 
investment firms.  This wide scope is necessary in the EU where banks authorised in 
one Member State can provide their services across the EU’s single market and as 
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such are more than likely to engage in cross-border services.  Also, applying the 
internationally agreed rules only to a subset of European banks would create 
competitive distortions and potential for regulatory arbitrage.   
Whilst the need to cater for “competitive distortions and potential for regulatory 
arbitrage” was the reason for extending the Basel Accords’ implementing laws to all 
credit institutions and investment firms, this same approach has not been adopted on 
the rise of shadow banking over the last decade. 
It is also ironic that though the EU has always applied the Basel Accords to all banks and 
investment firms, the European Parliament has in November 2016, and on resolving on 
the finalization of Basel III, recalled “the importance of the principle of proportionality, to 
be assessed not only in relation to the size of the institutions which are regulated, but also 
understood as a fair balance between the costs and benefits of regulation for each group of 
stakeholders”360.  This is ambiguous in light of the fact that though the Basel Accords only 
apply to “internationally-active banks” and not to all banks, it has been the EU itself 
which has imposed the requirements of the Basel Accords on all banks and investment 
firms without distinction.   
In its resolution the European Parliament however also called on the Commission to 
prioritise work on  
a ‘small banking box’ for the least risky banking models, and to extend this work to 
an assessment of the feasibility of a future regulatory framework consisting of less 
complex and more appropriate and proportional prudential rules specifically 
adapted to different types of banking model361. 
It will be interesting to see how this resolution will develop in the near future given that 
in the EU the argument of “competitive equity” has always been used in order to favour 
applying the Basel Accords to all banks and investment firms irrespective of their size or 
nature362.   
                                                     
360 European Parliament (n 7) Resolution 9. 
361 ibid Resolution 19.  It however seems that the need to cater for smaller entities will only be 
used in order to allow for a reduction in certain capital requirements when the counterparties of 
a bank consist of small and medium sized enterprises pursuant to Article 501 of the CRR, with 
CRR II proposing to extend the applicability of Article 501 further. 
362 Proposals which have been put forward in December 2017 suggest that a new framework 
should be created in order to distinguish larger investment firms from smaller investment firms, 
whereby larger investment firms would continue to be subject to the CRR and CRD IV, whilst 
smaller investment firms would no longer be subject to the same regime, but would become 
96 
 
3.4.2 United States 
In the US, the laws implementing the Basel regime have been much more restricted than 
in the EU, with the applicability of the implementing laws being limited to 
“internationally-active banks”, with this only being extended, to some extent, on 
providing for the introduction of Basel III363.    
Prior to the adoption of Basel III, US regulators limited the application of the Basel II 
standards, only to “core banks”364  (with the US implementing law only adopting the 
Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (“IRB”) approach for these banks, without making 
reference to the Standardised approach or the Foundation IRB approach)365.  All other 
banks in the US remained subject to the general US risk-based capital rules, based on 
Basel I, unless they elected to seek to obtain authorisation to adopt the Advanced IRB 
approaches, based on the Basel II standards366.  The US argued that this did not prejudice 
                                                                                                                                                        
subject to a new bespoke regime.  See:  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Prudential Requirements of Investment Firms and 
Amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 1093/2010 (COM (2017) 
790 final, 2017/0359 (COD), Brussels, 20 December 2017); European Commission, Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Prudential Supervision of Investment 
Firms and Amending Directives 2013/36/EU and 2014/65/EU (COM (2017) 791 final, 2017/0358 
(COD), Brussels, 20 December 2017). 
363 See also:  Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Concerns and Considerations for the Practical Implementation 
of the New Basel Accord (Remarks at the ICBI Risk Management 2003 Conference, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 2 December 2003) 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20031202/default.htm> accessed 
21 November 2014.  
364 The definition of “core banks” referred to: (a) any depository institution meeting either of the 
following two criteria: (i) consolidated total assets of USD 250 billion or more, or (ii) consolidated 
total on-balance sheet foreign exposure of USD 10 billion or more; or (b) any US-chartered bank 
holding company (BHC) meeting any of the following three criteria: (i) consolidated total assets 
(excluding assets held by an insurance underwriting subsidiary) of USD 250 billion or more, (ii) 
consolidated total on-balance sheet foreign exposure of USD 10 billion or more, (iii) having a 
subsidiary depository institution that was a core bank or opt-in bank.  Furthermore, a depository 
institution established as a subsidiary of a core-bank or of a bank which elected to adopt the 
Advanced Internal-Ratings Based Approach would also be considered as a “core-bank”.  See:  
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III Regulatory Consistency Assessment (Level 2) – 
Preliminary Report:  United States of America (October 2012) 8, 18 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/l2_us.pdf> accessed 12 December 2014 (US 
Regulatory Consistency Assessment); Richard J Herring, The Rocky Road to Implementation of 
Basel II in the United States (2007) 9 <http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/07/0731.pdf> 
accessed 17 December 2014; Ferguson (n 363); Herring (n 355) 276.   
365 US Regulatory Consistency Assessment (n 364); Herring (n 364) 9.   
366 US Regulatory Consistency Assessment (n 364) 8, 18; Herring (n 364) 9.   
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international convergence of the Basel Accords, and that those banks which were not 
“internationally-active” were already sufficiently regulated by the laws of the US367.  
Though the Basel regime did not define, or in any way outline the monetary thresholds 
which would define banks as being “internationally-active”, the thresholds for a bank to 
be considered as a “core bank” were established internally in the US, and were defended 
by the US regulators in light of the high-percentage of banking activity which was 
covered by the banks which fell within the said thresholds368.  This results-based 
approach was therefore used to justify the monetary thresholds established, and though 
this has not caused issues with assessors from the BCBS (in its assessment of 
implementation of Basel in the US369), it is conceivable to argue that these same 
monetary thresholds may have different outcomes (in the percentage of banking activity 
regulated) if they were to be transplanted in other jurisdictions. 
On implementing the more recent Basel III, the US opted to extend the scope as to which 
entities the Basel Accords would apply.  The Basel III Final Rule on capital standards, 
issued in July 2013, established that the Basel III provisions, as implemented in the US, 
would apply to all depository institutions in the US (other than for small banks with less 
than USD500 million in assets), as well as to systemically important non-bank financial 
companies370.  Since the US had previously only implemented the Advanced IRB 
approach, the new amendments specified that not all entities would be applying this 
approach, and banks which do not qualify under the Advanced IRB approach would 
adopt a method for calculation of capital built on the Standardised approach (with this 
method of calculation being established by US regulators, and not following the 
requirements set out by the Basel Accords)371.  The Standardised approach will also, 
however, act as a “capital-floor”, with the capital requirements being increased 
according to an entity’s size and complexity372.  Banks adopting the Advanced IRB 
approach are thus required to calculate their capital on the basis of both the 
                                                     
367 See:  Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Basel II:  A Realist’s Perspective (Remarks at the Risk Management 
Association’s Conference on Capital Management, Washington D.C., 9 April 2003) (Ferguson RMA 
Conference); Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Basel II:  Scope of Application in the United States (Remarks 
before the Institute of International Bankers, New York, 10 June 2003) (Ferguson IIB Remarks); 
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368 Ferguson IIB Remarks (n 367). 
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370 Rainer Masera, US Basel III Final Rule on Banks’ Capital Requirements:  a Different-Size-Fits-All 
Approach (PSL Quarterly Review, Vol. 66, No. 267, 2013) 388 
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Standardised approach and the Advanced IRB system, and they are then to use the most 
prudent approach for compliance purposes373. 
The Basel III amendments in the US will therefore not apply to small banks with total 
consolidated assets of less than USD500 million, to non-covered savings and loan 
holding companies, and to holding companies of industrial loan companies (unless these 
are considered to be systemically important entities)374.  These entities will continue to 
adopt regulatory capital requirements based upon the Basel I standards375.  One should 
also note that community banks (which include commercial banks and savings and loan 
associations and which have total consolidated assets of less than USD15 billion 
(calculated as at December 2009)) will be subject to a less stringent regulatory 
framework, whilst being subject to certain grandfathering provisions with respect to the 
calculation of regulatory capital376. 
Moreover, in the US, the liquidity coverage ratio will only apply to “internationally active 
banking organizations” (which are defined by referring to the same thresholds used on 
implementing Basel II, and with the liquidity coverage ratio therefore applying only to 
banks having total consolidated assets of USD250 billion or more, or having on-balance 
sheet foreign exposures amounting to USD10 billion or more), and to systemically 
important non-bank financial institutions377.  A less stringent liquidity coverage ratio 
will apply to bank holding companies that have more than USD50 billion in total assets 
provided that they do not meet the aforementioned thresholds378. 
Non-bank financial companies will only be subject to the rules implementing Basel III if 
these are considered as being “systemically important”379.  Rules have been established, 
setting out a three-stage process through which non-bank financial companies are 
evaluated in order to determine whether they should be classified as “systemically 
important” or otherwise, depending on the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, 
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities carried out by the said entity380.  However, 
                                                     
373 ibid 388 – 390. 
374 ibid (n 370) 389; Choulet (n 335) 4.   
375 Masera (n 370) 389. 
376 ibid 390; Choulet (n 335) 4. 
377 CIT Group Inc., CIT Bank, CIT Annual Report 2013:  Building Long-Term Value (3 April 2014) 12 
<http://ir.cit.com/Cache/1001185620.PDF?Y=&O=PDF&D=&fid=1001185620&T=&iid=102820> 
accessed 10 December 2014 (CIT Annual Report 2013).   
378 CIT Annual Report 2013 (n 377) 12.  
379 Masera (n 370) 388. 
380 See also:  Financial Stability Oversight Council, ‘Authority to Require Supervision and 
Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies’ (Office of the Federal Register of the 
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one of the initial conditions in order for a non-bank financial company to be classified as 
“systemically important”, is that it needs to at least have total consolidated assets 
amounting to USD50 billion (apart from other thresholds which would also need to be 
met)381. 
3.4.3 Other Jurisdictional Inconsistencies in the Application of the Basel Accords 
The position adopted by most jurisdictions has been that they have applied the Basel 
Accords, on a national level, to all banks found in that jurisdiction, without making any 
distinction between banks which are “internationally-active” or otherwise.  The 
extension of the Basel Accords to investment firms varies from one jurisdiction to 
another.  A few examples from the laws of different jurisdictions which implement the 
Basel Accords will be considered below. 
In Canada, the Canadian Capital Adequacy Requirements Guideline was made applicable 
to all banks incorporated in Canada, as well as to trust and loan companies, irrespective 
of whether these entities are internationally-active, or otherwise382.  Similarly, in 
Australia, the Prudential Standards implementing the Basel Accords apply to all 
“authorised deposit-taking institutions” incorporated in Australia (meaning that these 
standards apply also to small and medium-sized commercial banking institutions which 
might not be internationally-active)383.  The term “authorised deposit-taking institutions” 
includes banks (both domestically owned as well as subsidiaries of overseas banks), 
                                                                                                                                                        
National Archives and Records Administration, United States, 4 November 2012) 
<https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/04/11/2012-8627/authority-to-require-
supervision-and-regulation-of-certain-nonbank-financial-companies> accessed 18 December 
2014; Financial Stability Oversight Council, ‘Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of 
Certain Nonbank Financial Companies’ 
<http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/Nonbank%20Designations%20-
%20Final%20Rule%20and%20Guidance.pdf> accessed 18 December 2014; Chadbourne & Parke 




%2009%20Apr%2013.pdf> accessed 18 December 2014. 
381 Masera (n 370) 388. 
382 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme 
(RCAP):  Assessment of Basel III Regulations – Canada (July 2014) 4 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/l2_ca.pdf> accessed 12 December 2014 (Canada 
Regulatory Consistency Assessment). 
383 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme 
(RCAP):  Assessment of Basel III Regulations – Australia (March 2014) 3 – 4 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/l2_au.pdf> accessed 12 December 2014 (Australia 
Regulatory Consistency Assessment). 
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branches of overseas banks, credit unions, building societies, providers of purchased 
payment facilities, and specialist credit card providers384.     
In the People’s Republic of China, the relevant capital rules apply to all registered 
commercial banks – including small and medium-sized commercial banks which are not 
“internationally-active”385.  These rules do not apply, however, to “policy banks”, which 
are non-deposit taking, state-guaranteed investment entities386. 
The Capital Regulations of Brazil apply to all “financial institutions”, whether these are 
considered to be “internationally-active” or otherwise387.  The term “financial 
institutions” is very widely defined by Article 17 of the Brazilian Banking Law (Law 
4595/1964), and refers to “public or private corporate persons that have as their major or 
accessory activity the gathering, intermediation or investment of their own or third party 
financial resources in national or foreign currency, and custody services of assets belonging 
to third parties”388.  The applicability of the regulations implementing the Basel Accords 
are therefore similar to those found in the EU given that they are extended to institutions 
which also assist in the investment of their own or of third party financial resources. 
In Switzerland, the main legislative text for the regulation of capital standards and 
implementation of the Basel Accords is the Capital Adequacy Ordinance389.  This 
                                                     
384 ibid; See also:  <http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/pages/adilist.aspx> accessed 13 December 
2014.  
385 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme 
(RCAP):  Assessment of Basel III Regulations – China (September 2013) 6 
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387 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme 
(RCAP):  Assessment of Basel III Regulations in Brazil (December 2013) 59 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/l2_br.pdf>  accessed 12 December 2014 (Brazil 
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Ordinance makes the capital adequacy rules applicable to both “banks” as well as 
“securities dealers”390. 
On the other hand, in Japan, only “internationally-active banks” are obliged to comply 
with the rules implementing the Basel Accords391.  A separate regime was however 
established for “domestic banks”, with much less capital requirements being required 
(having a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 4 per cent, with various reserves being 
included in the regulatory capital)392.  One should also note that in Japan banks are 
considered to be “internationally-active” only if they have overseas subsidiaries or 
branches, notwithstanding that “domestic banks” might be active in foreign markets 
without having established subsidiaries or branches outside of Japan393.  The definition 
of “internationally-active” is therefore substantially different from that which had been 
adopted in the US (which referred to specific financial thresholds as discussed above).  
Furthermore, though the US has now limited the difference in applicability between 
internationally active banks and other banks, Japan has opted to retain its distinction 
between “internationally-active banks” and other banks. 
3.5 Competitive Equity and the Changing Objectives of the Basel 
Accords 
As discussed in the preceding Sections the lack of definitions in the international 
standards established by the Basel Accords has led to these standards being applied to 
different entities in different jurisdictions.  Though the Basel Accords refer to 
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“internationally-active banks”, in the EU these international standards have been applied 
to all banks and investment firms, whilst in the US they have only recently been 
extended to most “depositary institutions” (whilst applying a watered-down regime for 
smaller banks) and are only applied to those non-banks which are considered to be 
systemically important.   
In considering the scope of implementation of Basel II, the US had discussed the need for 
“competitive equity” between banks and non-banks, and though it was recognised that 
disparities between bank regulation and non-bank regulation should be avoided, it was 
also considered that supervisors have “an obligation to develop the regulations that they 
feel are appropriate to banks even if similar regulations will not be applied to nonbank 
competitors”394.  Furthermore the main focus of US regulation has been limited to 
internationally-active banks and systemically important financial institutions, 
notwithstanding that the three types of capital adequacy standards (i.e. the 
Standardised, Foundation IRB, and the Advanced IRB approaches) put forward in the 
Basel Accords as from Basel II were meant to apply not only to the most complex of 
banks, but to a wide range of banks and financial institutions irrespective of their 
activities and complexity395. 
The need for “competitive equity” between different financial entities has been discussed 
in both the EU and the US, whilst seeking to justify their different approaches as to which 
entities the Basel Accords should be applied to396.  It seems somewhat ironic, therefore, 
that the same argument was used in different jurisdictions to justify completely different 
approaches.  In the EU the argument of “competitive equity” was used in order to argue in 
favour of the extension of the capital requirements directives and the CRR to all of 
internationally-active credit institutions, credit institutions which are not 
internationally-active, as well as investment firms (even though the EU is yet to adopt 
this reasoning in relation to shadow banks)397.  On the other hand, this was used in the 
US in order to argue that, in light of the higher costs which the Basel regime imposed on 
banks, competitive equity required that the Basel regime should only apply to larger 
banks since otherwise smaller banks would be subject to disproportionate costs on 
implementation of the laws implementing the Basel Accords and would thus find 
                                                     
394 Ferguson RMA Conference (n 367).  
395 Herring (n 355) 276.  
396 Masera (n 356) 11.   
397 Lucia Quaglia, Setting the Pace?  Private Financial Interests and European Financial Market 
Integration (British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) 57. 
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themselves at a competitive disadvantage398.  It was also argued by US policymakers that 
large banks are not only able to absorb the high costs which the Basel regime imposes, 
but they are also better equipped to circumvent the regulations through the use of 
sophisticated derivative-based financial structures399. 
Whereas “competitive equity” was the reason why capital requirements were extended 
to investment firms in the EU, no consideration has been given to the possibility of 
extending the principles of the Basel Accords to shadow banking entities.  This has also 
been highlighted as a point of concern by the Banking Stakeholder Group who have 
stated that400: 
there is a potential danger that the overall regulatory regime that is applied to 
regulated banks may not be as sufficiently competitively neutral as between 
institutions conducting essentially similar business and that this may unnecessarily 
distort competition between the regulated sector and the less-regulated 
institutions in the shadow banking sector.     
Moreover, the definition of “internationally-active” itself has also been the subject of 
different interpretations, with the US and Japan adopting different arbitrary definitions 
which are not consistent with each other and which have therefore given rise to 
inconsistencies in the way in which the Basel Accords are applied internationally. 
One must therefore take a closer look at the objectives of the Basel Accords, particularly 
in light of varying reasons for regulation which have been given on adoption of these 
standards on a national level.  As seen in this Section, the historical reason for the 
implementation of the Basel Accords has been attributed to the need for a level playing 
field amongst banks in different jurisdictions, thus ensuring that international banks 
competing with each other are subject to similar regulatory frameworks.  This can also 
be seen from the text of Basel I, which stated:  “This report represents the outcome of the 
Committee’s work over several years to secure international convergence of supervisory 
regulations governing the capital adequacy of international banks” [emphasis added]401. 
Following the recent global financial crisis the main objective of the Basel Accords seems 
to have been changing, however, with priority being given to objectives other than that 
of having “regulatory convergence” between states.  Basel I had listed two “fundamental 
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objectives” which “lie at the heart of the Committee’s work”, in seeking to obtain 
regulatory convergence402: 
Two fundamental objectives lie at the heart of the Committee’s work on regulatory 
convergence. These are, firstly, that the new framework should serve to strengthen 
the soundness and stability of the international banking system; and secondly that 
the framework should be in fair and have a high degree of consistency in its 
application to banks in different countries with a view to diminishing an existing 
source of competitive inequality among international banks... 
Therefore, in Basel I, regulatory convergence had been set as the main aim of the Basel 
Accords, with this having been sought through the attainment of two “fundamental” 
objectives.  The two objectives which were considered necessary to reach regulatory 
convergence, were:  strengthening the soundness and stability of the international 
banking system; and having a higher degree of consistency of the regulatory framework.  
However, following the recent global financial crisis there has been a shift in emphasis 
from “regulatory convergence” towards seeking to reduce systemic risks by placing a 
greater emphasis on the soundness of banking systems (which in Basel I was only 
considered as a “fundamental objective” in achieving the main goal of regulatory 
convergence).  The title of the Basel documents itself is evidence of this.  Whereas each 
of the Basel I and Basel II texts were given the title of “International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”, the main Basel III documents (which 
amended (but did not replace) the Basel II text) were entitled:  “Basel III:   A Global 
Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems” and “Basel III:  The 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools” respectively.   
Regulatory capital in Basel III is therefore now seen as a means through which systemic 
risks may be contained, rather than being used to ensure that similar standards apply 
between different states and thereby reducing competitive advantages which certain 
states would otherwise have over others403.  The aim of countering systemic risks also 
appears to contrast with the position adopted prior to the recent global financial crisis – 
where the former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan had stated that the 
containment and elimination of systemic risks should be a function of central banks, and 
should not be catered for through the imposition of capital adequacy measures on 
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International Economic Law, Vol. 13(3), OUP, 2010) 763 – 764.  
105 
 
banks404.  Moreover, the Basel Accords now also seek to minimise systemic risk at a 
national level (rather than just focusing on systemic risks arising out of the international 
banking system), such that the Basel Accords have been seen as a system through which 
banks are strengthened in order to seek to ensure that claims on public funds (through 
depositor insurance/ guarantee schemes) are not resorted to.  
The shift in scope away from regulatory convergence seemed to already be present in 
Basel II – when referring to the ways in which supervisory authorities should have 
adopted Basel II it was specifically stated that on implementation of the Basel Accords 
national supervisors needed to carefully consider the benefits which Basel II would have 
had at national level and therefore develop a timetable and approach to implementation 
based on national considerations405.  This also shows a shift away from the objective of 
regulatory convergence, towards a system where the resilience and soundness of banks 
(through the adoption of stronger risk management practices) seeks to take precedence. 
As early as 2003, the Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board had already stated, on 
discussing Basel II, that “[m]any have forgotten that the first accord had its origins in 
complaints that globalization of banking had distorted competitive balance...”406.   He 
continued by stating:  “[w]e should not lose sight of the continuing imperative, both 
economic and political, to ensure that a revised accord is perceived by all to maintain a 
level playing field for banks operating not only across national borders but also 
domestically”407. 
In setting out its objectives, Basel II already implied that “sufficient consistency” amongst 
the laws and regulations of different jurisdictions will suffice, as long as the soundness 
and stability of the international banking system is catered for.  In this respect Basel II 
stated408: 
The fundamental objective of the Committee’s work to revise the 1988 Accord has 
been to develop a framework that would further strengthen the soundness and 
stability of the international banking system while maintaining sufficient 
consistency that capital adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of 
competitive inequality among internationally active banks. 
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The Basel III reforms’ main objectives, following the recent global financial crisis, 
continued to build on Basel II, by having their main objectives strictly focused on the 
reduction of systemic risks, by stating that “[t]he objective of the reforms is to improve the 
banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, 
whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real 
economy”409.  It has also been stated that a number of reforms in Basel III were 
introduced in order to “address the market failures revealed by the crisis”410. 
Therefore, whilst international regulatory convergence was the main reason for the 
promulgation of the Basel Accords, there has been, in recent years, a marked shift away 
from the original objective of international regulatory convergence, towards the 
protection from systemic risks and the “soundness and stability of the international 
banking system”.  This shift in scope away from regulatory convergence, and similarly 
the lack of competitive equity between different financial instruments has however 
increased regulatory arbitrage opportunities available, which may in turn even defeat 
the purpose of reducing systemic risks, as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.   
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Chapter 4:  Applying Economic Concepts to the Basel 
Accords 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis it has been shown how the Basel Accords developed primarily 
through regulatory cooperation and transnational regulatory networks, with the 
regulatory agencies responsible for developing this transnational regulation being 
subject to various influences.  This Chapter will start off by reviewing literature which 
sets out main law and economics principles, and Section 4.2 will then proceed to apply 
these principles to the Basel Accords.  It will here be shown that insufficient economic 
analysis has been carried out on formulating the Basel Accords, with this giving rise to 
legitimacy and accountability problems411.  In the following Chapter it will also be 
argued this has given rise to problems of regulatory arbitrage which limit the positive 
effects which the Basel Accords seek to achieve, and with regulatory arbitrage being 
encouraged as a result of the different approaches being adopted by different 
jurisdictions and as a result of the Basel Accords being extended to different types of 
entities across different jurisdictions as described in Chapter 3.    
4.1 Main Economic Concepts 
According to Waller, law and economics “applies economic reasoning to legal questions 
and in general views the creation and enforcement of legal rules primarily in terms of how 
legal rules and institutions promote allocative efficiency and wealth maximization”412.  He 
states that “law and economics examines and evaluates the changes generated in respect of 
one variable, human behaviour, in dependence and as a function of another variable, legal 
rules”, and this whilst other determinants are assumed to remain constant413.  Different 
actors therefore continuously seek to maximize their utility, particularly by responding 
to incentives and changes in regulation from time to time, such that one necessarily 
needs to understand the utility obtained by the different actors in order to predict what 
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effect certain regulation (and transnational regulatory laws) may have upon these 
actors, and how they would react to a change in regulation. 
Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler have stated that the goal of law and economics is to explain the 
content of law, and that law could have been established for two different reasons414:  
since laws can be seen as solutions to the problems which arise in trying to organize 
society, they may provide efficient solutions to organizing society; and on the other 
hand, laws may be enacted because of rent-seeking activities of politically-powerful 
actors.  In this regard Schillig has noted that “[l]aw as a means to an end aims to generate 
(or to preserve) a certain state of affairs in the world, to yield certain consequences, by 
providing a set of incentives for those subject to legal rules so that they may adjust their 
behaviour accordingly”415.  He however also observes how the ends which are pursued 
by the legislator are only achieved if the addressees of rules do actually adjust their 
behaviour in the way in which the legislator would have intended416. 
4.1.1 Law as a Sanction or Constraint 
Schillig, quoting Posner, has stated that “[e]conomics is the science of rational choice in a 
world – our world – in which resources are limited in relation to human wants”, and he 
therefore considers that “economics provides a theory of human behavior as a function of 
external constraints”, and that as a result law “is part of the constraints that restrict the 
individual’s free choice and necessitate the allocation of scarce resources to competing 
ends”417.  He continues by stating that economic analysis of law thus418:  
explores whether and in what way changes to the law – by way of legislation or 
adjudication – are likely to influence the behaviour of those subject to the law and, 
given certain pre-determined policy objectives, which regulatory or interpretative 
alternative appears to be preferable.   
Law as a “constraint” is very relevant to the Basel Accords given that these international 
standards act as a constraint not only on the industry, but also on the same states which 
are meant to implement and enforce the Basel Accords.  This thesis has considered, in 
Section 2.3, how the three actors involved in the Basel Accords consist of national 
regulatory agencies which come together as a transnational network; the individual 
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nation states which typically act out of self-interest; and the industry, which is not 
necessarily concerned with transnational problems.  As the industry and states are 
subject to the limitations established by the Basel Accords, both of these actors are 
conditioned to make rational choices which may help them reach their specific goals and 
which may defeat the aims for which the Basel Accords had been established by the 
international community made up of transnational bodies and transnational networks.   
Economic theory, as applied to law, provides a behavioural theory which seeks to 
explain and predict how people (or in relation to the Basel Accords, firms, or states) 
respond to incentives or disincentives which are created by legal rules and 
institutions419.  Cooter notes how the “imperative theory of law defines a law as an 
obligation backed by a sanction” and that economic analysis has “enjoyed great success by 
analyzing a legal sanction as if it were a market price”420.  Similarly, Korokbin and Ulen 
have stated that the “seminal insight that economics provides to the analysis of law is that 
people respond to incentives”, with this therefore being based, as a concept on the price 
theory421.   
Economic analysis has thus sought to predict the effect of sanctions upon one’s 
behaviour, and has considered how “sanctions” (including those arising from law and 
regulation) have the same effect as “prices” as they are both tariffs on behaviours, and 
given that people respond to heavier sanctions in the same way as they would respond 
to higher prices422.  Thus, in carrying out an economic analysis of law, economists have 
sought to adapt “price theory” to law in order to seek to determine the behavioural 
effects as to how people respond to sanctions imposed upon them by law and 
regulation423.  This thesis will therefore consider the behaviour of states and of the 
industry as a result of sanctions and limitations imposed by the Basel Accords, and it will 
be argued that regulatory arbitrage takes place as states and the industry act out of self-
interest.  
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Cooter further notes that when analyzing the effect which sanctions have on one’s 
behaviour, one also needs to analyse whether the subjects of law or regulation behave 
“strategically” or “non-strategically”424.  Though the main assumption behind price 
theory is that people behave non-strategically (with each participant expecting that his 
own buying and selling would not affect the market), there may be instances where 
participants do adopt a strategic approach425.  When participants adopt a strategic 
approach, “game theory” is resorted to in order to analyse how participants adopt 
strategic behaviour in response to changes in the applicable rules, with one’s actions 
being dependent upon the envisaged reaction which other participants may have426.  It 
has been noted that whether people behave strategically or otherwise will often depend 
on the number of participants in the market, given that where there are a larger number 
of participants one would assume that one’s actions alone cannot influence the “market” 
(as in a perfectly competitive model), whilst where there are very few participants each 
one may assume that his behaviour can affect the activities of other participants427.   
This thesis argues that when considering the Basel Accords, states (as actors and as 
entities which are regulated by transnational regulatory laws) behave strategically in 
adopting, implementing and enforcing the Basel Accords, with this being a result of the 
regulatory competitive environment which states find themselves in. 
4.1.2 Maximising Utility 
As the goals of the international community, of states, and of financing entities vary, the 
utility these different players derive from a transnational regulatory law such as the 
Basel Accords varies also.  Cooter and Kraus have noted how one combines goods into 
bundles in order to make overall judgments about whether one bundle is better than 
another, with this being the meaning behind the term “utility”428.  In light of limited 
resources and of different alternatives available (giving rise to different utility), a 
rational person would make those choices which would realise such person’s overall 
goal429.  They therefore state that this is “all that modern economists mean by an 
individual “maximizing utility””430. 
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Schillig has similarly noted how the concept of “utility maximization” is that “human 
behaviour is based on the idea that individuals seek their own interest as they perceive it 
and maximize their utility subject to constraints imposed on them by existing normative 
systems and factual determinants”431.  He however notes how this rests on three basic 
assumptions, being:  one ranks alternative combinations according to preference orders; 
there are limited resources (scarceness) which restrict the alternatives available; and 
one’s choices are a function of his preferences and constraints432.  One’s rationality is 
however “bounded” by constraints such as transaction costs, information costs, as well as 
by one’s limits of processing the information available433.  Given that one only has 
limited resources available, a consumer is considered to maximise his utility by choosing 
the consumption which best serves his preferences434.  One’s utility is considered to be 
maximised when the marginal benefit obtained from the additional unit is equal to the 
marginal costs represented by the loss in utility resulting from the foregone opportunity 
of investing in alternative goods435. 
Furthermore, Cooter and Kraus also note that economists usually assume that 
consumers get their utility from their own consumption of goods and not from 
consumption of goods by others, and that consumers are therefore purely “self-
interested”, and that “narrow self-interest” remains “the operate assumption” in areas of 
“applied economics, such as international trade, industrial organization, and finance”436.  
Economists also assume that persons only care about their own wealth or well-being 
and not about the wealth or well-being of others, with this therefore complementing the 
self-interest attributes referred to above437. 
As the thesis considers the different goals of the different actors, it argues (particularly 
in Section 2.3) that the different actors in the Basel Accords’ recursive process act out of 
self-interest and that the goals of each of the international community, the states, and of 
the financing entities vary due to their own self-interest and out of their interest to 
maximize their own individual utility.  This thesis therefore looks at the effect of firms 
and states adopting a “rational” approach to the Basel Accords, with firms and states 
                                                     
431 Schillig (n 413) 857 – 858.  
432 ibid 858. 
433 ibid. 
434 ibid 859. 
435 ibid.  
436 Cooter and Kraus (n 14) 21 - 22.  
437 ibid 21.   
112 
 
therefore acting out of their own “self-interest” in seeking to attain their specific goals, 
rather than as “reasonable” entities438. 
4.1.3 Efficiency in the Allocation of Property Rights and the Justifiability of 
Regulatory Intervention 
As seen above, rational actors seek to maximize their utility through the actions they 
take.  As a corollary of this, Coase has argued that notwithstanding the initial distribution 
of property rights, bargaining and trading among right holders will inevitably lead to 
property rights being allocated efficiently439.  He notes that the precondition for this to 
be able to take place is that property rights must be clearly defined, transaction costs 
(and information costs) must be close to zero, there must be no wealth effects which will 
affect marginal valuation, and with strategic behaviour and free-riding also being ruled 
out440. 
As a result, Schillig has argued that a conclusion which may be drawn from the Coase 
Theorem is that441: 
[r]egulatory intervention may be justified only when market failure reaches a 
degree and transaction costs reach a level which effectively prevents efficient 
exchange based on bargaining and negotiation.  Any regulatory intervention 
should be carried out only if, and to the extent that, its benefits outweigh its 
inevitable costs. 
Following on from the Coase Theorem it has been argued that the visible hand of the law 
(which therefore includes governance mechanisms such as public laws, regulations and 
business associations) improves economic performance only through its ability to 
reduce transaction costs442. 
When considering the particular nature of the Basel Accords, however, one needs to 
consider to what extent transaction costs are reduced and whether the Basel Accords 
can therefore be justified or otherwise.  One can argue that the limitations imposed by 
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the Basel Accords increase rather than reduce transaction costs and that the aim of the 
international community is only to reduce potential social costs which may arise in the 
long run on the happening of financial crises (and which the Basel Accords seek to 
prevent).  In light of the limited scope of the Basel Accords (as described in Chapter 3), 
regulatory arbitrage has been resorted to, resulting in the transfer of risk from the 
regulated to the unregulated activities (such as through entities such as shadow banks), 
which may therefore even bring into question whether the social costs which the Basel 
Accords seek to prevent are actually being prevented or otherwise. 
4.2 Extending Concepts of Law and Economics to the Basel Accords  
Notwithstanding that literature on law and economics generally refers to the concept of 
law and economics when considering how national law applies to individuals and firms, 
these concepts can also be extended to transnational regulatory laws such as the Basel 
Accords.  Transnational regulatory laws act as a constraint not only on individuals and 
firms, but also on states (in their role as “actors”).  Both states as well as the industry (as 
further described in Section 2.3.2) have their own goals to achieve, which may be 
different from the goals of the international community, and these goals may also change 
in response to further constraints imposed upon them.  
It is here argued that the Basel Accords will only reach their stated aims if they can be 
seen as emanating from a legitimate body by each of the international community, states, 
and the industry, and only if the objectives of the Basel Accords do not hinder the goals 
of each of these three different actors.  In order to have effective regulation of systemic 
risks and capital adequacy an analysis needs to be carried out of how the different actors 
are affected by the Basel Accords, who these different actors are and what their goals 
are, and how they would be expected to act if they are to act as rational actors seeking to 
maximize their own utility.   
Both the industry as well as states (acting independently from the international 
community), do not necessarily have global financial stability, the reduction of systemic 
risk, or regulatory convergence amongst different states, as their main areas of priority.  
Rather, one can safely assume that the main priority of industry participants (regulated 
by the Basel Accords) is that of making profits to the satisfaction of their shareholders or 
promoters.  Furthermore, one can also assume that the main interest of individual states 
is that of having a competitive advantage over other states in order to attract and 
encourage investment and provide for the well-being of their citizens (also since states 
obtain their own legitimacy from their citizens).  These specific goals of the industry and 
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of individual nation states may therefore be conflicting with the goals of the 
international community which gets together to set out the Basel Accords.   
Goldsmith and Posner have argued that the development of “international law” is not 
based on “legality, morality, opinio juris, and related non-instrumental concepts” but 
rather on “rational choice tools”443.  They argue that international law develops as a 
result of states seeking to rationally “maximize their interests” (as states) given their 
perception of the varying interests of other states, and the distribution of power 
amongst different states444.  They also argue that states have “no moral obligation to 
comply with international law, and liberal democratic nations have no duty to engage in 
the strong cosmopolitan actions so often demanded of them”445. 
The varying goals of the international community, the individual states, and of the 
industry also need to be analysed since the Basel Accords are only based on “soft-law” 
and would therefore be dependent on the individual states to be given effect to and to be 
supervised and enforced.  Furthermore, the promulgation of transnational regulatory 
laws (including the Basel Accords) is typically dependent on a number of external 
factors and influences such as regulatory capture.  As regulatory capture can affect the 
way in which regulatory agencies work, it can also influence the way in which 
transnational regulatory laws such as the Basel Accords are implemented and enforced 
in particular jurisdictions, possibly also by bringing the interests of the industry and of 
the individual nation states closer to each other (and further away from the interests of 
the international community).  This will also be bound to be exacerbated by cultural and 
domestic embeddedness which would typically only affect the industry and national 
regulatory agencies, drawing them even closer to each other. 
Moreover, hegemonic influences during negotiations leading up to the Basel Accords 
(and with similar influences also being applied on trying to encourage other jurisdictions 
to adopt these standards), also mean that certain states may not be willing to fully 
implement or enforce certain provisions of the Basel Accords.  States may thus be willing 
to agree to the adoption of certain principles in the Basel Accords, in full knowledge that 
the texts agreed to here are only “soft-laws” and do not necessarily bind their future 
actions. The Basel regime is dependent on being implemented into national 
                                                     
443 Jack Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The New International Law Scholarship (Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, Vol 34, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 126, 
May 2006) 463. 
444 ibid. 
445 ibid 463, 472. 
115 
 
implementing laws, meaning that various issues are left to national supervisory 
discretion, and divergences are common, with different rules also being applied in 
different jurisdictions (though divergences in the EU are limited in light of there being a 
unified set of laws applied at EU level)446.  These variations and limitations have also 
been recognised by the BCBS447. 
Posner has also noted how, notwithstanding the long history of capital adequacy, bank 
regulators have rarely carried out any cost-benefit analyses on capital adequacy rules, 
and when a cost-benefit analysis was carried out by the BCBS this was carried out 
wrongly448.  He has therefore argued that capital adequacy standards have only been 
adopted through a system which he calls “norming”, whereby regulators selected the 
“mean or model behaviour” of regulated entities and adopted that as a standard, thereby 
necessarily requiring a change in the behaviour of weaker banks which as a result were 
required to either increase their capital standards or stop operating449.  He notes how 
between 1981 and 2013 capital requirements were raised “slowly and reluctantly” and 
as a “response to the problem of regulatory arbitrage”450.  He argues that the capital 
adequacy requirements as introduced in the US were not based on proper cost-benefit 
analyses, and that the amendments made were only introduced as a reaction to periods 
of instability or periods of financial health and that “regulators therefore acted like a 
person in a shower who turns the faucet toward hot if the water is too cold and turns the 
faucet toward cold if the water is too hot”451. 
Posner has argued that another standard which regulators seem to have adopted in 
establishing the capital adequacy regulation is that of “feasibility”, thereby seeking to 
ensure that regulation did not impose excessive costs which could have resulted in job 
losses, bankruptcy and factory shutdowns452.  He however notes that “feasibility”, as a 
style of regulation, is less aggressive than what cost-benefit implies, and that regulators 
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seem to have been driven by the notion of imposing as little cost as possible over the 
industry453. 
It has furthermore also been argued that the assumptions underlying the Basel 
regulatory risk capital weight function are not substantiated, and are mostly based on 
intuition (having been made arbitrarily) rather than following a scientific approach454.  
Benston has also stated that the standardised risk-weights adopted are not economically 
optimal, and these risk weights only represent a political compromise, where low risk-
weightings are assigned to assets favoured by politically powerful groups455.  It has also 
been argued that the regulatory model adopted by the Standardised approach ignores 
other matters, such as the effect of government intervention (such as through deposit 
insurance and bailouts) on bank risk taking456.   
Prior to the adoption of Basel III, and the CRR and the CRD IV (in the EU), the economic 
analyses which were carried out by the BCBS457, and by other entities such as the 
European Central Bank458 (“ECB”) and the UK Prudential Regulation Authority459 
(“PRA”), limited their scope to the additional elements introduced by Basel III (and 
consequently the CRR and the CRD IV), but did not analyse the major concepts upon 
which the Basel Accords have been developed and which are highlighted and questioned 
by this thesis.  Therefore, notwithstanding the various restrictions imposed on the 
industry as a result of the Basel Accords, no proper economic analysis has been carried 
out despite the widespread economic implications of these international standards.  
Some of the economic considerations which one would have expected regulators to 
analyse on adopting and implementing the Basel Accords are: the loss of profits incurred 
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by banks in being required to keep higher capital ratios460; the effects on the industry as 
bank financing becomes less available (in light of higher capital ratio constraints); the 
incentives to transfer financing activities from regulated entities to unregulated entities 
(such as shadow banks), and what the implications are of having financing activities 
being provided by non-banks (particularly for industries which require long-term 
financing).  Furthermore, economic analysis should also identify the potential for 
regulatory arbitrage which exists as a result of the self-interested approach which states 
and the industry adopt. 
4.3  Legitimacy and Accountability of the Basel Accords  
Both “legitimacy” and “accountability” are essential for laws and regulations to be upheld 
by their subjects.  It has thus been stated that “the interplay of legitimacy and authority 
determines who obeys global norms”461.  As will be seen below, it has been argued that 
transnational regulatory laws generally suffer from both a lack of legitimacy as well as a 
lack of accountability in the absence of a proper economic analysis being adopted, and 
this Section will therefore examine the extent to which this lack of legitimacy and 
accountability may hinder the Basel Accords from reaching their stated objectives.   
Transnational regulatory networks such as the BCBS do not only have to be “legitimate” 
in the eyes of the industry being affected by the Basel Accords and accountable to them, 
but they also need to be “legitimate” and “accountable” towards states and national 
regulators too, given that transnational regulatory networks are dependent upon the 
latter in order to give effect to the transnational regulatory laws they promulgate.  This 
thesis argues that the Basel Accords suffer from there being a lack of legitimacy of the 
BCBS in the eyes of states (acting individually) and of the industry, with this resulting in 
serious constraints which hinder the Basel Accords from reaching their stated aims. 
Section 2.3 of this thesis has argued that the Basel Accords have been applied without 
there being a proper analysis of who the main players are and what the main interests of 
these different actors are.  Whilst different nation states come together (together with 
the BCBS) in order to establish transnational regulatory laws, individual nation states 
and the industry are then tasked with adopting, enforcing and abiding by the said 
transnational regulatory laws, notwithstanding that states acting out of self-interest may 
consider the Basel Accords to be an unnecessary burden which they need to be seen as 
being compliant with.  Given that the international community has no binding power, 
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and relies solely on soft-law and peer pressure, the proper adoption and adherence to 
such transnational regulatory laws can only be achieved if each of the main actors 
consider the Basel Accords to have been adopted through a legitimate body and if they 
consider that there is an element of accountability on adhering to those transnational 
regulatory laws.   
The legitimacy and accountability of the Basel Accords is here analysed by relying on 
traditional literature (which is reviewed in Section 4.3.1) which deals with the 
legitimacy and accountability of national regulatory agencies, and extending these 
principles further to transnational regulatory networks.  Furthermore the principles 
which are usually adopted in relation to the legitimacy and accountability of national 
regulatory agencies need to also be extended further in order to consider the legitimacy 
and accountability of transnational regulatory bodies in the eyes of states and their 
national regulatory agencies.    
4.3.1 Defining “legitimacy” and “accountability” 
Black has defined “legitimacy” as follows:  “[l]egitimacy, in its regulatory context, is an 
acceptance that a person or organisation has a right to govern both by those it seeks to 
govern and those on whose behalf it purports to govern”, and continues by stating that 
notwithstanding various strategies which may be adopted in order for a regulatory 
agency to seek to gain legitimacy, this will very much depend on the extent to which this 
claim to legitimacy is “accepted by others”462.  Shaffer has similarly stated that 
“legitimacy” refers to “the subjective belief of actors that a rule or institution should be 
obeyed”, and that “it depends on whether actors regard the institutions and processes that 
promulgate and convey it as “rightful”, and thus authoritative”463. 
Though Habermas has been of the view that only “political orders can have and lose 
legitimacy”, and that “[m]ultinational corporations or the world market are not capable of 
legitimation” (as he assumes that “political orders” are tantamount to “[s]tates”)464, it is 
here argued that regulatory agencies, even when operating on a transnational level do 
constitute a relatively new type of political order whereby transnational rule-making 
bodies come together in order to propose and promulgate transnational laws and 
transnational regulatory laws to be imposed on their separate subjects.  
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The “legitimacy” of global governance institutions has also been described as follows465: 
‘Legitimacy’ has both a normative and a sociological meaning.  To say that an 
institution is legitimate in the normative sense is to assert that it has the right to 
rule – where ruling includes promulgating rules and attempting to secure 
compliance with them by attaching costs to noncompliance and/ or benefits to 
compliance.  An institution is legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely 
believed to have the right to rule. 
On referring to “legitimacy” in relation to “states”, Habermas has considered how 
“legitimacy” is measured “against the belief in its legitimacy on the part of those subject to 
the domination”466.  He therefore continues by stating that this becomes a question of 
“belief that the structures, procedures, actions, decisions, policies, officials, or political 
leaders of a state possess the quality of rightness, of appropriateness, of the morally good, 
and ought to be recognized in virtue of this quality”467. 
The term “accountability”, on the other hand, refers to the “means by which legitimacy 
can be assessed”468. 
Avgouleas argues that transnational regulatory networks such as the BCBS face more 
questions about “accountability” rather than with regard to “legitimacy”, particularly in 
light of the fact that “soft-laws” established by these bodies are not complemented by 
structures of accountability469.  Verdier also argues that transnational regulatory 
networks are bound to be primarily accountable towards demands of their “domestic 
constituencies”, rather than to “the goal of international cooperation for its own sake”470.  
Thus, he states that national regulatory agencies acting at a transnational level, continue 
to be accountable to each of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of their 
states, as well as to the public at large and media of that same state471.  They also 
continue to be subject to administrative law requirements and legal constraints arising 
out of national laws472. 
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Black, in advancing her deliberative democratic approach to law and its requirement for 
legitimacy, has stated473: 
... Law and the exercise of political power is legitimate to the extent that it has been 
agreed upon by citizens in a process of deliberative opinion and will formation, a 
process that itself has to conform to certain conditions which will allow undistorted 
communication.  There is thus an internal relation between law and democracy, 
not simply an historical association.  The legitimacy of law depends on undistorted 
public communication, but as noted law has in turn to secure the infrastructure 
that will allow that communication to occur in accordance with those conditions.  
There is moreover an internal relation between law and political power.  In part 
this lies in their mutual interdependence.  Law needs political power in the form of 
an organized state to be able to perform the function of stabilizing expectations 
between citizens.  Political power needs law in order to be able to issue binding 
norms and to implement collective goals, and indeed to provide the basis for its 
organizations and procedures.  It is not a case of a simple exchange between the 
two, however.  For law to operate it also has to serve as a resource of justice, it has 
to be legitimate.  This will be lost if it is used by political power for just any 
purpose:  the familiar antagonism between law and politics. 
Black therefore considers proceduralization as being necessary for legitimation of law, 
and has considered how regulators should act as mediators and translators between 
different parties, and be capable of mapping differences and conflicts between 
deliberants, with a view of a solution being reached through effective regulation474.  
Black therefore mainly focuses on how interpretative communities can be fostered, on 
regulation being a means of conversation, and on the limits and possibilities of law 
itself475. 
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Though the above has been stated by Black in her contribution to “regulation” generally, 
it is here argued that the same issues still apply, and may become even more marked 
when considering the implementation of transnational regulatory standards.  It has been 
argued that networks such as the BCBS lack the necessary systems for the exercise of a 
deliberative democratic approach476.  Whilst typically business regulation emanates 
from an “array of private sector, civil society, multi-stakeholder and hybrid public-private 
institutions operating in a dynamic, transnational regulatory space”, and not just from 
“conventional state and inter-state institutions”, it is here argued that the Basel Accords 
only consider the interests of national regulators coming together in one international 
community, and the lack of consideration of interests of other actors gives rise to 
problems and challenges which hinder the effectiveness of the Basel Accords, rather 
than help in its development477.  
On referring to the “globalization paradox” Slaughter does not consider transnational 
regulatory networks as giving rise to issues of democratization and accountability, 
seemingly by relying on the fact that the members of these networks (i.e. the national 
regulatory agencies) have their own democratic and accountability credentials (without 
going into the debate as to whether these are sufficient or otherwise)478.  She therefore 
defends the democratic and accountability credentials of transnational regulatory 
networks by comparing these transnational regulatory networks to systems of global 
regulation which would by their nature be “amorphous” and “unaccountable”479.  
Nevertheless, it is here argued that having an unaccountable transnational regulatory 
network only means that the actors whose interests are not aligned to that of the 
transnational regulatory network will seek to find ways and means around the 
transnational regulatory law (through regulatory arbitrage), particularly where the said 
actors consider there to be a lack of legitimacy of the said network.  
In order for regulation to be successful, particularly when emanating from transnational 
law and transnational regulatory networks, the entities to whom such laws and 
regulations apply need to recognise those laws and regulations as being legitimate laws 
and regulations.  If one were to look at society and law-making, one would least have 
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issues with “legitimacy” when such laws would have been promulgated directly through 
Parliament – where the people’s representatives, elected through a democratic process, 
legislate in order to establish orderly systems through which members of the society can 
interact.  This process is however much more fragmented, however, when dealing with 
national regulatory agencies and transnational regulatory networks. 
The systems at play in transnational regulatory networks are somewhat hierarchical, 
with transnational regulatory networks establishing regulations which need to be 
implemented by national regulators, and applied to the industry.  Therefore legitimacy 
of transnational regulatory networks goes one step further than legitimacy of national 
regulatory agencies since the transnational regulatory networks also need to be 
legitimate and acceptable to both states as well as to the industry, with regulatory 
conversations being essential at all levels. 
4.3.2 Legitimacy of National Regulatory Agencies   
The topic of “legitimacy”, was subject to various discussions and divergent views upon 
the establishment of national regulatory agencies, as these regulators typically have 
rule-making functions, an executive branch in order to give effect to the rules they 
promulgate, as well as a dispute-resolution mechanisms (such as a Tribunal) where 
matters relating to regulation can be resolved.  Regulatory agencies have therefore been 
criticised as possibly leading to a lack of “transparency, accountability, due process and 
participation, as well as several values typically associated with formal conceptions of the 
rule of law”480.   
The traditional argument in favour of legitimacy which national regulatory agencies put 
forward is that national regulatory agencies are established by statute and obtain their 
legitimacy from the fact that the persons appointed to lead these regulatory agencies, 
would have been appointed by the persons who would have been elected 
democratically, with these regulatory agencies then being accountable towards 
Parliament.  Thus legitimacy is generally considered to be satisfied if the executive and 
the legislature of a state retain the power to establish the priorities of regulatory 
agencies, appoint and remove the persons who manage these agencies and if the state is 
briefed and consulted by these regulatory agencies481.   
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States are therefore said to have struck a “governance bargain” with regulatory 
organisations by granting them the authority to regulate specific industries (with the 
same argument also applicable to self-regulating organisations, in instances where the 
Government would have granted this authority by failing to impose specific laws or 
regulations itself), by allowing them to regulate conduct over areas of social and 
economic life, on the specific understanding that regulatory powers will be withdrawn 
should they fail to deliver to the satisfaction of the state482. 
Black argues that the process of legitimation, however, also requires administrative 
arms of a state to make use of “communicative power”, and that a regulatory agency 
therefore “cannot derive its legitimacy from the connection between the political 
institutions and communicative power”483.  Rather, regulatory agencies need to make 
direct use of communicative power, by entering into deliberative proceduralism as part 
of the process of such regulatory agencies’ claim to legitimacy and accountability484.  The 
methods regulatory agencies adopt (or should adopt) in order to enhance their 
legitimacy and accountability have been discussed in detail by Black, though a detailed 
analysis of this is beyond the scope of this thesis485. 
4.3.3 Legitimacy of Transnational Regulatory Bodies 
Regulation emanating from transnational regulatory bodies goes one step further than 
rules which emanate from national regulatory agencies.  Transnational regulatory 
bodies are typically made up of representatives from regulatory agencies from different 
states with there not necessarily being any constitutional mechanism of accountability 
as would typically be found in liberal democratic constitutional systems486.   
The democratic credentials of transnational regulatory bodies are limited to the extent 
that “their members are representatives of governments which are regarded as legitimate 
within their own nation states”487.  They have therefore been criticised as not having any 
form of legitimacy or accountability488.  Furthermore, concerns have also been raised in 
that domestic regulatory agencies may use transnational regulatory networks to seek to 
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free themselves from “domestic constraints” in order to pursue “self-regarding aims”489.  
Shaffer has also noted how “national actors are more likely to perceive transnational law 
to be legitimate where the law is formulated by actors who share their interests, where the 
process is procedurally fair and characterized by noncoercive reasoned argument, and 
where the results are functionally efficacious”490.  He however notes how transnational 
legal orders exercise their power through coercion, reciprocity, persuasion and 
acculturation, but they can be effective only if they are perceived to be legitimate by the 
different actors491.  
The Basel Accords have been promulgated following negotiations by representatives 
from G10 members (and subsequently extended to the G20 members), with these 
standards then being implemented in most jurisdictions across the globe492.  The trail 
towards a legitimate claim is therefore more remote here than in national regulatory 
agencies particularly since the varying negotiating positions of different states needed to 
be amended and discarded as the representatives of each state put forward their views 
and negotiated what the international standards should consist of.  It has been clearly 
documented that, by way of example, in the US there were also divergent views adopted 
by different US regulatory agencies at the Basel negotiating table, meaning that there 
was not even one common position which represented the views of the US (though some 
authors have used this in order to argue that this “internal” disagreement between US’ 
regulatory agencies helped increase transparency of the Basel process)493.  It has thus 
been stated that the “Basel Committee is perhaps the most important example of a 
transgovernmental regulatory network that exercises vast powers, seemingly without any 
form of democratic accountability”494. 
Furthermore, the representatives of states in the BCBS are generally representatives 
from central banks, who also have their legitimacy queried at a national level 
particularly in light of the fact that central bankers are many times insulated from any 
type of political accountability, with this position usually being resorted to in order to 
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ensure the independence of central banks from political influences particularly in 
carrying out their required monetary policy functions495.  
This perceived lack of legitimacy is also in stark contrast to private international law (or 
“conflict of laws”) which has been promulgated by states from time to time and which 
was the main method of cross-border cooperation before the rise of transnational law 
and transnational regulation.  Private international law was seen as a way through which 
international interests could be advanced, with this system being deeply rooted in 
national laws and domestic sovereignty – thus limiting any claims to such a system’s 
legitimacy496.  As a result of this, international regulatory cooperation focused on areas 
of law which “could be defended on the ground”, and which were thus considered to be in 
the best interests of the jurisdiction implementing those laws497.  This meant that the 
main focus of laws was uncontroversial in nature, and consisted of matters such as the 
proliferation of international commerce, international cooperation, and comity of 
nations498. 
On the other hand it has been argued by Wai that as transnational business networks 
work closer with each other, a sense of shared common interests and norms may be 
fostered, such that parties may lose their appeal towards looking at national regulation, 
whilst adopting a preference to make use of transnational regulatory law, and with this 
also leading to national laws losing their legitimacy and relevance over time499.  One 
must however here point out that any such argument can only be made in relation to 
certain types of transnational laws and regulation which are promulgated by the 
industry or with help from the industry (as is the case with transnational laws referring 
to arbitration and alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, being the main subject-
matter referred to by Wai).  It is here submitted that financial regulation such as the 
Basel Accords (and which has been promulgated through a top-down approach without 
any significant involvement from the industry) will not benefit from legitimacy in the 
same way. 
4.3.4 A ‘Global Administrative Law’ 
In light of the claims of lack of legitimacy and accountability, transnational regulatory 
bodies seek to build a claim towards legitimacy and accountability in a number of ways, 
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particularly by working together with national regulatory agencies which can help in 
enforcing transnational regulatory rules which they would have established, entering 
into public consultation exercises and acting in a transparent manner particularly with 
regard to their decision-making structures500.   
The contention is that a “global administrative law” should govern the main proponents 
of transnational laws, essentially being the transnational bodies and states, with the 
underlying principles being similar to domestic administrative law principles, such as 
“accountability, fairness, protection of individual rights, and some sense of democratic 
decision-making”501.   
This is particularly useful if domestic democratic credentials are lacking as well as if 
there is a high risk of regulatory capture, and the international standards adopted 
through a “global administrative law” can help to rectify claims of lack of legitimacy502.  It 
has been argued that the emergence of a “global administrative law” occurs through the 
“intersection and interaction among domestic and international administrative processes”, 
which takes place through systems which seek to improve the transparency of these 
systems, and includes the use of “notice and comment rule-making”, increasing public 
participation, and entering into proper cost-benefit analysis and rationality review503.  
These methods can take place at both the national as well as at the transnational level, 
with democratic credentials being particularly a function of domestic administrative law, 
whilst on the other hand also having a “global administrative law” that can help in 
providing more transparency and in providing oversight over the national law systems 
of administrative law504. 
Verdier has however highlighted contradictions in the “global administrative law” 
argument, by highlighting that whereas proponents of a “global administrative law” have 
considered national divergences to regulations implementing transnational regulatory 
laws to be desirable, in that they enhance the legitimacy of these regulations, the main 
rationale for these same regulations would have been that of establishing further 
regulatory cooperation and regulatory consistency505.  He consequently argues that 
national variation may actually be the result of an ineffective regime which does not 
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reach the stated goals of the transnational regulatory laws which would have been 
established506.  Verdier therefore argues that there is a paradox here, whereby507: 
On the one hand, if networks are effectively held accountable through domestic 
legal and political constraints, then their contribution to global governance will be 
limited.  On the other hand, the more domestic autonomy they have, the more likely 
they are to enhance international enforcement and harmonization of standards – 
but also to act in ways that reflect the self-interest of regulators rather than 
aggregate welfare. 
In light of the claims which the BCBS has faced in that it lacks elements of a 
constitutional criteria (as part of its legitimacy requirements), it has sought to enhance 
its accountability and legitimacy by engaging in a consultative process prior to the 
promulgation of the Basel II Accords (which was a marked difference from the 
promulgation of Basel I, which was agreed to through closed meetings without any 
transparency), thus seeking to improve its transparency508.  Furthermore, the national 
regulatory agencies forming part of this process have also sought to enhance the 
legitimacy of the process by subjecting the Basel standards to national consultation 
procedures, thus complementing the efforts towards enhancing legitimacy promoted by 
the BCBS509. 
However, it is here argued that states act rationally and out of self-interest in seeking to 
implement the Basel Accords selectively in order to gain advantages over other states.  
Whilst states need to necessarily be seen as forming part of an international community 
which establishes global standards to increase regulatory convergence and reduce the 
possibilities of systemic risks, individual states also act out of self-interest in seeking to 
have more beneficial laws (or less restrictive laws) than those of other states (and 
notwithstanding that the main reason for the Basel Accords was to have regulatory 
convergence), thereby reducing the claim to legitimacy of the Basel Accords.   
4.3.5 Lack of Legitimacy and Accountability of the Basel Accords 
Despite the objective of harmonisation of the Basel Accords, these international 
standards are still subject to varying methods of implementation within national laws 
and regulation, such that the standards adopted at a national level are typically very 
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different from the original texts which would have been agreed to at a transnational 
level.  It has been noted how international standards such as the Basel Accords are 
primarily adopted by states as a result of the “peer pressure” applied by other states and 
by market forces (including through credit rating agencies)510.  Furthermore, the 
perceived lack of legitimacy by states and local actors towards the international 
community gives rise to resistance towards the proper adoption of such a transnational 
regulatory law511.  Halliday and Shaffer have also noted that “if transnational legal norms 
are perceived to be instruments of imposition, coercion, surveillance, or control by stronger 
actors on weaker states or local actors, then the probability of resistance increases”512. 
The problem of lack of legitimacy also arises since transnational regulatory bodies tend 
to “gravitate far too quickly” towards rulemaking, instead of seeking to work towards 
harmonizing established regulatory practices513.  Therefore whilst transnational 
regulatory bodies have been somewhat efficient in proposing rules, their role in 
supervising and enforcing the rules they would have established has been very limited 
given that they typically rely on domestic regulators which may have their own 
interpretations (together with their own preferences and limitations) and which may 
therefore lead to significant variances in the ways in which transnational regulatory 
laws are adopted across borders514.  Avgouleas has therefore stated that though the 
success of “soft laws” is highly dependent upon there being a system of identifying 
“defections and deviations from what has been agreed”, the methods of monitoring and 
enforcement of such laws have been quite weak515. 
Claims of lack of accountability and of lack of legitimacy in relation to the Basel Accords 
also arise as states which did not form part of the “negotiating table” are faced with no 
option (due to the market pressures referred to above) other than to implement the 
international standards which would have been negotiated and agreed to by national 
regulators of other jurisdictions516.  The BCBS has therefore been criticised for not 
paying sufficient attention to the needs of the BRIC countries (which only started to form 
part of the BCBS as from 2010) and to those of emerging economies, with these 
jurisdictions facing pressures from bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank to adopt 
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these standards517.  Therefore whilst certain positions may have been agreed to 
transnationally, they might have been agreed to with views pertaining to certain types of 
countries (such as North Atlantic jurisdictions), with these rules not necessarily being 
adequate for developing and emerging economies518.  It has also been argued that the 
standards setting out the capital requirements are biased towards developed-market 
economies, as against developing countries, and that the latter face higher costs of 
capital than the former in reaching the same capital requirements519.  This reduces the 
Basel Accord’s legitimacy claims in those countries which were not represented on 
establishing these international standards.  In what can be seen as an attempt by the 
BCBS to increase its legitimacy, it has expanded its membership to include G20 members 
as from 2010 (and prior to that only used to be composed of the G10 members)520.  This 
expansion has however also been criticised in that it does not ensure that all relevant 
players are present in the BCBS (e.g. Argentina which only has a negligible presence in 
financial markets forms part of the G20, whilst Singapore does not)521. 
Another element which reduces the legitimacy of these international standards is that 
typically transnational regulatory networks only look at regulation falling within their 
particular area of focus – by way of example, though the main impact of capital 
requirements will be towards the banking industry (and the financial industry), this will 
also affect counterparties to such entities as well as consumers522.  It can however hardly 
be said that counterparties and consumers also had a say when the Basel Accords were 
being promulgated by the BCBS523.  Furthermore, transnational regulatory networks 
such as the BCBS hesitate to look beyond their particular areas of focus (possibly also in 
order to avoid stepping into regulatory realms of other transnational regulatory 
networks such as IOSCO).  This may also be a reason as to why the Basel Accords have 
been (and continue to be) limited to “internationally-active banks”, and not to investment 
firms and to alternative financing instruments.  One should here also note that the BCBS 
is composed of members from Central Banks, which typically only regulate banks.  
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The fact that transnational regulatory bodies operate transnationally means that it is 
uncertain as to whom these bodies are accountable to, and on whose behalf they act524.  
Given that there is no clarity as to who may call these bodies to account (and whether 
there is even the possibility of there being judicial review of the activities carried out by 
them), and given that there is no structure for these transnational regulatory bodies to 
be accountable, gives rise to further legitimacy issues525.  This is exacerbated by the fact 
that implementation by national regulatory agencies of the transnational standards may 
be segmented between different national regulatory agencies and by national and local 
Courts, such that the industry cannot hold one national regulator accountable for the 
improper adoption of the international standards, particularly when different 
interpretations are adopted at a national level526. 
It has also been noted how a lack of legitimacy may arise due to a lack of constitutional 
criteria in the BCBS given the lack of enforcement and dispute-resolution processes527.  
This has made it difficult for the BCBS to counteract domestic pressures, particularly on 
implementation of the Basel Accords528.  The BCBS’s response to this has been through 
the establishment of peer-review systems such as the Regulatory Consistency 
Assessment Programme established by the BCBS and also through the use of peer-
review systems undertaken by other bodies such as through the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program established by the IMF529.  Black has however been skeptical of 
peer-review systems since she states that as states know that they all have their own 
weaknesses, they will be reluctant to criticise each other530.   
The fact that the objectives of the Basel Accords have changed along the years (according 
to the self-interest of major states) also questions the legitimacy of the Basel Accords.  As 
seen in Chapter 3, the initial objective of having regulatory convergence between states 
became less and less important over time (particularly as Japanese banks lost the 
competitive edge they had prior to the introduction of the Basel Accords, and amidst 
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pressure from major western banks for a more lenient regime) in favour of a shift 
towards regulating in order to prevent “systemic risks”531.  Furthermore, one can also 
argue that neither of these objectives have been reached (particularly following the 
recent global financial crisis), thereby hurting the functional legitimacy of the Basel 
Accords.   
The unraveling and re-negotiation of the Basel Accords on implementation (or lack of 
implementation) at a regional or national level can also hardly help their claim towards 
legitimacy532.  It has been recognised that regulators who participate in international 
fora such as the BCBS often return to a “great deal of skepticism from domestic politicians 
and even other domestic regulators who have not been part of the international 
negotiation process”533.  Though some authors have argued that having national 
variances in themselves enhance the legitimacy of the Basel Accords, as different states 
enter into a “fluid process of convergence, rather than a dogmatic insistence that 
harmonization requires that all nations’ laws be the same”, this claim does need to be 
challenged534.  The argument of these authors would have held water should states seek 
to supplement (rather than amend) the international Accords, or should they have 
decided to get things done differently in order to ensure compliance with national laws.  
However, the fact that the changes made at national level have led to possibilities of 
regulatory arbitrage, whilst nullifying (or weakening) the effects of the Basel Accords, 
leads on to question the legitimacy of these international standards. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Basel Accords had to be revamped a number of times 
(with Basel III being introduced when Basel II was even yet to be fully implemented, 
particularly in the US535), and with long transitory periods for these Accords to take 
effect in different states (leading to the argument that most probably these Accords may 
become outdated before even being fully implemented, as industry players evolve, also 
in anticipation of what the laws and regulations would be looking like in the coming 
years as the Accords are implemented fully), can hardly help its claim towards these 
international standards being considered as “legitimate”. 
Regulation is, of its nature, bound to always be one step behind the market, thus being 
oriented to fixing the problems of the last crisis or problem, without being able to 
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understand or seek to deal with problems which may be ensuing from new systems 
adopted by the market536.  This argument can also be applied to transnational regulatory 
laws in the same way as it has been used with regard to regulation generally, and 
particularly in the case of the Basel Accords in light of the length of time until new 
standards which would have been agreed to are implemented (meaning that this gives 
arbitrageurs the opportunity to work around the revamped international standards).  
Black has also argued that the crisis has shown that regulators have failed, due to the 
fact that they did not understand the markets, and that the ways in which markets and 
regulation interacted were flawed537.  Black therefore states that “regulators did not have 
adequate information nor did they have a means of making sense of what they had”538. 
The fact that the Basel Accords can only be changed or amended with transnational 
agreement also hurts the legitimacy of these Accords, whilst also providing a breeding 
space for further regulatory arbitrage as industry players understand the intricacies of 
how the said international standards would have been applied in different 
jurisdictions539.  This makes the Accords unresponsive to changes in the industry 
(notwithstanding the fact that the use of “soft laws” has been advocated in light that they 
should provide a flexible regulatory regime)540.  Black has therefore criticised the move 
towards further hierarchical regulation following the financial crisis, since this type of 
regulation introduces rigidities into the system, hindering flexibility and scope for 
variety as the need for this arises, as markets evolve541.  Regulators need flexibility in 
light of changes which take place to regulated entities from time to time (such as 
changes to their scope, attitudes, and their available knowledge, expertise and 
resources), with this also being essential in order to allow regulators to plug gaps which 
arise as a result of regulatory arbitrage542.    
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4.3.6 “Regulatory Conversations” as a Means to Enhance the Legitimacy of the Basel 
Accords 
The consultative processes entered into by the BCBS on adopting Basel III may be seen 
as an attempt to seek to enter into “regulatory conversations”543 with the relevant 
participants in the market in order to give legitimacy to these international standards.  
Nevertheless it is here argued that the establishment of public consultation possibilities 
is not sufficient for legitimacy claims to be satisfied, in light of the various claims of lack 
of legitimacy discussed in this thesis.  Furthermore, in light of the quest for regulatory 
harmonisation across borders, and in light of the use of “soft-laws” across borders, the 
importance of having regulatory conversations here is much more marked – particularly 
when considering the self-interest of the different actors, and the need for acceptability 
of these international standards by all actors in order to have a successful transnational 
regulatory law.  
In considering how international rule-making should develop in light of the financial 
crisis, and on considering the need of involvement of the various players who deal with 
international standards, Black considered that544: 
…it is possible to foresee the emergence of something approaching a “legal and 
regulatory wikipedia”, operating at multiple levels in which the participants are 
the market, advisors, industry associations and regulators, but with the public 
sector acting as an arbiter of acceptability in relation to macro-level standards and 
an umpire in relation to their practical implementation.  In that sort of 
environment, consensus tends to replace dominance in establishing standards.... 
It may be argued that the attainment of consensus between national regulatory agencies 
in promulgation of the Basel Accords, weighs in its favour in having established 
international standards to which all members of the BCBS would have agreed to.  
However, though “consensus” would be ideal and possibly preferred by all parties, one 
needs to consider the deeper question of whether the consensus reached can also be 
seen as a consensus also amongst all relevant actors (i.e. including states and the 
industry) and whether the approach adopted by the BCBS consists of a sufficient 
deliberative approach. 
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In this sense, therefore, Cranston has stated545: 
If a commercial instrument is to meet its professed aim, then those most affected by 
its operation need to be part of the process of formulating it.  What is necessary is 
that the process must be transparent and must accord all interests an opportunity 
to have an influence.  With international commercial lawmaking, the input of 
developing countries is especially important, not least if an instrument is to have 
legitimacy and be widely adopted. 
Furthermore, though the members of the BCBS agreed to specific texts, this only came 
after various long-winded negotiations with the addition of very detailed rules in order 
to please different parties (and with states still knowing that the agreed texts only 
consisted of soft-law).  Furthermore, changes have been introduced by national 
regulatory agencies in the implementing national laws and regulations which seek to 
implement the Basel Accords, with claims also being made of there being a whole re-
negotiation of the Basel Accords in the EU (in the run-up to the promulgation of the CRD 
IV and the CRR).   
“Regulatory conversations” are, furthermore, essential in the promulgation of 
transnational regulatory laws in light of these instruments being “regulatory” in nature.  
This means that they are bound to be viewed negatively by the industry as they 
invariably lead to changes in established processes and add costs to the industry, as 
industry participants are faced with additional regulatory burdens.  The receptability, 
and hence acceptability of these regulations by the industry is necessarily dependent 
upon the perceived benefit the industry considers these measures have over their 
activities.  The requirements on minimum capital ratios have however been considered 
as nothing more than a “tax” which the industry needs to absorb546.  This leads towards 
market players seeking to arbitrage out of these requirements in the same way as a tax 
would be treated547.  On the other hand should there be a perceived benefit of these 
regulations, the industry would embrace the imposition of these regulations.  Goode has 
thus argued that “in the field of commercial law it is vitally important to involve 
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organisations representing the relevant business sectors from the outset and to do so not 
merely by way of consultation but through an active contribution to the scientific work”548. 
“Regulatory conversations” and “regulatory arbitrage” can be considered to be mutually 
exclusive, with these two options regulating the relationship between the regulators and 
industry participants.  A lack of regulatory conversations will invariably lead to a mutual 
lack of understanding of objectives and methodologies by the regulators and the 
industry, resulting in the industry looking further towards regulatory arbitrage.  On the 
other hand, should proper processes of regulatory conversations be entered into, 
regulations may be adopted in a manner which limits the costs on the industry, with the 
industry, in turn, understanding and appreciating further the objectives of the law and 
possibly also contributing, through its own methods, to reaching these same objectives.  
Unfortunately, however, the Basel Accords have emerged simply through transnational 
regulatory agencies without resorting to proper “regulatory conversations” and have 
both developed as a response to, and also given rise to further widespread regulatory 
arbitrage.     
4.4 Regulatory Competition and the Use of Treaties 
Notwithstanding that states get together to form an international community and that 
they liaise with international institutions to reach the universal goals of having a stable 
economic system, reduce systemic risks, and have regulatory convergence, one must 
also consider that different states compete against each other for business.  Therefore, 
whilst states negotiated and agreed to the Basel Accords, these same states (and others 
which adopted the Basel Accords due to market pressures) are tasked with adopting, 
implementing and enforcing the Basel Accords in full knowledge that the more 
regulatory strains are imposed, the worse-off they will be. 
It has been stated that competition amongst governments can be defined as rivalrous 
behaviour in which each government attempts to win some scarce beneficial resource or 
to avoid a particular cost549.  Competition between states typically takes place either 
through the use of (or lack of) taxes and other fiscal measures, through regulatory 
powers which the state may have, and through the way in which certain regulations may 
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be adopted, implemented or enforced550.  The attractiveness of states may also depend 
on regulatory capture which occurs between the state and the particular industry 
participants, as industry participants seek to convince national regulatory agencies in 
order to adopt certain approaches which may be beneficial to the said industries551.  A 
literature review has therefore been carried out in relation to how states behave in a 
regulatory competitive environment, and in order to argue that given the current 
regulatory competitive framework, a Treaty on the main principles of the Basel Accords 
should be resorted to in order to avoid a race to the bottom. 
It has been argued by Price that though three different theories as to how and why the 
Basel Accords were established have been put forward (being that states act as a “single 
community”; that states act out of their own “self-interest”, and that the Basel Accords 
follow on “regulatory capture”), he argues that it is only the “self-interest” theory which 
has continuously contributed to the substance of the Basel Accords552.  This is therefore 
consistent with economic analysis which considers rational actors to act out of their own 
self-interest as referred to in this thesis. 
In light of the “self-interest” adopted by states, Price draws upon “game theory” to explain 
how states, as rational actors (and behaving strategically) whilst having different goals 
and preferences, have negotiated the Basel Accords553.  Furthermore, it is argued that 
game theory concepts have also continued to apply throughout the years in the way in 
which the Basel Accords have been implemented in practice, particularly as states 
operate as entities adopting strategic behaviour and in competition with other 
jurisdictions. 
Price has pointed out how in game theory two elements are important, being the 
alternative feasible individual welfare levels of each party; and the welfare levels of the 
different parties at breakdown point (i.e. at the point in time where cooperation is no 
longer possible)554.  He notes how if a party’s breakdown point is stronger than that of 
the other parties, the bargaining solution will end up being more favourable to such 
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stronger party555.  He also notes how in considering the “breakdown point” one also 
needs to consider what the position would be on the breakdown of negotiations for each 
individual party if the different states would have failed to agree to cooperate, with this 
also being dependent upon what the actions of other states would be in such a 
scenario556.   
Lee also argued that there is a connection between transnational regulatory networks 
such as those establishing and implementing the Basel Accords and game theory 
particularly since those states which agree to be bound by certain international financial 
regulations may still opt out of these standards557.  She notes how these states act in this 
way in order “to maintain the competitive edge of their respective domestic financial 
markets, fearing that higher regulatory standards may harm foreign investment 
opportunities and thus their respective domestic economy”558. 
Thus, it is here also contended that a strategic approach is also adopted by states in 
implementing and enforcing the Basel Accords (rather than solely in the negotiations 
leading to the agreed texts of the Basel Accords):  whilst states need to be seen to be 
adhering to the Basel Accords in light of the pressure which the market and international 
organisations apply, states may attract more business if they manage to cater for the 
specific goals of the industry.  Thus regulatory arbitrage arises in light of the way in 
which different states adopt different approaches towards the Basel Accords. 
Trachtman has argued that, in strategic trade theory, if rents are to be captured between 
competing states, such competition might not result in there being optimal regulation, 
but merely in regulation that seeks to win the competition for rents559.  Thus, in light of 
game theory structures, states may reduce the level of regulation below what they would 
otherwise consider as optimal in order to attract investment560. 
It has therefore been stated that the prevailing consensus is that competition among 
states and local governments has predominantly negative effects as this can lead to 
inadequate measures taking place and/ or a waste of resources as governments seek to 
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attract business from other jurisdictions which will result in a zero-sum game561.  
Trachtman thus argues that in order to prevent an unstable competitive process from 
degenerating, a hegemonic power would need to take over regulation, with that 
hegemonic power possibly also being an international organisation (rather than a 
state)562.  On the other hand, however, Trachtman also argues that interjurisdictional 
externalities do not always require centralization and that market-type mechanisms 
may be the most efficient way in which these interjurisdictional externalities are 
internalized563.  He however notes that certain externalities may not be internalized 
because of the transaction costs and the strategic costs involved564.   
It has also been argued that harmonisation of certain regulations may also be 
established by states acting as a “cartel” in providing regulation565.  However, in the 
same way as in a cartel, the biggest costs here would be in enforcing such cartel, as in 
such a scenario, a participant stands to benefit in lowering the standards provided 
slightly, in order to benefit over other members of that same cartel.  The main risk which 
would arise in such circumstance is that states may steer away from a cartel, as they 
seek to benefit from the high standards adopted by all participants, and with this quickly 
degenerating into a “race-to-the-bottom”.  On this basis Carey has argued that the ideal 
solution to the lowering of corporate standards was that of adopting federal “minimum 
standards”, thereby eliminating competition between states and the consequent race to 
the bottom566. 
It has been stated that on assessing the political risk of non-compliance with 
transnational laws and regulations, game theory may “well counsel towards the use of 
treaties, rather than other forms of harmonised rules”, given the principles surrounding 
Treaties and the legal obligation states have in giving effect to such Treaties567.  It is 
therefore here submitted that Treaties are more appropriate in order to achieve 
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international financial regulatory law reform given that Treaties give rise to high 
compliance incentives since non-performance violates international law568.    
Dalhuisen similarly argues that if states do not adhere to international standards, and if 
peer pressure is not sufficient, this may lead the international community to push for the 
establishment of Treaty law in order to ensure the enforceability of the established 
norms569.  Thus he argues that uniform treaty law (as an international cooperation 
agreement which should have binding effect on all parties) should only be entered into 
at the request of the international legal order itself in order for it to be likely to succeed, 
and he argues that this is the reason why many UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT initiatives 
have not been taken up further by states notwithstanding the efforts made570. 
Consequently, in light of the ever present regulatory competition which exists, Chapter 9 
will argue in favour of a more formal approach to the Basel Accords through the 
adoption of binding principles through instruments which have legal force (such as 
through the use of a Treaty), rather than relying on soft-laws for the adoption of 
regulation such as the Basel Accords.  Such a Treaty should however be limited to the 
main principles which are to be followed, whilst recognising that regulatory competition 
on the finer details still takes place.  This would allow states to compete openly on 
regulation, whilst always having a safeguard that the minimum principles which would 
have been agreed to transnationally would be respected by all, and that there would be 
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Chapter 5:  Regulatory Arbitrage as a Consequence of 
Self-Interest   
 
Chapter 4 has argued that the Basel Accords have only developed as a consequence of 
hegemonic influences and as a response to the need for regulators to be seen to be doing 
something following the global financial crisis, and that no economic analysis has been 
carried out on the underlying principles of the Basel Accords.  It has also been shown in 
Section 2.3 that states (acting individually) and the industry have their own interests 
which do not necessarily correspond with the interests of the international community.  
Furthermore, the interests of national regulators may also be drawn close to the 
interests of the industry through regulatory capture (and therefore possibly even further 
away from the interests of the international community).  
The lack of consideration of the interests of the individual nation states and of the 
industry as separate actors, severely limits the effectiveness of the Basel Accords and the 
possibility of the aims of the said Basel Accords being reached.  As states and as the 
industry consider the Basel Accords to have negative effects on their own self-interest, 
each of the individual nation states and the industry, seek ways to minimise the effects of 
the Basel Accords.  The costs faced by states as a result of the Basel Accords, and the 
utility states (acting individually) obtain by lowering standards will therefore be 
considered below. 
As a result it is here argued that in light of the lack of consideration of the utility which 
the different actors obtain from the Basel Accords, regulatory arbitrage is resorted to, 
whereby the industry finds ways through which it shifts its activities to unregulated 
entities in order to avoid or minimise the costs of regulation.  The lack of regulatory 
convergence amongst states and the lack of regulatory consistency in relation to 
different types of entities, allows industry participants to reduce the costs of regulation 
on them, but at the added cost for the wider community of reducing the effectiveness of 
the Basel Accords.  
This Chapter also argues that regulatory arbitrage may also create an element of over-
regulation in the standards set by the Basel Accords, thereby further fuelling the 





5.1 Costs Faced by States as a Result of the Basel Accords   
Limitations imposed by the Basel Accords tend to give rise to costs to the economy as a 
whole (and particularly to the industry), as discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.  
However, as the costs of financial entities rise this may also become a problem for states 
(and their national regulators), as the industry participants in a particular state may find 
themselves in a worse position than before the adoption of the said standards.  
Furthermore, national regulators also face problems as industry players exit the 
industry, move to less-regulated jurisdictions, or stop providing particular lines of 
business.   
It has been stated that the Basel Accords (and particularly Basel II and Basel III) are too 
complex and put smaller firms at a disadvantage, thereby also restricting new entrants 
to the market (particularly in light of the wider opportunities larger banks are presented 
with)571.  The lack of provision of finance by smaller firms leads to a shift in the financing 
role to non-bank entities which fall outside the scope of the Basel Accords or the 
regulatory framework572. 
Another cost which national regulators have been faced with is that the Basel regime has 
been criticised for not adequately providing for long-term financing given that the 
underlying presumption of the Basel Accords is that banks are to correlate short term 
deposits with short term loans573.  As a result, banks cannot realistically provide long-
term financing for projects which require the cost of capital to be spread out over longer 
periods574.  Long-term financing requires long-term capital in place, whilst keeping more 
funding in reserves than the amount which would have been lent out575.  Nevertheless 
projects which require long-term finance may be important projects for an economy and 
this may therefore be seen as a fundamental problem for states.  The presumption 
adopted by the Basel Accords is also ambiguous in light of the maturity transformation 
role which banks are known to undertake. 
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The Basel regime has also been criticised for being too rigid and using static concepts, 
such as for example risk-weighted assets, whereby the ratings attributed to particular 
assets do not move along with the economic cycle and do not give incentives to banks to 
re-price risk when economic conditions are improving or deteriorating576.  In this sense 
it has been stated that compliance with rules might lead to a false sense of security if the 
rules alone are followed – though credit analysis itself is highly judgmental in nature, 
any such analysis needs to take into consideration economic forecasts and unforeseen 
crises577.   
It has also been argued that the Standardised approach adopted by the Basel Accords 
tends to favour loans being extended to the worst borrowers578.  Given that unrated 
corporates are generally all given the same treatment by the Basel Accords, irrespective 
of the credit risk they pose, banks may prefer to lend to riskier unrated corporates 
(when compared to other unrated corporates) given that this can justify higher interest 
rates and with the bank therefore hoping that this can also result in higher profits579.   
One must also note that the IRB approach was previously untested, since this system 
was developed entirely during the international negotiations on the Basel Accords, with 
regulators therefore taking a “leap of faith” when adopting this IRB methodology580.  This 
IRB methodology has been described by Wood as “like driving down a road looking into 
the rear view mirror and is pro-cyclical”, whilst arguing that in an economically benign 
climate credit losses reduce, leading to low capital requirements, whereas as soon as the 
cycle turns down, loan losses will lead to an increase in the capital requirements581.  As a 
result this means that there is no provisioning taking place when losses are incurred, 
and capital requirements must be increased when the financing entity is considered to 
be the most vulnerable. 
The introduction of liquidity standards in Basel III has also been criticised in light of the 
constraints it places on banks and the additional ratios it requires banks to apply.  
Though the liquidity coverage ratio was adopted in order to seek to create a buffer 
against banks’ insolvency, as from August 2012 even the ECB started advocating against 
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stringent liquidity requirements in light of the negative economic effects which this was 
bound to create due to the contraction of capital which this results in582. 
5.2 Utility Obtained by States and Incentives to Lower Standards  
As discussed above, though there are three main actors in the Basel Accords, the main 
goal of reducing global financial stability and having global regulatory convergence only 
lies with the international community.  This thesis assumes that individual nation states 
have goals which vary from that of the international community, with the goals of states 
being that of attracting business and increasing financial activity in such a way which 
can keep the state’s subjects (which include the industry) satisfied. 
States are therefore faced with a prisoner’s dilemma – whilst knowing that the greatest 
gains for all will be obtained through there being international harmonization of rules 
and continued regulatory co-operation, they tend to adopt policies which maximise their 
own self-interest and act in a protectionist manner (possibly also impacting 
international financial stability), knowing that this may provide short-term 
advantages583.  Tietje and Lehmann have thus compared the international financial 
system to the international trading system, concluding that the situation in the 
international financial system is very similar to that found in competition law584.  One 
should here also note that Goldsmith and Posner had also referred to there being a 
“prisoner’s dilemma”, and they considered this as being one of the reasons as to why 
states typically seek to comply with international law, and this particularly out of fear of 
retaliation by other states585. 
When dealing with international markets and the international trading system it has 
been argued by authors such as Ruggie, expanding on the works of Polanyi, that states 
are primarily engaged in “embedded liberalism”, whereby states seek to carve out a 
balance between having free trade, whilst at the same time acting in their self-interest, in 
order to cater for domestic social needs (and particularly in light of the fact that this is 
where a Government’s legitimacy comes from)586.  It is here argued that though in the 
international trading system, protectionist measures need to be put forward a priori by 
the relevant actors (due to the binding nature of the relevant international agreements), 
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when dealing with soft-law established through transnational regulatory networks, self-
interest of different states can afford to be dealt with at later stages (such as on 
implementing the relevant agreements in national law), in light of the non-binding 
nature of the said international standards.  Furthermore, this becomes even more 
relevant in light of the quest for states to adopt further protective measures following 
the global financial crisis. 
On harmonisation of laws, states may agree to adopt rigorous rules, knowing that if all 
states adopt the same rules, they need not be concerned about competitive issues.  Thus, 
as the international community agrees to harmonise rules, the standards which may be 
agreed to within the international community may be set above the “optimum” level of 
regulation.  Benston has therefore argued against full harmonisation of rules, and 
prefers to adopt a regulatory co-operative approach which would be coupled with giving 
leeway to national regulators, in light of the fact that full harmonisation of rules might 
result in the importation of rules which might be too extensive or intrusive587.  
Harmonising rules at a higher level than the “optimum” level will lead to further costs to 
society, such as increases in the costs of the operation of regulators, and increases in the 
costs of regulated entities on seeking to understand and deal with the regulation 
imposed on them588.  This may also lead to other problems, such as the problem of 
economic moral hazard (where entities ignore any default risk and just seek higher 
returns in light of the excess regulation and in light of other schemes such as deposit 
insurance schemes), as well as infantilization, (where in light of the elaborate regulatory 
systems, regulated firms feel that they are sufficiently protected, and hence may even 
result in acting irrationally, with the phrase being coined which may be applicable in 
such scenario being “[t]reat people like children and they will behave like them”)589.  
Furthermore, over-regulation may also inspire amoral behaviour, particularly through 
regulatory arbitrage, as firms may just become concerned with whether particular 
structures fall within established frameworks and within the “rules”, rather than seeing 
whether they comply with the spirit of the rules and whether the procedures they adopt 
make legal, economic, and financial sense and undergo a proper analysis of the risks at 
hand590.   
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On considering the supply of “regulation” by regulators, parallels can also be drawn to 
the theory of cartels, as states agree to co-operate in order to provide somewhat 
homogenous regulations in what could alternatively be seen to be a liberally competitive 
market between states591.  As suppliers would, in cartels, join together to harmonise 
their products and their respective prices, similarly transnational laws such as the Basel 
Accords provide national regulatory agencies with an opportunity to increase the 
onerousness of the regulation they impose on industry players (to a more onerous 
standard than that which would otherwise apply in a competitive scenario), given that 
this will result in better regulatory standards which would be harmonised amongst all 
participants, without there being negative effects on a state’s competitiveness, as all 
jurisdictions would be imposing the same onerous requirements592.   
Nevertheless, as the theory of cartels states, on there being harmonisation, there will be 
a great incentive for participants to “price” their products slightly below the agreed 
value, since this will then give a defector further profits as pricing products slightly 
below the agreed value would result in a massive swing in demand given that that entity 
would be more competitive than all other participants who would be following the rules 
of the cartel.  Thus as one entity does not follow the rules of the cartel, that entity will 
make super-profits given that products would still be supplied at a very profitable rate, 
but with that entity still having a very high demand for products at that rate, in light of 
the market positions of other market players. 
Similarly, jurisdictions may be tempted to set the standards of their regulations to be 
slightly below the standard set by transnational regulatory laws, in order to be able to 
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benefit from having a competitive edge over all other jurisdictions, whilst still 
maintaining higher standards than those which would otherwise apply in a competitive 
environment.  Pan states that “[t]o the extent national regulators operate independently of 
one another, they will always face competitive pressure and must be prepared to 
implement regulatory strategies that make their markets more attractive”593.    
This can similarly be seen in relation to the Basel Accords.  While initially Basel I was 
successful, by having ensured that bank capital levels increased, after some time national 
regulators sought to exploit regulatory arbitrage opportunities in order to provide a 
competitive edge over other jurisdictions, with the BCBS being powerless given the 
absence of supervisory or enforcement mechanisms594.  Hyoung-Kyu has also noted that 
“though external pressures – either from foreign states or from the markets – may induce 
formal standards compliance, they are likely to be much less effective in restricting 
cosmetic compliance”595.   
The main problem with states having incentives to lower their regulatory standards 
would be that if the number of “defectors” becomes substantial, then the whole system 
falls through as the harmonised “prices” or “regulation” can no longer be justified, with 
this leading, in terms of regulation, towards a competitive environment and a potential 
“race to the bottom” as states compete against each other. 
5.3 Regulatory Arbitrage and its effects on Regulatory 
Competition and on the Basel Accords 
As both individual nation states as well as the industry have incentives to look towards 
their self-interests, and in light of the gaps which exist in regulation, regulatory arbitrage 
has been resorted to in order to minimise the costs which the Basel Accords impose on 
the industry.  It has been argued that the Basel Accords have facilitated regulatory 
arbitrage by allowing “significant discretion in state implementation” as well as a result of 
the lack of clarity and specificity within the terms of the Basel Accords596.  Regulatory 
arbitrage has therefore allowed the industry to find ways around the strict measures 
required by the Basel Accords.   
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Riles has noted that “legal literature on regulatory arbitrage is surprisingly thin”, with 
commentators generally describing certain laws or regulations as “leading to regulatory 
arbitrage”, and with this being generally seen as an “obvious rationale for legal 
harmonization”597.  She has described this as being a practice whereby “value is created 
by seeking out and eliminating arbitrary differences between functionally equivalent 
assets”598.  Riles notes that regulatory arbitrage therefore requires there to be two 
different elements599:  
- a similarity (functional or economic) amongst the financial products being used 
such that one financial product can act as a substitute for another with the two 
being somewhat interchangeable; and 
- a formal difference in law or regulation which continues to exist throughout the 
use of the product which can account for a difference in price or costs through 
the use of that product instead of its substitute.  This difference should be great 
enough in order to yield a profit to an arbitrageur once all the costs of the 
regulatory arbitrage are taken into consideration. 
It has been stated that prudential rules will always give rise to a risk of regulatory 
arbitrage, and that even a process of harmonization may lead to regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities as different jurisdictions adopt different paces in changing their laws and 
regulations, with financing entities generally also always being one step ahead of 
regulators600.  Riles has adequately described the problem of regulatory arbitrage (which 
in this example refers particularly to the use of shadow banks) in financial regulation 
(not limited to the Basel Accords), particularly following the recent global financial crisis 
on saying601: 
In the world of financial regulation, national financial regulators confront a global 
financial system.  Since 2008, regulators have made concerted efforts to address 
the national regulatory differences that made AIG’s trades possible in the first 
place.  New rules hammered out at multiple G20 summits since 2008 seek to 
address how these global challenges apply to banks.  How have the markets 
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responded to these rules?  Financiers have simply found ways of booking their 
transactions through non-bank institutions, known as shadow banks, which are not 
subject to the G20’s rules.  The Financial Stability Board not surprisingly has 
responded by hammering out new rules to govern shadow banks.  And yet before 
these rules even come into operation, market participants are busy devising new 
kinds of exceptions. 
The ability of financial institutions to act beyond the reach of regulators threatens 
the sovereignty of nation-states and the well being of national economies.  Yet as 
regulators are aware, the threat is possible only because of differences in national 
regulatory regimes. 
It has been noted that regulatory arbitrage thrives on there being different legal regimes 
and different legal requirements, particularly when this takes place through systems 
which are not clear and coherent and where there is lack of coordination amongst 
regulators602.  As long as similar economic activities attract different types of regulation, 
with different costs being associated with these variances in regulation, firms will seek 
to maximise their utility by resorting to regulatory arbitrage.  Firms, as rational actors, 
have as their main goal the making of profits for the benefit of the firm and its 
shareholders or promoters.  A financing entity, which is the subject of capital adequacy 
and liquidity restrictions, is therefore economically justified in trying to adopt measures 
through which its returns and profits will be maximised and through which the least 
costs would be incurred.  A firm’s goals vary from the goals of the transnational 
regulatory bodies, and whilst the rationale for having the Basel Accords is in order to 
ensure financial stability and reduce systemic risk, this is not necessarily a priority for 
financing entities.  Furthermore as the goals of individual states may also vary from the 
goals of international regulation, this may mean that firms and states may collude (also 
through regulatory capture) in order to arbitrage international financial regulation, 
particularly if this means that states may attract further business, and if regulatory 
arbitrage could lead to there being higher profits for the industry. 
Heremans and Pacces argue that the “dynamics of regulation boils down to a continuous 
tension between the desire for a stable financial system and an economic efficient 
system”603.  They however further importantly note that604: 
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regulatory arbitrage provides an important lesson for financial regulation:  the 
more regulation is insisting on disciplining certain forms of financial 
intermediation, the stronger private incentives will be to develop financial 
innovation potentially harmful for financial stability. 
Barry observes that regulatory arbitrage takes place in light of the established legal rules 
not accurately tracking the economic substance of transactions, with regulation 
therefore failing to take economic realities into account605.  He thus states that 
regulatory arbitrage is not necessarily problematic, given that it may remove or lower 
socially undesirable burdens, such as social costs and transaction costs606.  Thus, though 
regulatory arbitrage allows one to avoid financial regulation this is not necessarily a 
negative consideration.  The fact that similar economic activities attract different 
regulatory considerations can mean that either: 
(a) there is a mismatch in the regulation such that there is an element of over-
regulation:  if “economic activity A” and “economic activity B” have the same 
economic effects, and if heavy regulation is imposed on “economic activity A” but 
not on “economic activity B”, then one may argue that the regulation imposed on 
“economic activity A” is an unnecessary social cost, given that there would be no 
issues with having the similar “economic activity B” being subject to less 
regulation.  It is therefore economically efficient, and desirable, from an 
economic perspective, for firms to make use of regulatory arbitrage in order to 
avoid the regulation imposed on “economic activity A”; or 
(b) one type of economic activity is more desirable than another such that regulation 
seeks to create incentives (or nudge607) for the transfer of risk by using one type 
of economic activity over another.  Here one would assume that one course of 
action is beneficial to society, whilst the other course of action is detrimental 
society.  Thus regulatory arbitrage is here seen as a positive thing in that firms 
make use of the more socially desirable method.   
                                                     
605 Jordan Barry, On Regulatory Arbitrage (Texas Law Review See Also, Vol. 89, 2010) 73 
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In each of these two instances, regulatory arbitrage has a positive effect, and it may be 
argued that these two types of regulatory arbitrage are generally present on there being 
a regulatory competitive environment in place.  
It is here argued that the mismatch in regulation arising out of the Basel Accords arises 
not out of incentives which states wish to create, but due to the lack of a proper cost-
benefit and economic analyses adopted throughout the years and due to the fact that in 
the past the main method of financing was bank financing such that previous crises have 
emanated from banks.  This has therefore led to the Basel Accords focussing solely on 
bank-financing, and ignoring other unregulated alternative methods of financing to 
which risk is being transferred.  Notwithstanding the stringent and rigorous rules which 
the Basel Accords apply over “internationally-active banks”, and notwithstanding that 
different jurisdictions have extended the said Basel Accords to other entities, non-banks 
and shadow banks carrying out the same economic function as banks are still not subject 
to the requirements of the Basel Accords (and with investment firms being subject to 
varying regimes) as described in Chapter 3 to this thesis.  This type of regulatory 
arbitrage is not desirable, however, as it encourages a shift from the regulated to the 
unregulated sectors, thus allowing the risks which the Basel Accords sought to prevent, 
to take place.  This also gives rise to the question as to whether the Basel Accords are an 
unnecessary social cost on banks, given that regulators are tolerating the transfer of the 
same activities carried out by banks, and the transfer of similar risks which the Basel 
Accords seek to protect against, to entities which are not subject to the Basel Accords. 
As discussed in Section 3.5, as the main objectives of the Basel Accords have developed 
along the years, the problem of regulatory arbitrage has been put to one side (as the 
importance of regulatory convergence has diminished over the years), only to have 
become a major problem once again.  Whereas the initial rationale for having the Basel 
regime in the first place was in order for there to be regulatory convergence, the 
situation is currently such that regulatory arbitrage opportunities continue to be a major 
concern, and though systemically important banks are subject to similar rules, different 
rules still apply between different types of banks in different jurisdictions (albeit 
consolidation of laws through maximum harmonisation at EU level); between banks and 
investment firms in different jurisdictions; and between banks and other entities which 
carry out shadow banking activities, amongst others608.  Therefore as the focus in the 
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Basel Accords shifted from “regulatory convergence” to that of reducing “systemic risks”, 
the regulatory arbitrage opportunities resulting from the lack of convergence (such as 
through shadow banking) are in themselves becoming a source of systemic risk 
(particularly also in light of its interconnectedness with the conventional banking 
system)609.  This has also been recognised by the FSB which noted that “[t]he 
instruments, markets, and entities that make up the shadow banking system are often 
complex and have historically been outside the focus of authorities for purposes of 
identifying and monitoring systemic risk and regulatory arbitrage”610. 
It has been argued that “regulatory arbitrage” can only be avoided if “the rules across all 
legal systems are harmonized” and hence that the “regulatory cost of transacting is 
identical globally”, though it has been acknowledged that achieving this may be 
“extremely contentious” particularly in light of different interests of different states611.  
The lack of convergence between prudential arrangements in the major economic blocs, 
such as the US, the EU, and Asian jurisdictions, can therefore distort competition and 
encourage regulatory arbitrage, at the risk of financial stability612. 
In addition to the above, and in light of the costs incurred by entities subject to the Basel 
Accords, entities which fall outside the regulatory scope of the laws and regulations 
implementing the Basel Accords not only have an advantage when competing with 
entities which are subject to the Basel Accords, but the difference in the laws and 
regulations actually encourages the latter to transfer their risks and their riskier 
activities to the former in light of them being subject to lighter regulation and lower 
costs (with this also being discussed in further detail in Section 5.4)613.  Jacobs and van 
Vuuren have therefore argued that as banks seek to maximise shareholder value they 
necessarily seek to find ways in which to save on capital requirements and be more 
competitive than other banks through regulatory arbitrage614.  It has been argued that 
on there being divergences in regulation between banks and non-banks, with banks 
being subject to further regulation than non-banks, there will be a corresponding shift in 
the amount and nature of business conducted towards the shadow banking (“non-bank”) 
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system615.  This has also been the subject of an example given by Riles on seeking to 
define “regulatory arbitrage”, who has stated616: 
A simple example is the case of an offshore non-bank entity that provides the same 
investment services to U.S. investors as an investment bank, and yet is not subject to 
G20-mandated capital adequacy requirements.  These capital adequacy 
requirements are intended to cushion the bank against the risk of failure, but the 
offshore non-bank entity is not subject to them – both because it is located offshore 
and because it is not a bank according to the G20’s definitions.  This offshore non-
bank entity pockets the substantial savings it incurs, relative to regulated banks, 
from not having to hold so much capital on reserve in order to sell its investment 
services to U.S. investors. 
It has therefore been stated that “[a] basic problem with the Basel system is that it cannot 
deliver a regulatory ideal of treating the same promises in the financial system in the same 
way wherever they are passed in the regulatory and tax arbitrage process”617.  The 
difference between the types of entities to which the Basel Accords apply across the 
globe, particularly the difference in the applicability of the Basel Accords to investment 
firms and shadow banks has therefore been seen as a cause of concern618. 
Given the divergent methods of implementation of the Basel regime the BCBS launched 
the “Basel III Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme” in April 2012, in order to 
analyse the different jurisdictions implementing the Basel Accords, in order to ensure a 
timely adoption of the Basel III standards, achieve regulatory consistency with Basel III, 
and also ensure the consistency of outcomes across different jurisdictions619.  It is 
therefore clear that whilst “regulatory convergence” is no longer considered to be the 
main objective of the Accords, the lack of convergence will cause issues and arbitrage 
opportunities.  The problem with this however remains that this programme will not 
analyse whether the current Basel rules are causing a shift in risk to other unregulated 
activities which fall outside the regulatory scope of the Basel Accords. 
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One of the reasons for this might also be due to the fact that the Basel Accords have 
always been set out as “minimum standards”, allowing different jurisdictions to build 
upon these standards as they required620.  Furthermore certain matters, such as 
decisions on which banks are to adopt the IRB approach, are also subject to national 
discretions621.  This is also enhanced by the fact that the scope of application for the 
purposes of the BCBS still remains that of “internationally-active banks” with the aim of 
reduction of systemic risks being only considered insofar as these arise out of the said 
“internationally-active banks”.  The BCBS therefore does not consider whether the 
systemic risks it is seeking to avoid are being shifted onto lesser regulated or 
unregulated financial entities to which the Basel Accords do not apply (and do not fall 
within the traditional understanding of what constitutes a “bank”), either through a lack 
of regulatory convergence or through a lack of competitive equity between different 
financial instruments.   
This has been further complemented by differences in how the Basel Accords 
themselves have been implemented.  By way of example in the US, only the Advanced 
IRB approach was adopted initially622, with the Standardised approach only being 
adopted on the implementation of Basel III (with this also acting as a “capital floor” for 
banks adopting the Advanced IRB approach and without there being any reference to the 
Foundation IRB approach).  On the other hand in Hong Kong a fourth variant called the 
“basic approach” was also added to the “standardized” approach and to the two IRB 
approaches623.  Another example of such a variance would be that, through the Dodd-
Frank Act, the US omitted reference to ratings obtained from credit rating agencies, and 
instead adopted an approach whereby alternative standards of credit worthiness are 
referred to624.   
It is perhaps somewhat telling that even in the EU, the CRD IV draft was also criticised by 
many regulators and by the IMF for having significantly watered down a number of key 
elements of Basel III – such that the British Treasury Minister has been reported as 
                                                     
620 Basel I (n 261) 1 para. 1; Basel II (n 264) 3 para. 9.  
621 Wood (n 1) 663 – 664.  
622 The US tried to justify this by stating that this would therefore not compromise the 
international playing field, given that internationally-active banks would still be subject to the 
rules set out by the Basel regime.  See:  Ferguson RMA Conference (367).  See also:  Ferguson IIB 
Remarks (n 367). 
623 Matt Schlickenmaier, Basel III and Credit Risk Measurement:  Variations Among G20 Countries 
(San Diego International Law Journal, Vol. 14, University of San Diego School of Law, 2012) 221 – 
223.  The Standardized approach and the IRB approach are further described in Chapter 7. 
624 Masera (n 370) 388; US Regulatory Consistency Assessment (n 364) 10; Scott (n 403) 767. 
154 
 
having stated “[w]e are not implementing the Basel agreement, as anyone who will look at 
this text will be able to tell you”625.   
Consequently, regulatory arbitrage is encouraged as states adopt their own variations of 
the Basel Accords, thereby allowing the industry to come up with methods in order to 
make use of the less restrictive provisions of different jurisdictions, thereby seeking to 
reduce the costs and limitations which would have otherwise been imposed upon them. 
5.4 Regulatory Arbitrage and Shadow Banking 
As shown in Chapter 3, “shadow banking” has been intrinsically linked with activities 
taking place outside of the regulated sector, with this also being the main defining factor 
as to what constitutes a “shadow bank”.   
Specific comments on shadow banks and their relationship with the Basel Accords also 
need to be made, given that the activities which would typically have been provided by 
banks can be provided through shadow banks, with the latter, however, not being 
subject to the Basel Accords626.  This has been described as the “boundary problem” – as 
effective regulation is put in place, firms have an incentive to move their activities 
outside the “boundary of regulation” onto unregulated entities, such as hedge funds, 
through which they may still carry out their business activities whilst avoiding the 
prescriptive nature and the costs associated with regulation (with it also having been 
argued that if regulated entities do not seek to avoid the constraints placed upon them, 
then probably the regulation imposed is simply ineffective!)627.  Jacobs and van Vuuren 
have also noted that though resorting to regulatory arbitrage particularly during the 
financial crisis was “reckless and perhaps even unethical, they were in most cases 
compliant with the letter of the law”628.   
Heremans and Pacces have noted how stricter capital requirements result in foregone 
earnings which arise as a result of high capital requirements and in light of the need to 
regain higher cash reserves, such that such foregone earnings can be considered as a 
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“tax” on financial institutions629.  Therefore, increasing the intermediation cost which 
financing entities are subject to, leads to disintermediation as larger market shares are 
transferred to non-regulated entities, giving rise to the problem of regulatory 
arbitrage630.  Thus, financial institutions “are bound to respond to an increasing 
regulatory burden by changing their activities and by introducing financial innovations in 
an attempt to circumvent the regulatory restrictions”631. 
Shadow banks generally provide (either acting alone or in a “chain” with other entities) 
the same type of credit intermediation and maturity transformation as traditional banks, 
including funding long-term projects through short-term funding, without, however, 
being subject to the same regulatory constraints as banks, with this also meaning that 
shadow banks are not required to internalise the true cost of their risks (contrary to 
banks which are subject to the Basel Accords)632.  Shadow banks do not fall within the 
traditional definition of a “bank” since rather than being funded through deposits and 
other repayable funds, they rely on money market instruments such as mutual funds, 
short-term commercial paper and repos633.  Credit intermediation through non-banks 
has been able to grow over the past years particularly in light of the advantages which 
these offered, such as providing market participants as well as corporations with 
alternative sources of funding, as well as in certain instances being able to develop 
specialised expertise such that certain functions in the credit intermediation function 
could be carried out more cost-effectively634. 
Banks are also encouraged to sponsor shadow banks and move their assets off their 
balance sheets since this would avoid banks having to increase their capital buffers, 
whilst allowing these sponsoring banks to benefit from unrestricted leverage, 
particularly since capital requirements are calculated on the basis of a bank’s balance 
sheet635.  The FSB has therefore noted, on discussing “shadow banks” in 2011, that “this is 
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likely to create opportunities for arbitrage that might undermine bank regulation and lead 
to a build-up of additional leverage and risks in the system” and that “[a]lthough Basel III 
closes a number of identified shortcomings, both the incentives for, and the risks associated 
with, regulatory arbitrage will likely increase as Basel III raises the rigour of bank 
regulation”636.  Pacces, however points out that “regulation should not incentivize 
marketing of financial assets as a way to reduce the burden of capital adequacy (or of any 
other regulation serving the same purpose)”637. 
It has been argued that shadow banks may be as systemically important as banks, 
notwithstanding that they do not accept deposits from the public, since the main concern 
for the liquidity and stability of the financial system is whether these entities carry out 
maturity transformation or otherwise638.  Entities which rely on short-term (liquid) 
liabilities to finance long-term (illiquid) securities or projects become relevant for the 
liquidity and the stability of the financial system as a whole639.  Thus shadow banks also 
give rise to various systemic risk considerations since they are strongly interconnected 
with banks and the banking system, as banks sponsor shadow banks, use shadow banks 
for regulatory arbitrage purposes, and whilst shadow banks and alternative financing 
entities also resort to banks for liquidity purposes (particularly in the short term)640. 
The FSB has noted how banks and shadow banks can easily become interlinked, such 
that risks arising in shadow banks necessarily cause spillover effects onto banks and 
regulated entities641.  Frequently banks also form part of a chain of entities through 
which shadow banks provide credit intermediation functions642.  Furthermore banks 
may also be exposed to shadow banks through temporary exposures, through the 
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provision of finance, or through the provision of contingent credit lines643.  Banks may be 
funded by entities forming part of the shadow banking system (such as money market 
funds), and banks and shadow banks may also be exposed to a number of common 
counterparties particularly since they may invest in similar assets644.  Therefore stress in 
one of these sectors can easily be transmitted to the other sector leading to possible 
contagion645. 
In this context, Canova has highlighted the dangers of not extending capital 
requirements to hedge funds, particularly in light of the vast amount of funds being 
controlled by the said “unregulated hedge funds”646, and the “destabilizing ripple effects 
throughout the financial markets” that the failure of any such large hedge fund may 
have647.  Canova however notes that “it is uncertain whether Congress and the president 
can muster the political will to impose regulation on such private centers of wealth, 
privilege, and power, which cross national borders”648. 
It has been noted that credit intermediation and the linkages between different credit 
intermediaries may, of their nature, have the potential of causing systemic risks with this 
being the main cause of concern arising from the use of hedge funds and shadow 
banks649.  Whereas when corporates and other entities become insolvent they tend to 
strengthen their competitors (as a competitor is removed from the market), when a 
credit intermediary fails, this weakens other credit intermediaries as one of the links in 
the chain of credit intermediation is dislodged650.  This can also be seen from the 
potential systemic repercussions which became very evident on the failure of the 
American hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998651.  Thus whilst shadow 
banks can be the subject of “runs”, the leverage they use can also increase procyclicality, 
with the interconnectedness with the banking system providing further potential 
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systemic risks in that the failure of a shadow bank can have ripple effects on the financial 
system as a whole652.   
The FSB has also noted that in light of the short-term financing used by shadow banking, 
they may be subject to “runs” which may cause systemic concerns653.  As bank financing 
becomes less attractive and industries move towards alternative methods of financing in 
order to raise funds, one simply finds an element of risk-shifting onto these alternative 
methods of financing, rather than there being a wholesome solution to a problem.  
Though the FSB has highlighted the need for regulation, particularly in order to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage though the use of shadow banks, regulation which seeks to 
eliminate the transfer of risk from the regulated to the unregulated sector through 
regulatory arbitrage continues to be lacking654. 
The end result therefore is that rather than reducing risks in financial activities, these 
risks are only being transferred to other less regulated providers of finance which may 
replace traditional banks in their traditional activities of financial intermediation and be 
subject to the same risks and problems which banks faced before the development of the 
Basel Accords.  This lack of regulatory convergence may very well result in there being a 
lack of soundness and stability in the system as a whole, with potentially alternative 
methods of financing giving rise to those systemic risks which banks are being protected 
from.  This may also negatively affect long term financing in the long run as alternative 
methods of financing may not necessarily be geared towards providing long term 
financing towards certain industries in the same way as banks, given that certain 
shadow banks, such as hedge funds, may be more focused on short term and medium 
term gains, and may seek to exit from certain projects once good opportunities to 
liquidate certain financings become available. 
Engert has recognised that states compete for hedge fund business through regulatory 
competition (by offering “less costly regulation or no (direct) regulation at all”), with this 
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entities; that the risk-based capital requirements for banks’ capital exposures to shadow banking 
entities be reviewed to ensure that such risks are adequately captured; and restrict banks’ ability 
to stand behind entities that are not consolidated with the said bank; FSB October 2011 (n 310) 
16 - 26;  See also:  FSB April 2011 (n 310). 
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in turn working against states’ objectives of curbing systemic risks655.  Rixen argues that 
whilst states engage in regulatory competition in order to seek to attract financial 
activity (with this possibly resulting in a race to the bottom amongst states) it is not 
possible for large states to rely solely on the financial activity attracted by these 
incentives, and large states should preferably act collectively in order to seek to curb 
regulatory competition (since a single jurisdiction acting alone would not be able to do 
so)656.  However even here, Rixen notes that those states with larger financial sectors 
(such as the US and the UK) have more to lose than others by acting collectively and 
these jurisdictions would therefore be more hesitant to support harmonised collective 
action657. 
Engert argues that regulatory arbitrage can only be managed through the emergence of a 
“cartel” in regulation whereby different states coordinate their actions towards 
regulatory harmonisation, whilst exerting pressures on other states in order to eliminate 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities through shadow banking activities658.  This is 
essential for the development of any form of harmonised rules and regulations in light of 
the number of shadow banks established in offshore financial jurisdictions659.  This is 
also true in light of Rixen’s assertion that “[a]s long as nation states conceive themselves 
to be in a position of jurisdictional competition, they do not have any interest in real 
change”660.  The varying interests of different jurisdictions have led to very limited action 
on regulation661.   
This has however also proven difficult at EU level, with different states having different 
approaches towards shadow banking, with jurisdictions with many hedge fund 
managers, such as the UK, being much more cautious about the potential influence of EU 
regulation in this area and the potential loss of business to alternative, less-regulated 
jurisdictions662.  The regulation (or lack of it) at EU level has therefore been a continuous 
source of tension between those favouring regulation and those opposing it – with the 
                                                     
655 Engert (n 308) 332.  
656 Rixen (n 632) 104 – 105.   
657 ibid 105.   
658 Engert (n 308) 332, 362.   
659 Rixen (n 632) 101; Nevertheless the introduction of third-party equivalence by the European 
Union on the introduction of the AIFMD can also be seen as a first step in this direction:  See:  
Howarth and Quaglia (n 309) 121 – 125. 
660 Rixen (n 632) 118.  
661 See:  Howarth and Quaglia (n 309) 116 – 118.    
662 Howarth and Quaglia (n 309) 114, 118 – 120.   
160 
 
balance only having tipped in favour of regulation following the financial crisis663.  
Nevertheless, even here, it has been stated (on considering the negotiations leading up 
to the AIFMD and the draft directive which was being discussed prior to the adoption of 
the AIFMD) that664: 
[t]he draft directive was revised following intense lobbying from affected financial 
service firms [...] and the American and British governments.  In the end, the most 
controversial proposals, including plans to impose fixed caps on leverage and 
capital requirements, were either removed or significantly watered down. 
Though the AIFMD formalised certain business practices in the hedge fund management 
industry (such as requiring hedge fund managers to appoint a separate custodian) and 
necessitated certain reporting requirements, the business practices were not affected in 
any significant manner665.  Specifically from a capital requirements’ point of view, the 
AIFMD established minimum initial capital requirements for AIFMs, whilst only 
establishing capital requirements in order to establish a requirement of holding 
minimum own funds being “equivalent to one quarter of their preceding year’s fixed 
overheads”666.  The AIFMD has adopted the same approach of the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
requires hedge funds of a certain size to be registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), whilst imposing reporting requirements and making hedge funds 
subject to periodic inspections by the said regulator667. 
In light of the above the FSB has been working towards establishing regulation in order 
to deal with shadow banks, with particular emphasis being given to the following 
areas668: 
 (i)  mitigating risks in banks’ interactions with shadow banking entities; 
 (ii) reducing the susceptibility of money market funds (MMFs) to “runs”;  
 (iii) improving transparency and aligning incentives in securitization; 
(iv) dampening pro-cyclicality and other financial stability risks in securities 
financing transactions such as repos and securities lending; and  
                                                     
663 ibid 119.   
664 ibid 119 – 120.   
665 ibid 120.   
666 See:  AIFMD (n 306) art 9.  
667 Howarth and Quaglia (n 309) 120.   
668 FSB August 2013 (n 310) 1. 
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(v) assessing and mitigating financial stability risks posed by other shadow 
banking entities and activities.  
The BCBS has since sought to adopt the FSB’s suggestions in applying capital 
requirements and applying leverage adjustments for banks’ equity investments in 
funds669.  The BCBS has therefore set out three different approaches through which 
banks’ equity investments in funds contribute towards banks’ capital requirements.  In 
the “look-through approach” the bank is to apply risk weights to a fund’s underlying 
exposures “as if the exposures were held directly by the bank”670.  In the “mandate-based 
approach” banks assign “risk weights on the basis of the information contained in a fund’s 
mandate or in the relevant national legislation” 671.  On the other hand in the “fall-back 
approach” a 1,250% risk weight is applied to a bank’s equity investment in a fund672.  A 
leverage adjustment is also applied to the average risk weight of the fund by its leverage 
for a given equity investment, with this being subject to a cap of 1,250%673.  It is however 
unclear as to why the BCBS has limited the focus of such bank exposures to shadow 
banking entities to “equity investments” rather than referring to all exposures (including 
debt) which banks have with shadow banking entities674. 
It is therefore being submitted that the above focal points established by the FSB in 
dealing with shadow banks are intrinsically contradictory.  Whilst the FSB argues that 
banks’ interactions with shadow banking entities need to be regulated in order to 
mitigate the risks which banks are subject to, the above proposals do not apply the same 
                                                     
669 See:  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Capital Requirements for Banks’ Equity 
Investments in Funds (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, December 2013) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs266.pdf> accessed 23 December 2015. 
670 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (n 669) 2, 3. 
671 ibid 2 – 4. 
672 ibid 2, 4. 
673 ibid 2, 5. 
674 The approach taken by the European Banking Authority has been wider as it refers to all 
exposures which institutions have to shadow banking entities.  The European Banking Authority 
will be requiring (as from 1 January 2017) the application of either of two approaches by 
institutions with exposures to shadow banking entities.  The first approach referred to is the 
“principal approach” whereby institutions set individual limits on exposures to shadow banking 
entities depending on, inter alia, the particular nature of the shadow bank to which it is exposed, 
the financial situation of such shadow bank, information and evidence available on the portfolio 
of the shadow bank, on the asset price or credit quality volatility of the shadow banking entity; 
and the interconnectedness of such entity with the particular institution.  The second approach is 
the “fallback approach” where institutions which cannot meet the requirements of the principal 
approach are required to apply the limits on large exposures to the sum of the exposures to 
shadow banking entities to which the principal approach cannot be applied.  See:  European 
Banking Authority (n 328). 
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risk mitigation techniques to which banks are subject (i.e. through the Basel Accords 
generally), to shadow banks.  It is clear that regulators are wary of the consequences 
which may arise on there being the failure or insolvency of a shadow bank such that they 
want to ensure that particular types of “shadow banks” are not subject to “runs”675.  
Nevertheless the principles which apply to banks (and investment firms in the EU and 
other jurisdictions) are not similarly applied to shadow banks and therefore banks are 
still encouraged to shift their business from the regulated sector to the unregulated (or 
regulation-lite sector) through the use of shadow banks, and these shadow banks are not  
tasked with ensuring that certain capital and liquidity requirements continue to be in 
place notwithstanding the similarity in their activities to the activities which banks 
undertake.  The proposed scope of regulation therefore seems to ignore the possibility of 
there being the failure of shadow banks (other than through there being a “run”).   
It is submitted that wide differences still continue to exist and that different rules and 
regulations still continue to apply to different entities – notwithstanding the economic 
function which they undertake, even though the FSB has stated that676: 
[b]y focusing on the economic function (or activities) rather than the legal forms of 
entities conducting them, the recommendations are intended to be robust in the 
face of innovations and adaptations that occur at or outside the boundaries of bank 
regulation or the regulatory perimeter. 
In order for this distinction to be abolished and in order to eliminate regulatory 
arbitrage opportunities, those entities which carry out the same economic functions 
(whether under the name of “banks”, “investment firms”, or other forms of financing 
vehicles such as “AIFs” or “shadow banks”) need to be subject to the same regulations – 
in the absence of which there will continue to be incentives for those financing activities 
which give rise to risk to move from the regulated sectors to the unregulated sectors677.    
                                                     
675 FSB August 2013 (n 310) 3. 
676 ibid 1. 
677 Though as discussed throughout this thesis even if the Basel Accords were to apply to all 
banks, investment firms and to shadow banks equally, inconsistencies would still arise in light of 
varying approaches taken by national regulators and also due to differences arising in underlying 
national laws (and particularly in light of differences in the level of risk depending on whether a 
jurisdiction can be considered to be pro-debtor or pro-creditor). 
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Contradictions can also be clearly seen from the EBA Guidelines which seek to limit 
exposures to shadow banking entities678.  After considering the microprudential risks 
which shadow banks may give rise to, it stated as follows679: 
Macro prudentially, institutions’ exposures to shadow banking entities could be of 
concern for different reasons.  Here, institutions’ exposures to such entities 
undertaking bank-like activity may lead to regulatory arbitrage concerns, and 
worries that core banking activity may migrate systematically from the regulated 
sector ‘into the shadows’.  In order to seek profits, institutions may still actively seek 
ways to arbitrage rules by funding shadow banking entities.  These entities, which 
are potentially more vulnerable to runs and/ or liquidity problems, tend to be 
highly correlated and interconnected with the banking sector, which leads to 
financial stability concerns. 
However, whilst the regulatory arbitrage potential is clearly outlined in the EBA 
Guidelines, and the risks which shadow banks give rise to are also recognised, the 
regulations and guidelines do not consider equating regulation of “shadow banks” with 
that of “investment firms” or of “banks” in the EU.  Regulation therefore only seeks to 
ensure that banks continue to be protected by setting limits on the exposures which 
banks have to shadow banking entities.  The EBA Guidelines therefore continue by 
stating680: 
To minimise the risks posed to institutions arising from their exposures to shadow 
banking entities, the guidelines lay down requirements for institutions to set limits, 
as part of their internal processes, on their individual exposures to shadow banking 
entities (alleviating primarily the microprudential concerns expressed above) and 
on their aggregate exposure to shadow banking entities (alleviating 
macroprudential concerns. 
Thus, the potential macroeconomic consequences of the failure of (or of runs on) 
shadow banks is ignored notwithstanding the substantial economic role which these 
entities play and the potential negative consequences on financial stability which may 
arise from a shadow bank facing financial or liquidity difficulties.   
                                                     
678 European Banking Authority (n 328). 





Part III of this thesis has started off by considering the entities to which the Basel 
Accords apply in different jurisdictions.  It has been shown how there are severe 
variances across different jurisdictions, such that though the Basel Accords had been 
established for the sole purpose of applying to “internationally-active banks”, these today 
apply to different types of entities across different jurisdictions. 
It has also been shown how though the Basel Accords had “regulatory convergence” as 
their initial objective, this changed along the years in order to shift towards there being 
reduction of “systemic risks”.  This Part III also argues that differences in regulation are 
giving rise to regulatory arbitrage, with this encouraging a shift in financial activity from 
the regulated sectors to the unregulated sectors through the use of shadow banks and 
other entities which are not subject to the Basel Accords across different jurisdictions. 
It is here argued that the drafters of the Basel Accords have failed to adopt a law and 
economics approach, and consequently the BCBS failed to consider the interests of the 
different actors identified in Section 2.3.  Thus, as each of these actors seeks to maximise 
his utility, the effectiveness of the Basel Accords becomes much more limited, with the 
Basel Accords losing their legitimacy and accountability even further.    
This thesis therefore argues that since regulatory competition still exists, a proper 
framework should be established wherein regulatory competition is recognised and 
properly regulated.  This thesis therefore argues that the main concepts which underlie 
the Basel Accords should be agreed to in a binding treaty, giving rise to legal rights and 
obligations between different states.  This should set out the limits to regulatory 
competition in order to avoid a race to the bottom.  On the other hand, however, such a 
system will result in individual nation states taking responsibility for their actions, and 
thereby limiting the loopholes they seek to create on seeking to attract further players.  
States should therefore work with the industry in order to ensure that entities which 
carry out the same economic function (such as banks, and shadow banks) are subject to 
the same laws, and different laws and different entities across different jurisdictions are 
not made use of in order to arbitrage the system and reduce the effectiveness of the 
Basel Accords.  It is therefore argued that national regulatory agencies and individual 
states know the relevant players within their market in a much better way than a 
transnational regulatory network does, and national regulatory agencies should 
therefore be given flexibility and incentives to ensure the effectiveness of the Basel 
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Accords, rather than have incentives to seek ways and means whereby they encourage 
the industry to arbitrage the regulatory system.  
Part IV of this thesis will continue by arguing that though the Basel Accords seek to 
create a transnational regulatory law which reduces systemic risks, the Basel Accords 
seemingly start off from the presumption that risk does not vary from one jurisdiction to 
another and does not depend on the underlying legal framework in each jurisdiction.  
This thesis however argues that the Basel Accords remain subject to domestic 
embeddedness such that the same transnational regulatory law will have different 
effects in different jurisdictions, with this being dependent upon the underlying laws 
within which the Basel Accords are to apply.  The main distinctions which will be drawn 
relate to the different laws on insolvency and on security interests across different 
jurisdictions, such that it will be argued that financing entities which operate in pro-
debtor jurisdictions are subject to much more risks than financing entities which 
operate in pro-creditor jurisdictions, notwithstanding that the Basel Accords do not give 










Chapter 6:  Domestic Embeddedness and Differences 
Arising from Underlying National Laws 
 
Whilst Part III of this thesis argued that the Basel Accords did not consider the Basel 
Accords from an economics perspective, and with this giving rise to regulatory arbitrage, 
Part IV focuses on another main limitation of the Basel Accords, by arguing that the Basel 
Accords do not distinguish between the different legal systems within which they 
operate.  It is here contended that even if the Basel Accords were to be adopted in a 
perfectly uniform manner in different jurisdictions, and even if each different national 
regulator were to work towards there being regulatory convergence and the reduction 
of systemic risks, the fact that the Basel Accords need to operate within different 
national frameworks still means that the Basel Accords will give rise to different 
outcomes in different jurisdictions.  Divergences will occur as a result of intrinsic 
differences which exist within underlying national laws681.  Furthermore one can also 
argue that unless the transnational regulatory laws resonate with local laws, then issues 
of legitimacy will also arise for this reason682. 
The main function of the Basel Accords is that of seeking to minimise and regulate risks 
which internationally-active banks face.  Capital adequacy is therefore required to be 
respected by internationally-active banks in order for this to act as a buffer against 
losses which banks may incur whilst catering for potential runs which they may face due 
to a general drop in the confidence in the banking industry.  Given that the Basel Accords 
regulate risk, the underlying assumption arising from the Basel Accords (as a 
transnational regulatory law) is that entities operating in different states, are subject to 
the same risks, notwithstanding the underlying domestic laws and legal culture within 
which they operate. 
It is here argued that the most fundamental differences amongst different jurisdictions, 
and which particularly affect the variances which arise between one jurisdiction and 
another in regulating risk, are the national laws which relate to insolvency and to 
security interests.  The laws on security interests (and other “credit risk mitigation 
                                                     
681 Though the BCBS publishes “progress reports” which seek to provide indicators as to the 
status of implementation of the Basel Accords, it ignores the fact that the same transnational 
regulatory law is bound to have different effects in different jurisdictions in light of the varying 
national laws within which the Basel Accords are to operate.  See:  Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (n 529). 
682 Shaffer (n 201) 256. 
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techniques”, which also include the possibility of netting and set-off on insolvency, the 
provision of guarantees and the availability of the trust) allow banks and financing 
parties to get recourse to funds owed to them on there being a debtor in default.  
Furthermore, the laws on insolvency and the policy choices made in relation thereto 
affect the relationship a creditor may have with a debtor, and the relationship a secured 
creditor may have with other unsecured creditors of a debtor who would be in default.   
This Chapter will set out by considering the main differences arising from national laws 
in relation to insolvency, as well as in relation to the ways in which creditors seek to 
reduce their risks (referred to in the Basel Accords as “credit risk mitigants”, but which 
generally refers to the strength and availability of security interests).  It will also show 
that there has been little harmonisation of these laws across different jurisdictions.  
Chapter 7 will then take a closer look at different types of credit-risk mitigation 
techniques and how these are dealt with by the Basel Accords. 
6.1 Pro-Debtor and Pro-Creditor Jurisdictions:  Differences in Laws 
on Insolvency and Security Interests 
The features of insolvency law and the strength of security interests in a particular 
jurisdiction affects the confidence which a creditor may have and the ease of provision of 
credit by a financing party to a party in need of finance.  This Chapter will show that 
notwithstanding there being one transnational regulatory law regulating capital 
adequacy (the Basel Accords), this operates within very different underlying 
frameworks, meaning that banks and financing entities (as creditors of customers to 
which they would have provided finance) are subject to varying levels of risk, arising 
from the specific legal system within which they operate and the underlying national 
laws. 
Wood has considered insolvency law to be the “root” of commercial and financial law on 
stating683: 
Insolvency law is the root of commercial and financial law because it obliges the 
law to choose.  There is not enough money to go around and so the law must choose 
who to pay.  The choice cannot be avoided or compromised or fudged.  The law 
must always decide who is to bear the risk so that there is a winner and a loser.  On 
bankruptcy it is difficult to split the difference.  That is why bankruptcy is the most 
                                                     
683 Wood 1995(I) (n 15) 94.   
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crucial indicator of the attitudes of a legal system and arguably the most important 
of all commercial legal disciplines. 
He has also stated684:   
... it is only on insolvency that jurisdictions are forced to make the most difficult 
choice between winner and the loser, a choice which can otherwise often be fudged 
or compromised.  In addition, it is insolvency that leads to real competition and 
arouses the deepest resentment and the greatest losses. 
As will be seen below, different jurisdictions adopt different policy choices and choose 
whether to increase efficiency for the benefit of a creditor, or alternatively whether the 
need to protect and safeguard debtors’ interests is given priority.   
The role of security interests (and other credit risk mitigation techniques generally) is 
important in that it allows secured parties to have recourse over particular assets or 
against particular persons in order to safeguard such secured parties’ interests, and this 
therefore provides an ex-ante perspective to insolvency.  Insolvency laws, on the other 
hand, regulate the relationship between creditors and their debtors, and also between 
the various creditors amongst themselves on a debtor being declared insolvent.  
Insolvency law therefore provides an ex-post perspective, whereby the relationship 
between different parties is considered on an insolvency event having occurred.   
Cohen has examined the links between “security interests” and “international insolvency 
law” and has come to the conclusion that there are various legal and economic links 
between the two685.  He has considered that as “rights created under the aegis of secured 
credit law are sometimes vulnerable in bankruptcy; for this reason, bankruptcy law is often 
considered the “acid test” of any security interest”686.  Similarly Buxbaum has noted 
that687: 
When a debtor enters insolvency, applicable bankruptcy or insolvency law may 
interfere in a variety of ways with security rights.  In many systems, the bankruptcy 
petition suspends the ability of a secured creditor to enforce its interest against the 
debtor; in addition, the bankruptcy administrator in most regimes has the power to 
                                                     
684 Wood 2007 (n 15) 335. 
685 Neil B Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit:  The Next Frontier (Texas 
International Law Journal, Vol. 33, 1998) 174.   
686 ibid.   
687 Hannah L Buxbaum, Unification of the Law Governing Secured Transactions:  Progress and 
Prospects for Reform (Uniform Law Review, Vol 8, 2003-1/2, UNIDROIT, 2003) 325.  
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avoid as preferential transfers some types of security rights created in the 
immediate pre-petition period. 
One important caveat is that this Chapter will not be dealing with procedural issues of 
insolvency but will mainly focus on substantive issues.  It will primarily consider general 
principles applicable to corporations (given their major impact on economies, and hence 
risks to financing entities), and will therefore not analyse bankruptcy regimes of 
individuals and family companies or partnerships which may be different from those 
applicable to corporations.    
As different laws seek to protect different parties, this gives rise to different risks to 
financial entities, depending on which jurisdictions they operate in.  Distinctions will be 
drawn between pro-creditor jurisdictions and pro-debtor jurisdictions and it will be 
argued that financing entities operating in pro-creditor jurisdictions are consequently 
subject to less risk than those financing entities which operate in pro-debtor 
jurisdictions.  This thesis will therefore argue that the one-size-fits-all approach adopted 
by the Basel Accords in relation to different jurisdictions (notwithstanding that these 
may be pro-debtor or pro-creditor jurisdictions) is not appropriate.  The differences in 
the laws of different states within which the Basel Accords are to operate lead to 
different risks which the Basel Accords do not cater for, resulting in their being a 
situation whereby though similar regulatory laws may apply amongst different 
jurisdictions, the actual risks which banks and other financing entities face varies 
depending on the underlying laws within which they operate.  Thus, regulation does not 
adequately price risks according to the risks emanating from the underlying laws of 
particular jurisdictions, but simply assumes that having one transnational regulatory 
law would give rise to similar results as if the said transnational regulatory laws operate 
in a completely harmonised framework.  
Notwithstanding the different risks which pro-creditor and pro-debtor jurisdictions are 
subject to, and despite credit risk mitigants which different jurisdictions may adopt, the 
Basel Accords (and other implementing laws such as the CRR and the CRD IV), which 
establish various risk provisions in order to ensure the safety of banks, do not consider 
the underlying position of creditors in the said underlying laws.  Though the Basel 
Accords do consider the importance of credit risk mitigants, they only do so limitedly 
(and generally only in relation to financial collateral, as will be seen in Chapter 7).   
The presumption in the Basel Accords is that as long as the required ratios are complied 
with, the subjects of those rules will be safe – and this without consideration of the risks 
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arising from the underlying laws of different states.  The Basel Accords therefore do not 
distinguish between pro-debtor states and pro-creditor states, and the ease through 
which creditors can deal with insolvent entities.  Similarly, the strength of security 
interests (and other credit risk mitigants) in different states is also ignored, 
notwithstanding that this may affect the ease through which a financial entity can have 
access to collateral which would be used as security in favour of such financing entity.  
Unfortunately, however this also means that given the limited scope of eligible financial 
collateral, banks and financial entities which are subject to the Basel Accords are 
disadvantaged against the financing entities to which the Basel Accords do not apply, 
particularly since the credit risk mitigants they put in place may not be given due 
consideration by the applicable regulatory laws. 
6.1.1 Pro-Creditor and Pro-Debtor Systems 
Wood has noted that the world’s legal systems have historically been divided into three 
main groups which had “a very different idea about who to pay on bankruptcy”688.  These 
three different groups were the Napoleonic systems (which protected debtors); English 
Common Law systems (which protected creditors); and Roman-Germanic systems 
(which were somewhere “in between” the Napoleonic systems and the English Common 
Law systems)689.  He has however noted that this threefold polarization is merely 
historical and is inconsistent with the present day culture of the relevant jurisdictions690.   
Wood has further classified present-day jurisdictions into three categories (which still 
continue to be similar to the historical classification)691.  This threefold classification 
consists of “pro-creditor” jurisdictions; “pro-debtor” jurisdictions; and those jurisdictions 
which Wood considers as being “not interested” (and which in his view consist of certain 
Communist states, certain fundamentalist Muslim states and those states without a 
commercial tradition)692.  He also considers that there are a few jurisdictions which may 
then be classified as “don’t knows”693. 
                                                     
688 Wood 2008 (n 15) 242; Robert R Bliss, Bankruptcy Law and Large Complex Financial 
Organizations:  A Primer (Economic Perspectives, First Quarter, 2003) 50 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=378320> accessed 26 March 2015.  
689 ibid 242. 
690 ibid; Wood has split these further into eight different groups, consisting of:  American common 
law jurisdictions; English common law jurisdictions; Napoleonic jurisdictions; Roman-Germanic 
jurisdictions; Mixed civil/common law jurisdictions; Islamic jurisdictions; New jurisdictions; and 
unallocated jurisdictions; See:  Wood 2007 (n 15) 333. 
691 Wood 1995(I) (n 15) 96. 
692 ibid; Bliss (n 688) 50. 
693 Wood 1995(I) (n 15) 96. 
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It has been noted that the main difference between pro-debtor jurisdictions and pro-
creditor jurisdictions is that whereas pro-creditor jurisdictions allow creditors to be 
pro-active and seek to protect themselves from the limitations which would otherwise 
apply in insolvency (such as through the obtainment of certain security interests, or 
through the possibility of setting-off claims on insolvency), in pro-debtor jurisdictions 
the main interest of the law is to maximise the value of the assets of the insolvent entity 
for the benefit of an insolvent debtor694. 
The main argument in favour of pro-creditor states is that creditors should be able to 
avoid losses arising from the default of a debtor, and that the impossibility of having 
such a system in place will lead to risks to all and possibly even risks to the financial 
system as a whole695.  It has been argued that insolvency systems are important in order 
to resolve financial distress and that strong creditor rights lead to both efficient ex-post 
resolution of distressed corporations, whilst also affecting ex-ante risk taking 
incentives696.  Efficient systems of insolvency make it easier for firms to get credit and 
hence encourage investment, particularly since these insolvency laws reassure creditors 
that they will have recourse to the money due to them in the event of a debtor becoming 
insolvent697.  On the other hand it has been argued that if insolvent entities are punished 
too severely, entrepreneurship may be discouraged as entrepreneurs are put off from 
taking financial risks in order to carry out their particular economic activities698.  
Therefore both the availability of debt, as well as the willingness for entrepreneurs to 
take on debt has been considered as an essential element for there to be economic 
growth699.   
The aim of pro-debtor laws is to ensure that insolvent entities (and their employees) are 
safeguarded, and that creditors assist debtors who find themselves close to insolvency, 
particularly also by granting time through which a debtor’s estate can improve, thus also 
resulting in unsecured creditors being able to benefit from a greater pool of assets700.  It 
has however also been argued that though pro-debtor states seek to destroy creditor 
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and owner rights in order to increase the estate of the insolvent entity, many times this 
merely results in greater returns to priority creditors (such as the state through taxes, 
and employees), and that unsecured creditors are rarely better off particularly since the 
returns on insolvency are generally still very small701. 
Pro-creditor and pro-debtor systems have at their basis two main irreconcilable 
principles, and which are both based on the need of “fairness”702.  In pro-creditor 
systems it has been considered as unfair for there to be “cherry picking”, whereby a 
bankruptcy administrator claims amounts due from a solvent counterparty under one 
contract, whilst simultaneously refusing to pay that same counterparty under another 
contract703.  Therefore “cherry picking” is considered to be contrary to the principles on 
which pro-creditor systems are based, with pro-creditor systems typically allowing for 
set-off on insolvency, with the right of contracting parties to freely protect themselves 
against events of default by entering into contractual arrangements, such as through 
netting agreements and the provision of collateral704. 
Pro-debtor systems, on the other hand, see ex ante private contracting of creditor 
protection agreements as creating “a privileged class of claimants to the detriment of the 
remaining creditors”705.  This protection leads to certain creditors being more protected 
than other creditors if amounts could be netted against an insolvent entity – leading to 
other creditors suffering more substantial losses706.  Pro-debtor systems (particularly 
those having a Civil Law background) see set-off agreements as providing “unpublicized 
security” and therefore certain assets are set aside for the benefit of a particular creditor 
without other creditors having knowledge of that limitation, with pro-debtor systems 
therefore considering such arrangements as being unfair to the general body of 
creditors707. 
It has thus been stated that there needs to be a careful balance between debtor interests 
and creditor interests on establishing insolvency regimes, and that in situations where 
judicial expertise is not effective, where judicial ability is lacking, and where contract 
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enforcement deteriorates, pro-creditor systems are preferred708.  Thus in order for 
certain pro-debtor elements to function properly, such as attempts to preserve going-
concern value, as found in the US through the promulgation of Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code, effective judicial expertise is required, with this being essential in 
order for there to be  proper identification of viable firms709.  In the absence of this 
ability, Ayotte and Yun argue that creditor-friendly systems should be preferred710.   
Whether pro-creditor or pro-debtor policies maximise creditor returns is “highly 
controversial”711.  Nevertheless some jurisdictions have chosen to prefer credit 
providers’ (such as banks) interests, instead of debtors’ interests, with the view being 
put forward that this is essential since banks are the main intermediaries of credit and 
should be preferred in light of them holding the savings of various individuals712.  Wood 
has however also acknowledged that preference towards creditors also developed due 
to a distaste of debtors who became bankrupt713.    
An important point for the purpose of this study, however, is that financing entities, as 
creditors, necessarily favour pro-creditor systems in light of the possibility of ease of 
enforcing their rights over collateral provided and with the possibility of declaring a 
default over the debtor, or alternatively by taking control of the entity which would have 
been financed (or by using these as negotiating tools in their discussions with their 
defaulting debtors) on there being the need to enforce its rights. Pro-creditor systems 
therefore result in there being less risk for banks and financing entities on the 
insolvency of their debtors as they are presented with stronger security interests and 
easier enforcement mechanisms should there be the need. 
Therefore, financiers prefer pro-creditor laws given that lending and financing is less 
risky as a result of there being sufficient creditor control rights714.  As will be seen below, 
however, different risks exist in different jurisdictions and there has been little or no 
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harmonisation amongst different states in this area of law notwithstanding that the 
Basel Accords establish uniform standards to be applied by banks in order to cater for 
the risks which they face.  The Basel Accords do not distinguish between financing 
parties operating in pro-creditor jurisdictions and financing parties operating in pro-
debtor jurisdictions, notwithstanding the different risks to which they may be subject.   
6.1.2 Different Approaches Towards Insolvency Law 
Different jurisdictions adopt different insolvency procedures, with the efficiency of these 
procedures also varying greatly715.  This distinction is most profound when comparing 
pro-debtor systems with pro-creditor systems716. 
Over the past few decades Wood has sought to map and rank jurisdictions according to 
whether they can be considered as pro-creditor or pro-debtor jurisdictions, basing his 
analysis on a number of key indicators717.  The classification of jurisdictions established 
by Wood has been reproduced below, with the first jurisdictions listed being the most 
pro-creditor jurisdictions, and the last jurisdictions listed being the most pro-debtor 
(though Wood has recognized that other than for those jurisdictions listed in rank “one” 
and “ten” it might be legitimate to move some jurisdictions “up or down a rung or two in 
the scale”)718: 
1. Hong Kong, Singapore and other English-influenced states (about 80 of them); 
2. Australia, England, Ireland; 
3. Germany, Netherlands (and former Dutch states like Indonesia), Sweden, 
Switzerland; 
4. Scotland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway; 
5. United States, Canada (Quebec more pro-debtor); 
6. Austria, Denmark, South Africa (and related states like Botswana and 
Zimbabwe); 
7. Italy; 
8. Greece, Portugal, Spain, most of Latin America; 
                                                     
715 Succurro (n 696) 4. 
716 ibid.  




9. Belgium, Luxembourg, many former French colonies;  
10. France. 
Wood has recognised that this scale may be “highly impressionistic” and “bound to be 
unreliable” in light of the vast comparative research which would need to be undertaken 
to authenticate it, whilst he also specifies that various domestic elements, such as how 
certain rules are applied, and the underlying legal civilisation would also need to be 
considered in order to undertake a wholesome analysis719.  He further notes that the 
classification he established is based on the legal rules of states, and does not look at the 
culture found in different states720.  He however states that notwithstanding such 
essential qualifications, there is still value in adopting this analysis721. 
Wood established the above scale by setting out a number of key determinants, to which 
he then attributed a “score” in order to be able to rank the different jurisdictions 
according to the score which each jurisdiction obtained in relation to each key 
determinant722.  Some of the said key indicators (security, rehabilitation proceedings and 
set-off) were granted a higher weighting by Wood in light of their importance in 
considering whether a jurisdiction is pro-creditor or pro-debtor723.  The key 
determinants used by Wood in determining the above scale are the following724: 
1. The scope and efficiency on bankruptcy of security and title financing (such as 
retention of title, factoring and financial leasing); 
2. Insolvency set-off (enabling the reciprocal unsecured creditor to be paid ahead 
of other unsecured creditors); 
3. Corporate rehabilitation statutes; 
4. Ownership of assets in the possession of the debtor (trust, tracing); 
5. Honouring the veil of incorporation and protection of directors against 
personal liability.  This is an ambiguous factor since arguments can be made 
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that a weak veil is either pro-creditor or pro-debtor.  But unquestionably a 
strong veil shows a business orientation; 
6. Preferential transfers; 
7. Contract and lease rescission. 
Notwithstanding that the historical classification of jurisdictions depended very clearly 
on whether jurisdictions were Napoleonic, based on English Common Law, or Roman-
Germanic, in establishing the above scale Wood has come to the conclusion that it is 
unimportant as to whether jurisdictions are “common law” jurisdictions or “civil law” 
jurisdictions (other than for the possibility of using trusts) in classifying jurisdictions as 
being “pro-debtor” or “pro-creditor”725.  He therefore states that it is not particularly 
relevant as to what format is used to write the relevant laws and that what is more 
relevant is the substantive content of those laws726.  Wood has therefore noted that 
though jurisdictions may be split into different legal families, such as Napoleonic 
jurisdictions, Roman-Germanic jurisdictions and Anglo-American jurisdictions, the 
Roman-Germanic group and its related jurisdictions in the mixed civil law/ common law 
group include the second and third largest economies, being Japan and Germany, and 
with Luxembourg, being traditionally Napoleonic in nature, having the highest per capita 
income727.  Furthermore, if one were to compare English law with the laws of the US, one 
would find that English law is more pro-creditor than the laws of the US in light of 
underlying policy choices which the different laws have established728.   
Notwithstanding Wood’s analysis, one cannot ignore that certain civil law systems 
continue to be more ingrained in pro-debtor backgrounds in light of their historical 
origin, and though certain Civil Law jurisdictions have developed along the years to 
move towards a more pro-creditor stance, other jurisdictions may still be ingrained, 
whether fully or partially, in the historical Napoleonic system which sought to safeguard 
debtors as its starting point.  Other authors therefore still continue to associate pro-
creditor systems with Common law jurisdictions and pro-debtor systems with Civil law 
systems729. 
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Wood also notes that where a country lies in the scale of being pro-debtor or pro-
creditor is not influenced by how developed that particular jurisdiction is, and that a 
developed country or a developing country may be either a pro-debtor or a pro-creditor 
jurisdiction730.  Cranston however argues that the more pro-creditor a jurisdiction is, the 
more this helps facilitate economic development particularly, given that pro-creditor 
jurisdictions are looked upon favourably by foreign investors731.   
Burman has argued that though reduction of risk and credit enhancement systems are 
ultimately as old as pre-Roman commerce, the reform of secured finance laws over the 
past decades has become one of the “most effective tools” through which different 
jurisdictions enhance their credit capacity, thus encouraging financing parties to operate 
within their laws, allowing the opening up of modern trade and commerce and the 
development of infrastructure732.    
6.1.3 Different Approaches Towards Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques   
Wood has argued that as laws develop in different jurisdictions, the problem of reaching 
“international consensus” on the “three major risk mitigants” (security interests, netting 
and set-off on insolvency, and the availability of the trust), will continue, as this has 
continued for at least the past two centuries, and he therefore did not envisage much 
harmonization taking place in relation to the laws which deal with credit risk mitigation 
techniques733.  He envisaged that discussions relating to the laws of insolvency will 
continue in the medium term, and that arguments such as whether insolvency law 
should protect creditors or debtors, whether certain actors should receive favourable 
protection, and what degree of regulatory intervention and micro-management of the 
legal system there should be, will remain734.  He argued that as legal systems become 
more complicated, new carve-outs will be created, with different legal systems becoming 
even more “laddered or tiered or tranched”735. 
When considering the “three major risk mitigants”, Wood has argued that “the traditional 
Napoleonic systems are negative on all of them, the Roman-Germanic systems are negative 
on one and a half of them and the Anglo-American systems are positive on all three”, 
though he has recognised that this classification may consist of an “extremely broad 
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generalization”736.  He therefore considers that:  in Napoleonic jurisdictions, insolvency 
set-off is not permitted, with there being no universal trust, and whilst having “relatively 
poor” security interests; Roman-Germanic jurisdictions do have insolvency set-off, and 
with relatively strong security interests (being somewhere midway between Napoleonic 
and English common law systems), with the trust concept being largely rejected; and all 
Anglo-American common law systems have insolvency set-off, wide security interests, 
and the universal trust737. 
Certain credit risk mitigation techniques, such as the availability of strong and effective 
security interests are also seen as an essential part of the equation for there to be 
economic growth, such that even before the World Bank grants loans to a developing 
country, it will normally examine the creation and protection of security interests in 
place in the respective jurisdiction, and support to less developed countries has only 
been extended upon such countries pursuing reforms in order to facilitate credit 
extension and on having available efficient default remedies738. 
Notwithstanding the differences between jurisdictions and notwithstanding the lack of 
successful harmonisation initiatives in relation to credit risk mitigation techniques that 
will be discussed in Section 6.2, the Basel Accords do not distinguish between the 
varying underlying frameworks across different jurisdictions.  The Basel Accords adopt a 
“one-size-fits-all” approach and assume that the same standards can be applied to all 
jurisdictions across borders and give rise to the same effects, notwithstanding the 
varying pro-debtor or pro-creditor stances which different jurisdictions adopt. 
Though Wood recognizes that there have been vast areas of harmonisation of financial 
law along the years, he contends that this was possible as these represented 
“comparatively easy areas and do not affect the fundamental issues”, and argues that the 
“world has had little difficulty on agreeing on issues which are not insolvency-related”739.  
He however notes that “when insolvency intervenes, the international consensus stops”740. 
Goode has identified “wide differences” in “philosophy and legal culture” regarding the 
recognition of security and the conditions for the validity of security interests across 
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different jurisdictions741.  He states that common law jurisdictions “are generally 
sympathetic to the concepts of party autonomy and self-help”, and adopt a “liberal attitude 
towards security”, such as through the need of there being minimum formality for the 
grant of security, with the possibility of security being taken over both present and 
future assets, and with the possibility of securing both existing as well as future 
indebtedness742.  Furthermore common law jurisdictions also allow universal security, 
rather than being limited solely to specific security743.   
On the other hand, Goode states that civil law jurisdictions “have been more cautious in 
their approach to non-possessory security and have been anxious about the “false wealth” 
which such practices are perceived as permitting”744.  Therefore the general rule in civil 
law jurisdictions is that specific security needs to be taken over specific assets; a notice 
may need to be given to a debtor as a perfection requirement for the validity of an 
assignment of debts (which will hence affect the validity and not merely the priority of 
such act); together with there being limitations on self-help remedies such as through 
the possession and sale of secured assets745. 
The formalities required for the creation of security also vary between different 
jurisdictions – whilst Civil law jurisdictions typically require the existence of specific 
formalities in order for security to be perfected, it has been recognized that in Common 
law jurisdictions consensual security “may be created in the most informal fashion in 
equity, even in the case of land”, and that a mere agreement between the parties 
suffices746.  
The ease of enforcement of security interests also varies greatly between Common Law 
jurisdictions and Civil Law jurisdictions, particularly in light of self-help remedies which 
are typically found in Common Law jurisdictions747.  Whilst in Civil Law jurisdictions one 
would typically require access to the Courts in order to enforce a security interest, the 
notion of “self-help” found in Common Law jurisdictions grants secured creditors a: 
right to possess and sell his security, or appoint a receiver of it, without the aid of 
the court; to stipulate that the receiver is to be the agent of the debtor company, 
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which is to be solely responsible for his acts, omissions and remuneration; to take 
over the management of a debtor company’s business and to apply the profits 
towards discharge of the mortgage debt and interest748. 
In Common law jurisdictions such as in the UK, a creditor may avail himself of various 
rights over the debtor and over property held by the debtor, with these rights consisting 
of both self-help remedies, as well as of judicial remedies749.  On default by a debtor, a 
creditor may (apart from having the possibility of accelerating a debt due, withholding 
his performance, and terminating the agreement), enforce his security interests by 
obtaining possession or enforcing the sale of particular assets, and by so doing be 
preferred over other creditors of the debtor750.  Furthermore the creditor may also be 
entitled to set-off amounts due to him751.  A creditor may also resort to judicial remedies, 
which may include the institution of proceedings against the debtor for “payment, 
delivery, possession, foreclosure, or sale”752.    
Wood has ranked jurisdictions according to whether these can be considered as being 
“sympathetic” or “hostile” to security interests, such that he has considered most English-
based common law countries (and to a lesser extent Sweden, Finland and Norway) as 
being “very sympathetic” to security interests, particularly in light of the possibility of 
taking a universal business charge over assets of a debtor which may be enforced 
through self-help remedies; jurisdictions such as Germany, Japan, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Scotland and South Africa as being “quite sympathetic” to security interests 
(particularly as a result of the possibility of having fiduciary transfers taking place by 
way of security); jurisdictions such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Latin American countries, 
Greece and Spain as being “quite hostile” to security interests; and with jurisdictions 
such as Austria, France and Italy being classified as being “very hostile” to security 
interests753. 
Wood has however also recognised that notwithstanding the above, most jurisdictions 
allow for mortgages to be taken over land, ships and aircraft, and therefore some 
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jurisdictions may be more pro-creditor when dealing with particular assets, thus 
resulting in lower risks for financing parties754. 
Drobnig has, on the other hand, classified jurisdictions somewhat differently (when 
considering security interests in international insolvency proceedings), on stating that 
“[u]ndoubtedly the most creditor-prone country is the United States; followed by the 
Anglophonic Canadian provinces; then Europe, Germany; followed by the United Kingdom; 
and then by France”755.  He specifically continues by drawing distinctions in relation to 
non-possessory security, and lists the US and most of the Anglo-Canadian provinces as 
being the most accommodating towards non-possessory security, and this as against 
Germany, England and France (with his comparison focusing on those countries which 
he considers “hav[ing] advanced the farthest on the road to modern solutions for security 
interests in movables”)756. 
While this Section has sought to outline the varying approaches towards credit risk 
mitigation techniques across different jurisdictions, Section 7.1 will consider the main 
elements of each of these major credit risk mitigation techniques and how these vary 
across different jurisdictions.   
6.2 Lack of Harmonisation of Laws   
6.2.1 Insolvency Law 
Though there has been “substantial harmony and convergence of the underlying concepts” 
of financial regulatory law, there continues to be considerable divergence in financial 
laws in light of the divergences on the laws of insolvency757.  One of the proposals laid 
out in Chapter 9 of this thesis is that regulatory laws such as the Basel Accords (and their 
relevant implementing laws) can be used as a means to achieve a level of harmonisation 
of insolvency laws, with this possibly giving rise to harmonization across the different 
underlying laws within which the Basel Accords operate.   
Having harmonization of underlying laws will add to the effectiveness of transnational 
regulatory laws such as the Basel Accords, given that this thesis argues that 
notwithstanding the existence of transnational regulatory laws such as the Basel 
Accords, these regulatory laws are rendered somewhat ineffective in light of the 
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different risks which financing entities are subject (and being dependent upon the 
particular jurisdiction within which they operate).  It will here be argued that having 
incentives at the transnational level for insolvency laws to be harmonised is necessary in 
light of the various domestic policies and the traditional obstacles in each jurisdiction 
which continue to be an obstacle to reform, and in light of jurisdictions not being offered 
incentives to reform their domestic laws and regulations758.  The proposal which will be 
put forward will therefore ensure that appropriate incentives are given to states to 
reform their laws to ensure that if insolvency risks are high, then this is appropriately 
reflected in their bank’s credit risk calculations. 
Cohen has stated that the differences in insolvency law, whether substantive or 
procedural, “create a serious problem” in international transactions and “create one more 
battlefield to be survived in the eventual allocation of the debtor’s assets”759.  Thus, as 
creditors typically seek risk aversion, greater uncertainty typically results in higher 
interest rates being charged on the advancement of credit760. 
The concept of the “centre of main interests” has become the yardstick, in cross-border 
insolvency on seeking to determine the proper forum for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings, and this concept can be found in both the EU Insolvency Regulation as well 
as in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency761.  In both the EU 
Insolvency Regulation as well as in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency, however, the underlying national insolvency laws still remain untouched, 
unchanged and unharmonised, such that substantial differences exist between different 
states762.  One should here also be mindful of the fact that even getting different 
jurisdictions within the EU to agree to a conflict of law mechanism in insolvency has 
proved problematic – the EU Insolvency Regulation763 was the result of negotiations 
which started back in 1960 (where a Convention was being proposed), and it was only 
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agreed to “in a last-ditch effort to rescue the project from oblivion”764.  The formulation of 
the EU Insolvency Regulation as well as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Insolvency have 
therefore already been considered as tasks of great magnitude, in order to seek to have 
some form of alignment between different jurisdictions, and this notwithstanding that 
the outcome of these tasks has been limited to understanding which of the unchanged 
national laws are to apply to an insolvent entity765.   
Other than the UNCITRAL Model Law on Insolvency one can also find the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law766 which was formulated in 2005 and which aims to 
“assist the establishment of an efficient and effective legal framework to address the 
financial difficulty of debtors”, and “to be used as a reference by national authorities and 
legislative bodies when preparing new laws and regulations or reviewing the adequacy of 
existing laws and regulations”767. 
This lack of harmonisation has also come about in light of the various policy issues 
which insolvency gives rise to, such as protection of employees, and the important policy 
choice as to whether the law protects the insolvent party by seeking to maximise the 
assets available to it on insolvency, or whether it considers the rights of creditors and 
their recourse to amounts due to them and with this being dealt with in an expeditious 
manner (to the detriment of maximising the pool of assets belonging to the insolvent 
entity). 
Having some degree of harmonisation of the laws on insolvency has become even more 
relevant in light of the ever increasing mobility of capital and goods and the need to 
ensure that the debtor’s assets are caught by the same proceedings and are not subject 
to multiple proceedings which may invariably give rise to different outcomes768. 
6.2.1.1 Harmonisation initiatives in the European Union 
As seen above, notwithstanding the vast legal harmonisation processes adopted in 
various fields by the EU, harmonisation in relation to insolvency laws has been limited to 
the Insolvency Regulation.  This Regulation merely adopted a conflict of laws’ approach 
(with its main focus being on establishing the jurisdiction of insolvency proceedings, and 
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ensuring recognition and enforcement of insolvency proceedings across EU borders), 
and establishes that insolvency proceedings will take place where a debtor’s centre of 
main interests is, with other jurisdictions only having a secondary or a supporting 
role769.  The EU Insolvency Regulation did not harmonise the substantive insolvency 
laws which different member states adopt770.  This has also lead to forum shopping 
opportunities for both insolvent companies as well as to bankrupt individuals771. 
The Insolvency Regulation has been replaced by the Recast Insolvency Regulation772 on 
26 June 2017773.  It has nevertheless been argued that even here, the EU has been “too 
cautious regarding the harmonisation of substantive insolvency laws of the Member 
States”774.  Therefore, though the Recast Regulation has sought to extend the provisions 
of the EU Insolvency Regulation, this has not brought any further harmonisation in the 
laws of the different member states and the amendments sought are mostly procedural 
and continue to be reliant on the “centre of main interests” as a conflict of laws 
mechanism775.   
The main amendments which the Recast Regulation has introduced to the Insolvency 
Regulation are that:  it has introduced a formal definition of “centre of main interests”776 
(as this concept was only referred to in the recitals of the Insolvency Regulation777), with 
there being a rebuttable presumption that the centre of main interests corresponds to 
the place of registered office of a company or of a legal person778;  the scope of 
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insolvency proceedings has been broadened in order to cater also for pre-insolvency 
proceedings779; mechanisms have been introduced in order to limit the need to open 
secondary proceedings780;  and provisions have been inserted for there to be a voluntary 
group coordination proceeding where different members of the group are found in 
different member states781.   
Eidenmüller argues that the recent amendments to the Insolvency Regulation present 
themselves as a missed opportunity since harmonisation is essential and “clearly 
necessary for the efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies”782.  He therefore 
refers to the need for harmonisation in order to avoid forum shopping in relation to the 
differences regarding the deadlines a debtor must meet when the opening of insolvency 
proceedings is mandatory; as well as the need to have uniform security interests in 
relation to movable property (rather than relying on the lex situs rule)783. 
The EU has, over the past few years also sought to tackle ancillary issues such as through 
a Commission Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and 
insolvency784.  This Commission Recommendation seeks to give entities which are likely 
to be subject to insolvency proceedings the possibility of staying creditor proceedings 
and establishing a framework for restructuring of the particular entity (including 
through the use of mediators or supervisors for negotiations to take place between the 
particular debtor and the debtor’s creditors)785.  One should here also point out that 
though this framework is only subject to a Commission Recommendation (and cannot 
therefore be considered as a harmonisation mechanism), the provisions of the Recast 
Insolvency Regulation also apply to restructurings contemplated by the said Commission 
Recommendation786.  One should also note that the effects of this Commission 
Recommendation have the potential of making the general approach of European laws 
more pro-debtor rather than pro-creditor, thereby increasing risks which financing 
entities face. 
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The 2012 Impact Assessment which led to the Recast Insolvency Regulation787 set out a 
relatively pro-debtor approach to businesses in financial distress, by giving particular 
importance to the need for maximisation of asset value, given that it argues that this will 
provide better recovery rates for creditors788.  This Impact Assessment considered three 
possibilities in order to tackle the main problems faced with cross-border insolvencies in 
the EU, and which consisted of either retaining the status quo; or “modernizing the 
existing Regulation while preserving the current balance between creditors and debtors 
and between universality and territoriality” (referred to as “Option A” in the said Impact 
Assessment); or of “modifying the fundamentals of the Regulation and requiring some 
approximation or convergence of national insolvency laws and proceedings” (referred to 
as “Option B” in the said Impact Assessment), and with the latter option thereby leading 
to harmonisation of national insolvency laws across the EU789.  
The Commission however felt that more comparative analysis was required prior to 
resorting to Option B and prior to there being substantive harmonisation of insolvency 
laws, and this notwithstanding that the said Impact Assessment concluded that Option B 
would be more effective than Option A in “reaching the objectives and providing economic 
and social benefits for the Single Market”790.  The Impact Assessment therefore stated791: 
The approximation of national insolvency laws and procedures would...require an 
in-depth comparative-law analysis of national insolvency laws and procedures 
which would enable the Commission to identify the precise areas in which 
procedural harmonisation would be necessary and feasible, and not too intrusive to 
the national legislations and insolvency systems. 
It was therefore concluded that Option A “seems a more proportionate option at this 
stage”792.  As a result, laws of different member states continue to be different and rely 
solely on conflict of law provisions as seen above. 
6.2.2 Security Interests 
Similar to the laws on insolvency, harmonisation of laws in relation to security interests 
has also been very limited793.  According to Cohen this lack of harmonisation “lower[s] 
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the expected value of a transaction to the creditor”, particularly since when security 
interests provide certainty and are effective, they act in order to preserve the creditor’s 
interests on the insolvency of their debtors and leave the creditor in a better position794.   
It has been argued that in light of further globalization, cross-border commercial finance 
requires further harmonization in order to provide predictability to financing parties, as 
well as to reduce risks – thus bringing credit into a number of markets and reducing the 
costs associated with higher risks795.  Buxbaum has thus stated that parties are subject to 
higher costs, in light of there being more substantial risks on the application of less 
modernised law on security interests, therefore leading to more expensive credit796.  
Burman has also noted that along the years the structure of secured finance has often 
had a “significant effect” on the types of parties who can most readily grant credit, the 
types of businesses it favours, the types of property interests which gain preeminence as 
collateral, and he argues that many jurisdictions rely quite heavily on movables (both 
tangibles and intangibles) as prime collateral797.  It has therefore been recognized that 
harmonisation on the laws of secured transactions and having an efficient enforcement 
system is necessary in order to ensure better access to credit, and to substantially lower 
borrowing costs798.   
On UNIDROIT's 50th anniversary, Matteucci highlighted the main issues which bodies 
tasked with the unification of such laws on security interests faced, with the main 
concerns primarily consisting of799:  the question as to whether harmonisation should 
take place through substantive unification, or alternatively through unification of private 
international law principles; whether unification of law should only be limited to 
international transactions, or alternatively whether it should also be sought for domestic 
law matters; and whether to seek to achieve “organic unification” or alternatively 
whether one should focus on specific legal relations. 
Bazinas’ 1980 report entitled “UNCITRAL's Work in the Field of Secured Transactions” 
also concluded that the differences amongst the various legal systems in relation to 
secured transactions were too great to allow for there to be unification of law, and 
therefore UNCITRAL had here concluded that unification of law in relation to security 
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interests was not feasible800.  Burman also noted how in the mid-1990s harmonisation of 
secured transactions law was placed on the ““impossible” list”, and “consigned to the 
dustbin because of deep differences in legal traditions, the uses of commercial law, and 
legislative and cultural differences in changing long-standing law”801. 
Cohen, however, writing in 1998, has been much more positive on the potential for 
harmonization of the laws on secured credit due to a number of economic and political 
changes which took place in the preceding years, due to which harmonization initiatives 
would not have required jurisdictions to revamp their laws in order to be receptable to 
harmonization initiatives802.  In Cohen’s view, the period 1977 – 1997 dramatically 
changed the international secured transactions’ landscape and that as new initiatives 
“mushroomed”, the prospect of “modernization and harmonization are no longer far-
fetched dreams”803.  He therefore stated that the degree of harmonisation in the decade 
leading up to 1997, provided harmonisation of law which would have been “not 
imaginable only twenty years ago”804.   
On the other hand, Wood has been of the view that in the medium term there will be 
more “splintering and fragmentation” of the laws on insolvency and security interests, 
rather than further harmonisation, which he envisages will be “a shattering like a stone 
hitting a windscreen”805.  This however contrasts with Goode’s view who has argued 
that806: 
States all over the world have had to recognize that a diversity of national laws is 
no longer adequate to meet the needs of the market place, and that long-standing 
legal traditions, concepts and techniques, however laudable in their objectives, 
must now be modified so as to be responsive to the needs of commerce and finance, 
which require above all the minimum degree of formality and the maximum degree 
of flexibility. 
Furthermore, in 2003 Goode stated that in the previous two decades:  
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we have come to appreciate the importance of a sound legal regime for security 
interests in personal property, both for domestic and for cross-border transactions, 
and the fact that property rights and their protection against insolvency need not 
be a no-go area for the harmonisation process”807.   
Nevertheless, according to Goode having international harmonization of personal 
property security law is “wholly unrealistic” given that the law is “too complex and the 
differences between national laws too great”, though Goode does recommend that states 
resort to model laws and Conventions dealing with specific types of security interests in 
order to limit the problems faced on the international plain808. 
However, notwithstanding the importance of security interests and the positive 
predictions in relation to harmonization of laws on security interests, this has been very 
limited, and even in regional groupings such as in the EU there have been very limited 
attempts towards unification of these laws809.  The lack of harmonization can also be 
seen as a result of a proposal which has been put forward by the European Commission 
in May 2017, whereby an “accelerated loan security” has been proposed to be put in 
place whereby banks will be able to recover value from secured loans in the event of 
there being a default810.  This continues to show how despite the harmonization of laws 
regulating banks’ risks, the actual risks to which such banks are subject vary 
substantially from one jurisdiction to another. 
Therefore, a further 20 years after Cohen’s writing, the lack of harmonization of laws on 
security interests continues to be evident.  This problem has been even more 
exacerbated by the fact that there continues to be uncertainty, in day to day transactions, 
as to the laws of which states apply, particularly in light of the complex conflict of law 
rules which apply in different jurisdictions, thus leading to parties to a transaction to 
take different types of security in the different jurisdictions in which they operate, 
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notwithstanding substantial overlaps which may be created in the security taken, in 
order to ensure that the creditor continues to be sufficiently protected811. 
The lack of harmonisation is even more surprising as the proliferation of transnational 
laws and regulation in other areas of law has been one the main developments over the 
past two decades.  It will therefore be argued that the time is ripe for new initiatives to 
be adopted in order to achieve harmonization, particularly in light of the wider 
regulatory frameworks which have become ever more harmonized, and also in light of 
the fact that this will enhance the effectiveness of transnational regulatory measures 
such as the Basel Accords. 
6.2.2.1 Harmonisation initiatives 
In the absence of there being unification in both the laws on insolvency as well as in the 
laws on security interests, conflict of law principles have had to be resorted to in order 
to determine the proper laws to apply when varying security interests may be obtained 
over particular assets812.  In Goode’s view, resorting solely to conflict of laws, without 
unification of laws, is however “inherently unsatisfactory”, particularly in light of the 
need to apply domestic laws to international transactions813. 
The general conflict of law rule is that corporeal movables are governed by the lex rei 
sitae, such that the particular asset becomes subject to the laws of the place of the 
location of the said asset (though difficulties may arise in light of the wide ranging 
differences in non-possessory security interests amongst different jurisdictions)814.  One 
should also note that in light of the international mobility of means of transport, which 
due to their nature venture across national borders on numerous occasions, the proper 
law of security taken over assets such as vessels and aircraft, is usually determined by 
the state of registration (rather than by the lex rei sitae) of the particular asset (with this 
usually coinciding with the law of the flag or nationality)815. 
On the other hand the situation is somewhat different with regard to intangibles, in light 
of the fact that intangibles may invariably not have an unambiguous situs816.   Therefore 
the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 1980 
established conflict of law provisions in order to regulate this, with the main concept 
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found in the Rome Convention being that intangibles which are assigned will be 
governed by the law governing the assigned receivable, therefore moving from the lex rei 
sitae to the lex contractus817.  The general presumption here is that the same rules 
governing assignments will also govern the pledging of receivables818.  The Rome 
Convention has since been replaced by the Rome I Regulation which has incorporated 
the same concepts819. 
Drobnig has sought to highlight the main initiatives entered into by different 
jurisdictions which sought to achieve some degree of uniformity in relation to the laws 
on security interests820, and has also referred to two proposals which had been put 
forward and which consisted of a range of possible unification schemes:  the 1968 
UNCITRAL proposal; and the 1972 proposal put forward by the Service de Recherches 
Juridiques Comparatives of the CNRS of Paris821.  Drobnig has however stated these 
attempts at achieving uniformity were all ineffective, and has stated that “transnational 
incidence of security interests is as yet relatively moderate” and that it: 
would probably be difficult to obtain sufficient government support for an 
international conference dealing with the relatively technical topic of security 
interests; and even if the text of an international interest could be agreed upon, 
national parliaments would probably be slow and perhaps even reluctant to ratify 
such a text822. 
He has recognized that “[t]he only area recording some successful international legislation 
for security rights is in certain means of transport”823.  International recognition of 
security rights in aircraft have been recognised as from the Geneva Convention of 
1948824, with this Convention being highly successful (though this only established 
                                                     
817 ibid 64 – 65.   
818 ibid 65.  
819 Article 24, Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations [2008] OJ L 177 (Rome I).   
820 These initiatives included:  (a) the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (entered into by Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark, 1915 – 1917); (b) the UNIDROIT draft provisions concerning the impact of 
reservation of title in the sale of certain goods (1939, 1951); (c) the provisions regarding the 
effect of bankruptcy of reservation of title in the sale of goods in the draft EEC Bankruptcy 
Convention (1970); and (d) the model reservation of title clauses contained in several “General 
Conditions” (as elaborated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe);  See Cohen 
(n 685) 178. 
821 Cohen (n 685) 179. 
822 ibid. 
823 Drobnig (n 755) 62; Cohen (n 685) 178 – 179.  
824 Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft (Geneva, 1948).  
193 
 
conflict of laws rules)825.  This has furthermore been supplemented by the CTC which 
will be analysed in further detail in Chapter 8826.  On the other hand, various other 
initiatives, such as on ship mortgages and maritime liens have only had limited 
success827. 
Drobnig dismissed the usefulness of the adoption of “recommendations” for states to 
adopt in seeking to achieve uniformity of security interests828.  He therefore stated:  
“[m]ere recommendations, even if emanating from an international organization of the 
highest repute, will not command sufficient moral or other support for adoption by any 
sizeable number of States”829.  His view was however “less bleak” when considering the 
possibility of developing model laws on security interests, though he stated that 
“[p]erhaps moral persuasion or intellectual insight into the virtues of the model rules will 
move some States to adopt them.  Others may need persuasion by more effective means 
such as insistence on the part of international financing institutions”830.   
Harmonisation has also been sought, along the years, in relation to specific instruments 
which seek to provide security interests or similar rights.  One of these initiatives has 
been in relation to factoring – though factoring generally involves a sale of an asset, 
rather than a credit transaction, this is so closely associated with secured credit 
(historically and functionally), such that it is typically also governed by secured credit 
laws831.  In light of the cross-border nature of factoring, the 1988 UNIDROIT Convention 
on International Factoring was seen as a landmark which showed that it is indeed 
possible to reach international agreement on complex legal issues in relation to 
international secured finance832.  Similarly in 1988 the UNIDROIT Convention on 
International Financial Leasing was also agreed to833.  Both the UNIDROIT Convention on 
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International Factoring and the UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial 
Leasing came into force on 1st May 1995834.   
 UNCITRAL has also sought harmonisation on the laws which govern international 
accounts receivable financing, through the 2001 Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade835.  This Convention, which follows on Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) (which in itself had already been a very important 
harmonisation initiative in the different states of the US and through which the US 
obtained a harmonized law on security interests which could be applied consistently 
throughout), would govern any international assignment of a receivable and any 
assignment (domestic or international) of an international receivable (i.e. where the 
debtor and the creditor are in different jurisdictions)836.  This Convention has therefore 
sought to provide clarity to a myriad of issues which arise in light of there being an 
account holder (or account debtor), an account creditor (who will be the debtor of the 
secured party and the assignor of the credit), and the creditor (who is also the assignee 
and will also be the secured party), with all these parties potentially also being situate in 
different jurisdictions837.  This Convention however is yet to enter into force838.  
The Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions839 was also developed by UNCITRAL, and 
also placed great reliance on Article 9 of the US UCC.  McCormack has however been 
critical of this since he considers that this “neglects reference to indigenous secured credit 
law norms that also reflect national social policy choices in a range of countries”840.  He 
therefore states that the UNCITRAL Secured Transactions Guide to reform the law 
worldwide along neoliberal American lines is “fraught with difficulty not least by 
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overlooking the regulatory and cultural plurality of the countries on which it seeks to have 
an impact”841. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development issued its Model Law on 
Secured Transactions in 1994, with this having been drafted for the purpose of serving 
as a model modern secured transactions law, particularly for the Central and Eastern 
European jurisdictions842.  Other regional projects for the development of modern 
secured credit laws have also been in place along the years843. 
In 2002 the Model Law on Secured Transactions, sponsored by the Organization of 
American States was also adopted844.  The drafting of this Model Law sought to build on 
common elements found in different legal systems in order to establish a Model Law 
which could uniform and harmonise laws on non-possessory secured credit financing 
and which could be adopted by different states, notwithstanding their varying legal 
cultures, thereby seeking to ensure the ease of access to credit with the resulting 
economic benefits which this brings845.  The OAS Model Law creates a uniform system 
for all non-possessory interests in movable property by way of single registry and 
priority system.  For this purpose the OAS Model law was complemented by the 2009 
OAS Model Registry Regulations846. 
Notwithstanding these initiatives, the laws on security interests continue to vary across 
different jurisdictions, and harmonisation initiatives have not been particularly 
successful (including in economic groupings such as the EU); consequently financing 
entities in different jurisdictions are subject to different underlying laws.  Against this 
backdrop, Chapter 9 will propose that the Basel Accords themselves can also be used as 
a method in order to encourage different jurisdictions to adopt uniform laws on security 
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interests (using the same methodology adopted by the CTC, as further described in 
Chapter 8 of this thesis), with this in turn being used as a means through which 
differences arising from the laws of different jurisdictions are reduced. 
6.3  Domestic Embeddedness and the Basel Accords 
Section 2.2.2.3 of this thesis has argued that transnational regulatory laws are affected 
by domestic embeddedness, cultural embeddedness and domestic preferences, such that 
what is agreed to in a transnational law or in a transnational regulatory law will 
necessarily be subject to different approaches, different methods of implementation and 
different enforcement mechanisms across different jurisdictions.  These variances are 
therefore bound to arise in light of different underlying laws across different 
jurisdictions and within which a transnational law or a transnational regulatory law are 
meant to operate; in light of the way of “doing things” in a particular jurisdiction; and 
also in light of preferences which society as a whole may have. 
Whilst it may be a close to impossible task to analyse certain cultural or societal 
preferences across jurisdictions and in relation to a particular transnational regulatory 
law such as the Basel Accords, this thesis refers to literature which studies the main 
underlying laws which affect financing entities which the Basel Accords seek to regulate.  
Although the Basel Accords’ (current) main aim is that of regulating risk in order to 
minimise systemic risks, this thesis argues that financing entities operating across 
different jurisdictions are subject to different levels of risk due to different underlying 
laws within which they operate. 
This Chapter has shown how different underlying laws in different jurisdictions can lead 
to jurisdictions being classified as more “pro-creditor” or “pro-debtor” than others, 
depending on the types of laws they adopt, and due to implicit policy choices which form 
part of these different national laws.  Furthermore, it has also been shown that 
notwithstanding the recognition that laws on insolvency and on security interests are 
fundamental in order to assist financing parties, there have only been few harmonization 
attempts, and various authors have been of the view that harmonization on these topics 
is very difficult to achieve.  This can also be seen from the policy choices adopted at EU 
level, such that even in this regional grouping there are yet to be harmonized insolvency 
laws or harmonized laws on security interests – other than systems based on conflict-of-
laws which determine which national law is to apply in cross-border situations, and as a 
result of there being a lack of harmonisation. 
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It is therefore here argued that the Basel Accords cannot reach their full potential unless 
it is recognized that further importance needs to be given to the consideration of 
whether a particular entity operates in a pro-creditor or in a pro-debtor jurisdiction.  
Furthermore, in such instance the drafters of the Basel Accords will need to choose 
between two different options:  either that of providing different regulatory regimes for 
financing entities which operate in different jurisdictions (with entities operating in pro-
debtor jurisdictions being subject to stricter capital adequacy requirements); or 
alternatively seeking to create incentives in order to encourage different jurisdictions to 
adopt similar underlying laws on insolvency and security interests. 
Having different jurisdictions adopting similar laws on insolvency and security interests 
will mean that the effectiveness of the Basel Accords will increase, since the drafters of 
the Basel Accords will be able to understand each other better and adopt a regulatory 
system which reaches the same effects across different jurisdictions.  Once similar 
underlying laws are adopted, financing entities established in different jurisdictions will 
be subject to comparable risks, meaning that the starting point of the transnational 
regulatory law would be very similar to all the subjects of such regulation 
(notwithstanding that certain differences arising from cultural and domestic preferences 
may still arise). 
Whilst one may argue that creating similar underlying laws and harmonization on the 
laws of insolvency and security interests is a highly challenging task, Chapter 8 will draw 
upon the CTC in order to show how a transnational law has been capable of harmonizing 
laws on insolvency and security interests across borders.  It will be argued that this can 





Chapter 7:  Limitations of the Basel Accords arising from 
Differences in the Laws of Different States 
This Chapter will commence by considering the importance of credit risk mitigation 
techniques, and how these vary amongst different jurisdictions.  It will then continue by 
showing how notwithstanding the importance given to credit risk mitigation techniques 
by financing entities, during the transactional stage (and on seeking to reduce their risks 
on extending finance to third parties), most of these credit risk mitigation techniques are 
overlooked by the Basel Accords.  
7.1 Different Types of Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques   
On financing counterparties, banks and financing parties seek to reduce the risks they 
are subject to through the use and availability of credit risk mitigation techniques which 
may be made use of in the particular jurisdictions within which they operate.  The 
stronger certain credit risk mitigation techniques are, and the more pro-creditor 
jurisdictions are (as discussed in Chapter 6), the less are such banks and financing 
entities exposed to credit risk.  Notwithstanding that banks and financing parties 
consider the need for collateral and the potential exposure which they may have to 
individual transactions, on each transaction entered into, and on seeing that it makes 
commercial sense to enter into such a transaction, it is argued here that these 
considerations are not given due importance in the regulatory framework and 
particularly in the Basel Accords.  
In light of the importance of the strength of credit risk mitigation techniques and of 
having pro-creditor insolvency laws for financing entities, one should also point out that 
pro-debtor systems increase contagion risks in the financial system:  as banks and 
financing entities struggle to recoup funds owed to them or to enforce security interests 
which may have been given in their favour, the risk of a financing entity becoming 
insolvent increases, thereby possibly increasing the downward spiral of a financial 
system.  This is particularly relevant to banks given that the business model of banks is 
reliant on maturity transformation, whereby they borrow for the short term, but hold 
assets and lend for the medium and long term847.  Banks are therefore faced with a 
problem if they cannot recoup moneys due to them within the short term as this may 
also affect their liquidity positions. 
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Wood has outlined the existence of “three major risk mitigants” being security interests, 
insolvency set-off, and the availability of trust848.  The main feature of these risk 
mitigants is that they protect creditors, rather than seek to enlarge a debtor’s estate849.  
Each of these three different types of credit risk mitigants will be considered in further 
detail, though security interests will be the main focus of this thesis.  For this purpose 
the laws of various jurisdictions will be considered, particularly in order to highlight 
differences between pro-creditor and pro-debtor jurisdictions. 
7.1.1 Security Interests 
Security interests allow creditors to have preferential rights over other creditors in 
relation to particular assets, with the rationale for this being that a secured creditor 
should be preferred over other unsecured creditors since he would have bargained for 
that right and since that would be the basis on which the said creditor would have based 
his decision to provide credit to his debtor850. 
It has been stated that security interests lie at the “crossroads of two conflicting 
principles”, being the preferred treatment of creditors on the one side, and the principle 
of equality of creditors on insolvency (pari passu) on the other851. 
Wood has identified two main characteristics of “security”, as follows852: 
- The creditor can force a sale of the property and use the proceeds to pay 
the secured debt ahead of other creditors; or 
- The debtor can insist on a release of creditors’ rights of realisation on 
payment of the secured debt. 
Collateral is generally obtained through the pledging, hypothecating, mortgaging, or 
charging of assets by the borrower himself or by a guarantor (at times referred to as an 
“obligor”), or even by entering into certain title finance transactions such as sale and 
repurchase agreements, for the benefit of an obligee (who for the purposes of this thesis 
will typically be the bank)853.  The effect of such collateral is such that it can transform 
the borrower’s credit risk to the risk on the asset being provided as collateral854. 
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Security interests may either be “personal”, such as the grant of a guarantee (suretyship) 
or indemnity in favour of a secured party, or alternatively “real” (at times also referred 
to as “proprietary”) which means that specific assets of the debtor’s property are granted 
to the creditor as security for the amounts due855.  “Real” security provides security “in 
an asset or pool of assets”, which may take the form of a mortgage or some other charge 
over specific assets or a class of existing and future assets856.  “Personal” security on the 
other hand provides an undertaking by the debtor himself or by a third party, such as 
through the provision of a guarantee857.  
Formalities for granting of security interests however vary widely from one jurisdiction 
to another.  Whilst some jurisdictions require no formalities for the grant of security 
interests, others require the drawing up of a contract between the parties, the 
registration of a contract with a public registry, the registration of a security interest 
without there being a formal document, or even the marking of the encumbered asset in 
order to show that this is subject to a security interest (or alternatively of the advertising 
to the public at large that a certain security interest has been put in place)858. 
Goode considers that certain security interests are unique to particular jurisdictions and 
may not have specific counterparts in other jurisdictions859.  He therefore refers to the 
English floating charge, by way of example, given that this is unknown outside England 
and certain Commonwealth jurisdictions based on English law860.  Different regimes 
therefore differ in various aspects, such as whether they provide unified treatment for 
all security interests or whether separate regimes apply for specific types of security 
interests; the types of property over which a security interest may be granted; the 
creditors in whose favour a security interest may be granted; the ability of a debtor to 
grant a security interest in after-acquired or subsequently-created property; the 
applicable rules of priority; as well as whether transactions which are security interests 
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“in substance” but not “in form” (such as conditional sales) are governed by the laws of 
security interests or otherwise861. 
Traditionally, English common law and equity recognized three major types of 
consensual security interests:  a mortgage, a charge and a pledge (though Goode has also 
included “contractual liens” as a fourth category of security and which provides for a 
right of detention of an asset by way of security (and does not grant rights to sell the said 
asset))862.  A mortgage transfers the ownership of an asset from the debtor to the 
creditor on condition that the ownership would be re-transferred upon satisfaction of 
the debt secured by it863.  A charge, on the other hand, does not transfer ownership of an 
asset, but the grant of a charge ensures that a specific asset would be available to satisfy 
a claim of a creditor864.  A pledge involves the transfer of possession of an asset to a 
creditor by way of security865.  These security interests are also complemented by liens, 
which arise by operation of law rather than through agreement between parties866.  All 
of these security interests therefore involve the transfer of a proprietary right in an asset 
as security for payment of a debt or other obligation867.  The need for there to be a 
proprietary right has therefore meant that conditional sales and other title retention 
devices, together with hire-purchase agreements and lease options have been 
considered to fall outside of the traditional definition of a “security interest”, in England, 
and are only referred to as “quasi-security”, contrary to the US where they have now 
been recognised as forms of security868.    
Differences also exist between North American jurisdictions and other jurisdictions 
(whether civil or common law jurisdictions) in relation to retention of title under sale 
and lease agreements869.  In jurisdictions other than those in North America, a debtor is 
merely considered to hold possession of assets, given that these contracts will be 
governed by a sale or by a lease respectively.  On the other hand, in North America, 
through Article 9 of the UCC, and through the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts, 
one would look at the economic substance of a transaction rather than the legal form, 
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and therefore in such cases one would still be considered as holding a “security interest” 
over such assets, rather than holding mere possession of that particular asset870. 
In the US, bankruptcy creditors are typically divided into three groups: secured, 
preferred and unsecured creditors871.  Secured creditors are those creditors whose debts 
are secured by a ‘lien’, which can either be consensual liens (which arise with agreement 
of third parties, and are generally just referred to as “security interests”, and prior to the 
UCC were referred to as “chattel mortgages” when these referred to consensual liens 
over personal property, and “mortgages” when these referred to liens over real 
property); statutory liens (which become operative by operation of law); and judicial 
liens (which arise due to there being court action, and which may also include “pre-
judgment” attachments or garnishees)872.  Preferred creditors are creditors who the law 
grants a preference such as employees who may have been due wages, and expenses in 
relation to the administration of an estate (with these being governed by the US 
Bankruptcy Code)873.  Unsecured creditors are those creditors which do not rank and 
who therefore share pari passu amongst themselves874. 
Article 9 UCC adopts the “principle of unity” for security in movable property in that 
there is only one type of personal “security interest” which may be granted, and this 
irrespective of the type of asset over which such interest would be granted875.  This 
means that under the provisions of Article 9 UCC the particular relationship between a 
debtor and a creditor is regulated under the terms of the particular agreement giving 
rise to the “security interest”, and all types of security interests (whether retention of 
title clauses, security transfers of title, financial leases provided by way of security, and 
assignment of receivables for purposes of security) are considered to fall under and be 
regulated by the same provisions on “security interests” 876. 
Though in the US the Bankruptcy Code is a federal statute, it is state law which 
determines a number of matters, such as:  the existence of property interests, how liens 
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are constituted, perfected and their order of priority877.  Nevertheless the promulgation 
of the UCC has brought about substantially similar laws amongst all of the states in the 
US, with the basic premise being that “the law of commercial transactions should not 
change substantially from state to state”878.  Article 9 of the UCC therefore regulates how 
a security interest “attaches” and how this can be “perfected”879. 
Whilst the concept of having a “mortgage” is alien to Civil Law jurisdictions, these 
jurisdictions typically allow immovable property to be “hypothecated”, whereby the 
debtor remains in possession of the immovable, whilst the creditor’s interests are 
registered in the public register relative to the said asset880.  In most Civil Law 
jurisdictions hypothecs are the means through which creditors seek to protect their 
rights over immovables.  Hypothecs rank highly, though they generally remain subject to 
privileged claims, which are generally established by virtue of law (and are hence not 
subject to negotiation with regard to nature and form between the debtor and the 
creditor), and which may need to be registered in the particular jurisdiction in order to 
take effect881. 
Furthermore, one of the main forms of security in relation to movables in civil law 
jurisdictions, similar to common law jurisdictions, is that of the possessory pledge, 
whereby movables are placed in the possession of the creditor, who may dispose of the 
said asset in the event of the debtor not fulfilling the obligations being secured by the 
asset granted to the creditor on pledge, as security882.  A pledge gives a creditor a 
proprietary right (i.e. a right in rem) over the particular asset being pledged in his 
favour883.  The disadvantage of this type of security, however, is that the pledged asset 
cannot be made use of by the debtor, and therefore it is unlikely that equipment or stock 
and inventories are given to the creditor on pledge884.  Another problem with the 
possessory pledge is that it may be cumbersome for a creditor to store such items, given 
that the element of possession by the secured party is required885.  Furthermore, the fact 
that the debtor needs to part with possession in order for the pledge to be constituted, 
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can prove problematic for the debtor since it may limit the debtor’s ability to carry out 
its day to day operations and function properly and profitably886.   
In light of the limitations brought about by the need of “possession” by certain security 
interests (particularly over movables), different legal systems have sought to create 
other forms of “non-possessory security”, thus eliminating the limitations seen above887.  
The two main approaches adopted in different jurisdictions therefore have been that of 
the “non-possessory pledge”, and that of “ownership as a form of security”888. 
Different legal systems vary in their approach as to what assets may be provided as non-
possessory security889.  Most Civil law jurisdictions limit non-possessory security 
through their “numerus clausus” doctrine, in virtue of which non-possessory security 
may only be granted if specific statutes exist and outline how such non-possessory 
security is to be granted890.  On the other hand the general rule in Anglo-Saxon systems 
is that all assets may be granted as non-possessory security891. 
In establishing the non-possessory pledge, where applicable, legislators have extended 
the provisions of possessory pledges to intangibles, such as accounts receivable, with the 
requirement of “possession” being instead replaced by the requirement that the debtor is 
to be notified of the pledge, thereby replacing the “publicity” element discussed above892.  
Examples of laws which regulate the registered non-possessory pledge can be found in 
the Dutch Civil Code of 1992 and the Quebec Civil Code of 1994893.  The notion of a non-
possessory pledge has therefore also allowed the pledging of intangibles as collateral, 
with the requirement of notification of the underlying debtor being sufficient in order 
for the pledge to take effect894.   
In France specific laws in relation to non-possessory pledges over specific assets have 
been enacted, with specific legislation existing for each of the following:  enterprises; 
automobiles; farm equipment and crops; industrial equipment; goods in warehouses; 
certain raw materials and industrial products; equipment and commercial furniture of 
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hotels; petroleum stocks; films; and the right to exploit software895.  Though some of 
these special statutes cater for the granting of all forms of credit, other types are limited 
specifically for providing security in relation to the acquisition of the respective 
collateral itself, whereby the assets acquired through the credit provided are pledged as 
security in favour of the financing entity (i.e. acquisition financing)896.  On the other 
hand, in Germany non-possessory pledges are available for only three specific assets, 
being agricultural tenants’ inventory; agricultural fruits; and overseas cables897. 
The second form of “non-possessory security” is through the use of “ownership” 
structures.  The French refer to this as “propriété sȗreté”898.  According to Drobnig there 
are three major forms of “ownership as security”, with these being the “reservation of 
ownership”, the “hire purchase” and the “security transfer of ownership”899.  The 
reservation of title acts as security for a seller’s claim for the purchase price (together 
with any other obligations which a buyer may have towards a seller)900.   
The rights of a secured party in non-possessory security are much wider than those of a 
pledgee, with this being primarily due to the fact that the concept of “ownership” has not 
originally been used for the purpose of providing security, and therefore the secured 
party has rights which are more akin to that of an owner, though there is a general 
tendency to seek to restrict the ownership rights when assets are given under 
ownership, as security901.    
In Germany security interests are regulated along the “principle of multiplicity” whereby 
different types of security interests are available for different types of assets902.  
Movables are generally secured through the grant of pledges (whether of the movable 
thing itself, or of any rights or receivables thereon)903.  Another possibility under 
German law is that of granting the usufruct to a creditor, with this giving rights over the 
asset to the creditor904.  It is also possible for certain ownership rights to be retained by 
a creditor by way of security over the purchase price or also over additional debts which 
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may be agreed to between the parties905.  German law also caters for the provision of 
security in movables through the transfer of ownership (which may be over movables, 
rights or receivables) – in such case though the secured creditor is considered to be the 
owner of the particular asset, he may only sell such asset in case of a default by the 
debtor906. 
On the other hand in Germany immovables are typically secured through non-accessory 
land mortgages whereby immovables are given as security under a mortgage, with this 
being “non-accessory” in light of the fact that this security exists independently of 
whether a debt continues to be in existence or otherwise907. On the other hand it is also 
possible to have an accessory land mortgage (referred to as the “hypothek”)908. 
This Section has illustrated the importance of security interests to financing parties, but 
also the vast differences which exist in the way in which security interests come into 
existence and operate within different jurisdictions.  Section 7.2 will show that the Basel 
Accords discard most of the security interests which apply in different jurisdictions, and 
ignore the vast differences which apply in relation to security interests which may 
protect creditors in different jurisdictions. 
7.1.2 Netting and Set-Off on Insolvency 
Another important credit risk mitigation technique is that of “On-Balance Sheet Netting” 
of mutual amounts due on insolvency between a borrower and a lender.  Close-out 
netting and set-off on insolvency is also a fundamental concept embraced by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) whereby all contracts under a 
Master Agreement can be closed-out and netted, with this serving to protect creditors, 
whilst also acting as a limit to potential systemic risks which could otherwise arise in the 
financial system909. 
There may be various transactions between borrowers and lenders:  borrowers might 
have deposits and other funds held with banks, apart from outstanding loans and 
borrowings.  The role of netting is such that cherry-picking on insolvency of a borrower 
is avoided by ensuring that banks and other creditors would be able to net assets held by 
the borrower with the said creditor, against liabilities due from the borrower to the 
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creditor, with the outstanding net position of the mutual credits then being the final 
outstanding position due between the creditor and the borrower.   
Close-out netting and set-off on insolvency are also important elements in distinguishing 
between pro-debtor states and pro-creditor states.  The difference here is best 
illustrated by an example:  if a financing entity holds 100 on deposit from X, and X has a 
loan of 100 from the same financing entity, on there being netting and set-off on 
insolvency the financing entity’s exposure will be nil, whereas if netting and set-off is not 
allowed on insolvency, then the financing entity’s exposure will be of 100, since the 
latter entity will still need to repay the 100 held on deposit, whilst it will only have a pari 
passu claim with all other unsecured creditors over the 100 due to it910.  Wood has 
recognised that whereas some legal systems permit such set-off, other jurisdictions such 
as France reject it (subject to some exceptions)911. 
According to Wood, “[s]et-off is one of the leading, and most accurate, indicators of pro-
debtor or pro-creditor attitudes to insolvency – it is a litmus test of jurisdictions”912.  Wood 
considers that this is of “paramount importance” in international financial affairs, and 
that the “amounts involved are immense and the reduction in exposures achieved by set-off, 
with resulting reduction in credit costs, and cascade risks threatening the integrity of the 
financial system, are correspondingly large”913.  Both set-off and close-out netting reduce 
credit risk and counterparty risk, and also act as very important systemic risk mitigants 
and work towards avoiding contagion in the financial system914.  This principle has also 
been recognised by the Basel Accords, which allow capital requirements to be calculated 
on the basis of net, rather than gross credit exposure – though banks are required to 
show that there is a sound legal basis guaranteeing that close-out netting is enforceable 
in each relevant jurisdiction915. 
Wood considers insolvency set-off to be one of the main characteristics which 
distinguishes certain jurisdictions from others, since the availability of set-off on 
insolvency means that where this is present, this pays the creditor, whilst in its absence 
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the debtor benefits916.  Wood therefore considers there to be a “straight choice” which 
jurisdictions have to make, with this being particularly relevant for financial markets917.   
Set-off or netting may also be coupled with “close-out” provisions which permit a solvent 
counterparty to terminate a contract under certain conditions (“early termination”) and 
demand immediate payment under the terms of the contract (for the replacement value 
or for the market value of the contract), or for the repayment of principal in the case of a 
loan918.  “Netting” and “set-off” are conceptually similar, though they need to be 
distinguished since their legal treatment may vary919.  Close-out netting refers to the 
determination and settlement of amounts due between different parties under a single 
agreement (typically a “Master Agreement”) which provides for close out, which means 
that if a solvent counterparty owes on the netting of the amounts, it will pay 
immediately, whilst if amounts remain outstanding in favour of the solvent creditor, 
such entity becomes a creditor for the amount due to it920.  On the other hand, set-off 
refers to the netting of individual contracts which individually then provide for netting 
and close-out and which are then each netted against each other in order to determine 
the net sums due between the parties921.  Set-off or netting, particularly on insolvency 
favours creditors since it ensures that a debt due to a creditor by an insolvent entity can 
be netted or set-off against amounts which the creditor owed to the same insolvent 
entity922.   
This would therefore discharge both claims and ensure that the creditor is being 
satisfied of amounts due to such creditor notwithstanding that the remaining pool of 
assets would only have to be shared between other unsecured creditors of the insolvent 
entity923.  As a result, set-off and netting encourage commerce because they allow 
financing parties to provide finance to parties in need if those same entities hold monies 
or deposits with the financing party.  Therefore, by way of example, whilst a company 
may hold money on account for daily operations and financing of inventories, it may also 
get money on loan, with the financing entity or bank safe in knowledge that the amounts 
held with it by the company for its daily operations, can, in the case of insolvency, be set-
off against the moneys due to the bank or financing entity. 
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A distinction can be drawn between jurisdictions which are English-based, as against 
Franco-Latin jurisdictions924.  Typically, in English-based countries set-off is restricted 
between solvent parties, but compulsory on insolvency925.  Pro-creditor systems 
therefore allow creditors to protect themselves on default by allowing ex ante 
contractual agreements that permit the solvent counterparty to close out contracts and 
set off obligations926.  On the other hand in Franco-Latin jurisdictions set-off takes place 
immediately between solvent entities, whilst this is usually prohibited on insolvency (in 
order to increase a debtor’s estate on insolvency particularly by disavowing claims made 
on the firm through “cherry picking” or “avoidance”)927.  Therefore from a Franco-Latin 
perspective, set-off on insolvency is a violation of the “pari passu” principle because a 
creditor who benefits from set-off gets paid in full, as against other creditors whose 
share from the insolvent estate is limited to the remaining pool of unsecured assets of 
the debtor928.  This position has also been taken in light of the fact that whereas an 
intrinsic element of having a security interest is that of having publicity, which is either 
obtained through registration, or otherwise through having possession of an object, in 
the case of a set-off on insolvency there is no prior publicity taking place in order for 
other creditors to be aware that certain assets of the debtor will not form part of the 
pool of assets to be shared by all creditors on insolvency of the debtor929. 
On the other hand, those jurisdictions which do not cater for set-off on insolvency 
typically only allow set-off to take place if this would have been possible prior to the date 
of insolvency, and therefore the claims must have been mutual, certain, liquidated and 
due between both parties prior to the established insolvency date (with this possibly 
also being affected by a suspect period)930.  Therefore, if set-off on insolvency cannot 
take place, a creditor is bound to pay amounts due to the debtor into the pool of assets of 
the insolvent entity, and then only have a claim as an unsecured creditor together with 
the rest of the unsecured creditors to the assets found in the said pool931.  Examples of 
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some states which do not allow set-off on insolvency are the following932:  Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and various other states which formed part of 
French or Belgian dominions933. 
Notwithstanding that set-off on insolvency is rejected in some states, there are two main 
exceptions to the general prohibition to set-off on insolvency, within which set-off on 
insolvency would still be able to take place934.  The first of these exceptions is in the 
instance of there being a current account between parties:  the balance on a current 
account is considered to be one amount due, notwithstanding that this is ascertained 
through both debits and credits entering into such current account935.  By way of 
example, this exception is found in the laws of each of France, Luxembourg, Argentina 
and Bahrain936.  The second exception to the restriction on set-off on insolvency is found 
when there is a transaction set-off:  therefore the general rule is that where debts and 
credits relate to one transaction, then set-off can take place on insolvency in relation to 
that same transaction937.   
7.1.3 The availability of the trust 
The third major credit risk mitigation technique referred to by Wood is that of there 
being the availability of the trust.  The importance of using trusts arises due to the 
possibility of one holding title to property as an intermediary for the benefit of the real 
owner, thereby making such property immune from private creditors of the 
intermediary, and with this being fundamental for global custodianship and settlement 
systems938.  This is also particularly useful for trustees of security interests and trustees 
of bondholders since property of a debtor can be retained in a security trust for the 
benefit of a creditor until the debtor’s obligations are satisfied939. 
The trust concept developed in English Common law jurisdictions, though over the past 
few years a number of civil law jurisdictions have sought to make use of similar concepts 
in order to reach similar effects940.  Nevertheless the concept of trusts remains alien to a 
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number of Civil law jurisdictions, with this limiting the structuring possibilities which 
banks and financing parties may have when operating within these jurisdictions.  The 
reduction of credit risks which these entities may seek to achieve may therefore vary 
depending on whether entities operate within jurisdictions which cater for the 
possibility of using trusts or otherwise. 
7.2 Credit Risk Mitigation in the Basel Accords   
Though the Basel Accords seek to reduce the risks which “internationally-active banks” 
face, this is done through a transnational regulatory law which ignores the differences in 
credit risks which these entities face and which vary from one jurisdiction to another.  
There is therefore no consideration given as to whether this transnational regulatory 
law is to operate in a pro-creditor or in a pro-debtor jurisdiction.  
Banks and financing entities invariably adopt methods to mitigate their credit risk 
whenever advancing funds to one of their debtors, thereby ensuring that they will be 
protected in the event that the debtor defaults on his payments.  The Basel Accords also 
refer to three main “Credit Risk Mitigation” techniques941:  Collateral; Guarantees and 
Credit Derivatives; and Netting of amounts due.  Given that these “credit risk mitigation” 
techniques result in banks and financing entities having their credit risk exposure 
reduced, the Basel Accords allow a bank’s capital requirements to be reduced due to the 
reduction in credit risk which such bank would be facing942.  One should not however 
assume that the fact that a credit risk mitigation technique would have been adopted, 
then all the credit risk would have been eliminated, as the particular riskiness of the 
credit risk mitigant itself will still need to be taken into account, and one will therefore 
need to look at the quality and risks pertaining to the particular credit risk mitigant 
itself943.    
Notwithstanding the above, this thesis argues that one of the main problems of the Basel 
Accords is that only very limited instruments have been recognised as being capable of 
reducing a bank’s credit risk.  Basel I had only recognised cash, gold, government 
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securities and securities issued by multilateral development banks, as being “eligible 
collateral” for the calculation of credit risk944.  This eligibility criteria was widened by 
Basel II as described below. 
The applicable credit risk mitigation rules which the Basel Accords apply today vary 
according to whether a bank adopts a “Standardised approach” or an “IRB approach”945.  
For the purposes of this Section specific focus will be made on collateral and guarantees 
(as opposed to netting of amounts due).  It suffices to say however that the Basel Accords 
allow risk weights to only be applied on a bank’s net exposure where legally enforceable 
netting arrangements apply946. 
In terms of the Basel Accords, in order for credit risk mitigation measures to be 
considered in the calculation of its capital requirements, banks must ensure that the 
documentation used is legally binding and enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions947.  
Banks would also be required to review the legal position to ensure continuing 
enforceability, and have clear and robust procedures for the timely liquidation of 
collateral should the need arise948.   
The different credit mitigation rules which apply to banks which adopt the Standardised 
approach and banks which adopt an IRB approach are described in further detail below.  
One must however also point out that a recent report published by the EBA has 
highlighted how the credit risk mitigation framework in the CRR (and which is generally 
reflective of the Basel Accords) requires a higher degree of clarity and that this should be 
the subject of a comprehensive reform (particularly in order to avoid regulatory 
                                                     
944 Slaughter and May, The New Basel Capital Accord:  A Guide to the Main Provisions (3rd edn, 
September 2004) 42 
<http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/39266/the_new_basel_capital_accord_-
_a_guide_to_the_main_provisions_-_third_edition.pdf> accessed 3 October 2014.  
945 Articles 107 and 143 of the CRR set out the criteria as to when the different approaches are to 
apply. 
946  Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins, Regulatory Capital Requirements for European Banks:  
Implications of Changing Markets and a New Regulatory Environment (July 2009) 91 
<http://lw.com/presentations/regulatory-capital-requirements-for-european-banks> accessed 
10 October 2014.    
947 Wood (n 1) 639; Slaughter and May (n 944) 42; Allen & Overy, Capital Requirements Directive 
IV Framework – Collateral:  Funded Credit Risk Mitigation in the Banking Book (Allen & Overy 
Client Briefing Paper 5, January 2014) 4, 7 
<http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Capital%20Requirements%20Directive
%20IV%20Framework/Collateral%20Funded%20credit%20risk%20mitigation%20in%20the%
20Banking%20book.pdf> accessed 12 October 2014.   
948 Wood (n 1) 639; Slaughter and May (n 944) 42; Allen & Overy (n 947) 4. 
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arbitrage and to ensure a consistent application of this framework across different 
jurisdictions)949. 
7.2.1 Standardised Approach:   
7.2.1.1 Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques for Collateral  
There are two approaches to collateral as a credit risk mitigation technique in the Basel 
Accords:  a “Simple Approach” and a “Comprehensive Approach”950.   
It is to be noted that not all collateral is considered as collateral which can mitigate 
credit risk for the purposes of the Basel Accords, in view of the list of “eligible financial 
collateral” being limited to specific financial instruments (which are described in further 
detail below).  Furthermore, in order for the collateral to be able to be considered as an 
appropriate credit risk mitigant for the purposes of the Basel Accords, this cannot have a 
material positive correlation with the credit quality of the counterparty951.  Article 
194(4) of the CRR states that “the degree of correlation between the value of the assets 
relied upon for protection and the credit quality of the obligor shall not be too high.” 
A bank or financing entity subject to the Basel Accords must also have the right to 
liquidate or take legal possession of the particular asset provided as collateral, whilst 
also having clear and robust procedures for the timely liquidation of collateral on a 
default or on the insolvency of the obligor952.  The bank must also ensure that it takes all 
necessary action to maintain the collateral953.  Furthermore, where collateral is held 
through a custodian, it must take reasonable steps to ensure that the custodian 
segregates the collateral from its own assets, in order to ensure that the insolvency of a 
custodian does not adversely affect the rights of the particular bank or financing 
entity954.  
                                                     
949 European Banking Authority, Report on the Credit Risk Mitigation (CRM) Framework (19 March 
2018) 7 – 8, 18 
<https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2087449/EBA+Report+on+CRM+framework.p
df> accessed 21 March 2018. 
950 Deloitte (n 853) 4; Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 92; Wood (n 1) 638 – 639. 
951 Basel II (n 264) para 123; Basel IV (n 354) para 124; Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 
946) 93; Wood (n 1) 639; Slaughter and May (n 944) 42. 
952 Basel II (n 264) para 124; Basel IV (n 354) para 140; Wood (n 1) 639; Slaughter and May (n 
944) 42 – 43; Allen & Overy (n 947) 5. 
953 Wood (n 1) 639; Slaughter and May (n 944) 42; Allen & Overy (n 947) 7. 
954 Basel II (n 264) para 126; Basel IV (n 354) para 143; Slaughter and May (n 944) 43; Allen & 
Overy (n 947) 5, 7. 
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According to the CRR, for collateral to be eligible for recognition, the eligible assets 
relied upon must be sufficiently liquid and their value over time must be sufficiently 
stable955. 
7.2.1.1.1 Simple Approach 
The Simple Approach is generally a continuance of the regime originally introduced by 
Basel I, and is meant for those banks which do not have the expertise or capacity to 
adopt the Comprehensive Approach956.   
The Simple Approach is a “substitution method” whereby the risk weight of the collateral 
is substituted for the risk weight of the counterparty957.  The risk weight is however 
subject to a general floor of 20% in light of the fact that it is considered that there will 
always be some risk attached to the collateral or the collateral provider958.  This 20% 
floor represented a departure from the Basel I regime, which did not have such a floor 
attached to it, with this also being subject to some exceptions such as when the collateral 
is provided in cash, or when collateral consists in debt securities issued by sovereign 
states959. 
Not all assets are considered to be “eligible financial collateral” (and hence allowing for a 
reduction in a bank’s capital requirements due to the bank being considered to be 
subject to less credit risk)960.  In the Simple Approach used by banks adopting the 
Standardised approach, only the following assets are considered to be “eligible financial 
collateral”961: 
 Cash on deposit with the lending bank; 
                                                     
955 Article 194(3) of the CRR; Allen & Overy (n 947) 5.  Though Article 194(10) of the CRR 
required the EBA to develop regulatory technical standards to specify “what constitutes liquid 
assets and when asset values can be considered as sufficiently stable”, the EBA has considered that 
these requirements are already covered, “explicitly or implicitly” throughout the CRR, and has 
consequently argued that the obligation imposed on it pursuant to Article 194(10) of the CRR 
should be deleted.  See:  EBA (n 949).  
956 Article 194(3) of the CRR; Allen & Overy (n 947) 5.   
957 Deloitte (n 853) 4; Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 92; Wood (n 1) 639 – 640; 
Slaughter and May (n 944) 44; Allen & Overy (n 947) 7 – 8. 
958 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 92; Wood (n 1) 639 – 640; Slaughter and May (n 
944) 44. 
959 Allen & Overy (n 947) 8; Slaughter and May (n 944) 44. 
960 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 93. 
961 It should here also be highlighted that though the “eligible financial collateral” is limited to the 
list provided, both in the Basel Accords and the CRR, limited consideration is also given to 
mortgages given over residential property as well as over commercial immovable property.  This 
however only affects the “risk weighting” given to a particular exposure, and does not allow 




 Rated debt securities (which need to have a rating of BB- or higher in the case of 
sovereign debt; and BBB- or higher in the case of debt securities issued by banks, 
securities firms and corporates); 
 Senior, unrated debt securities issued by a bank if listed on a recognised 
exchange, and all other debt securities issued by a bank if these are rated BBB- or 
higher; 
 Equities (including convertible bonds) included in a main index; and 
 UCITS/ mutual funds, the price of which is quoted daily and only where such 
UCITS/ fund invests in the above instruments962.   
In the Simple Approach, collateral needs, as a minimum, to be provided for the lifetime of 
the exposure, and cannot be for a shorter period than the exposure in order for this to be 
considered as “eligible financial collateral”963.  Collateral needs to be marked to market 
and revalued at least every six months964.   Furthermore the risk weight applicable to the 
collateral should at least be equal than or less than the risk weight of the exposure965. 
One can therefore here see that the types of assets available to be considered as “eligible 
collateral” are very limited such that only the aforementioned items are considered as 
providing collateral for the purposes of the calculation of the capital adequacy of the 
bank or the particular financing entity.  This applies notwithstanding that from a 
transactional point of view a bank may have been very comfortable entering into a 
particular transaction in light of other collateral which may have been provided to it 
(and notwithstanding that any such assets provided as collateral are not listed in the 
aforementioned list). 
7.2.1.1.2 Comprehensive Approach 
The aim of the Comprehensive Approach is to better reflect the mitigation in risks due to 
the effect of collateral966.  In the Comprehensive Approach, the value of the collateral is 
deducted from the risk exposure before assigning the risk weight to such exposure, 
though the value of the collateral is also subject to “haircuts” in order to cater for the 
                                                     
962 ibid; Wood (n 1) 638 – 639; Slaughter and May (n 944) 43. 
963 Slaughter and May (n 944) 44; Allen & Overy (n 947) 8. 
964 Slaughter and May (n 944) 44; Allen & Overy (n 947) 7. 
965 Slaughter and May (n 944) 44. 
966 ibid 45. 
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risks and changes which may apply to such collateral, particularly upon realisation of 
such asset on liquidation or in a foreclosure scenario967.   
These “haircuts” may either be pre-defined by the regulator (the “Standard Supervisory 
Haircuts”) (referred to as “supervisory volatility adjustments” in the CRR) or alternatively 
estimated by the bank itself (the “Own-Estimates Methodology”) (referred to in the CRR 
as the “Own Estimates Volatility Adjustments”), and are considered to be essential in light 
of the number of risks (such as fluctuations in value, correlations of the collateral with 
the debtor, enforceability, exchange rate mismatches, and others) to which the collateral 
may be subject968.   
The Standard Supervisory Haircuts are applied according to established calculations 
depending on the type of collateral, the issuer’s creditworthiness and the maturity of 
such collateral969.  On the other hand, in the Own-Estimates Methodology, banks are 
required to develop internal models, and calculate the Loss Given Default of such 
collateral970. 
Similar to the Simple Approach, in the Comprehensive Approach there are also 
limitations on what can be considered to be “eligible financial collateral”971.  The only 
assets which are considered as “eligible financial collateral” here are the following:  
 Those assets considered to be “eligible financial collateral” under the Simple 
Approach; 
 Equities not included in a main index but listed on a recognised exchange; and 
 UCITS/ mutual funds which invest in the above-mentioned equities972. 
Therefore, as seen above, under both approaches the Basel Accords only consider very 
limited assets as “eligible financial collateral”, with very strict restrictions as to how and 
when these can apply.  This results in an ambiguous situation whereby any other asset 
provided as collateral to financing entities which are subject to the Basel Accords, 
whatever its value, is ignored by both the Simple Approach and by the Comprehensive 
                                                     
967 Deloitte (n 853) 4, 6; Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 92; Wood (n 1) 640 – 641; 
Slaughter and May (n 944) 45; Allen & Overy (n 947) 7, 9. 
968 Deloitte (n 853) 4, 6; Wood (n 1) 640 – 641; Slaughter and May (n 944) 45 – 46. 
969 Deloitte (n 853) 7; Allen & Overy (n 947) 9. 
970 Deloitte (n 853) 7. 
971 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 93. 
972 ibid; Wood (n 1) 638 – 639; Slaughter and May (n 944) 43. 
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Approach, notwithstanding that a bank may have security interests over these particular 
assets.   
7.2.1.2 Guarantees  
Guarantees and credit derivatives are also considered as techniques through which 
credit risk can be reduced in terms of the Basel regime, given that these also act in 
reducing a bank’s risk.  Though the Basel Accords and the implementing laws regulate 
both guarantees and credit derivatives, for the purposes of this thesis the main focus will 
be on guarantees (though most of the arguments made here should similarly also apply 
in relation to credit derivatives).  The reason for focusing specifically on guarantees and 
not on credit derivatives is that a guarantee provides security to a creditor in the same 
way as a debtor does, either through providing assets as collateral or alternatively by 
being bound as an obligor together with the debtor for the benefit of the creditor. 
In order for guarantees to act as a mitigant of credit risk for banks adopting the 
Standardised approach, they must constitute direct, explicit, irrevocable and 
unconditional claims on the protection provider, whilst the bank’s supervisor must be 
satisfied that the bank fulfils certain minimum operational conditions relating to its risk 
management processes973.  Furthermore, protection must be explicitly limited to and 
provided for specific exposures or a pool of exposures, whilst documentation must be 
legally binding and may not contain any clause permitting a protection provider to 
unilaterally increase the effective cost of cover due to the deteriorating credit quality of 
exposures974.   
On there being a default by an obligor, a bank should be able to pursue a guarantor for 
outstanding exposures, without first needing to take legal action against the obligor975.  
The Basel Accords further state that a guarantor may, on being pursued for monies due, 
be obliged to either make one lump sum payment of all monies due, or may alternatively 
assume future payment obligations of the borrower976.    
Should a guarantee only cover parts of the amounts due, such as only covering the 
principal sums due, then uncovered payments should be treated as unsecured, and 
capital relief will therefore only be afforded to the secured portion of the exposure977.  
                                                     
973 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 94; Wood (n 1) 632 – 634; Slaughter and May (n 
944) 47. 
974 ibid. 
975 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 94; Slaughter and May (n 944) 47. 
976 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 94; Wood (n 1) 632 – 634.  
977 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 94; Slaughter and May (n 944) 47. 
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Thus, the risk weights to be applied will be as follows:  the protected part of an exposure 
will be assigned the risk weight of the protection provider, whilst the unprotected part 
will be assigned the risk weight of the underlying obligor978.    
The recognised eligible protection providers in the Basel Accords are sovereign entities, 
public sector entities, banks and securities firms, together with other entities rated A- or 
better (including credit protection provided by parent, subsidiary, or affiliate 
companies).  In order to be considered as eligible protection providers, these entities 
should also have a lower risk weighting (i.e. being less risky) than that of the 
borrower979.  
The Basel Accords therefore only recognize very limited eligible protection providers, 
and this notwithstanding that it can be argued that guarantees should be encouraged 
even if the guarantor is, for example, an unrated corporate having the same risk 
weighting of the borrower, as this would still be of benefit to a bank given that the bank 
gets a double cover (meaning that it can seek payment from either of the debtor or the 
guarantor).  The risk weight afforded to the exposure under this regime (whereby the 
risk is calculated on the basis of the guarantor’s risk weighting), does not take into 
account the double cover which the bank is getting through there being such guarantee. 
7.2.2 Internal Ratings-Based Approach 
Banks adopting an IRB approach may generally use the same credit risk mitigation 
techniques available to banks adopting the Standardised approach (i.e. collateral; 
guarantees and credit derivatives; and on-balance sheet netting)980.  However banks 
using the IRB approach are only permitted to adopt the Comprehensive Approach 
outlined above, and may not make use of the Simple Approach981.  The credit risk 
mitigation techniques adopted, will work towards reducing the Loss Given Default factor 
used by banks adopting the IRB approach in calculating their capital requirements 
(though for guarantees, banks may alternatively adjust their Probability of Default; 
whilst for on-balance sheet netting the Exposure at Default would be affected)982.   
Furthermore, banks using the Advanced IRB approach may make use of their own 
estimates for establishing the Loss Given Default of sovereign, bank and corporate 
                                                     
978 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 96; Wood (n 1) 632 – 634. 
979 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 95; Wood (n 1) 632 – 634; Basel II (n 264) para. 
195.  
980 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 99. 
981 ibid; Slaughter and May (n 944) 52. 
982 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 99; Slaughter and May (n 944) 50. 
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exposures, provided that the necessary supervisory approvals would have been 
obtained, whilst if the Foundation IRB approach is used, banks will have to make use of 
the Loss Given Default values provided by the supervisor983.  
7.2.2.1 Collateral 
The eligible financial collateral permitted for banks using the IRB approach is wider than 
that accepted for banks using the Standardised approach, and consists of: 
 All financial collateral permitted to be used as eligible financial collateral by 
banks using the Standardised approach;  
 Receivables; 
 Residential and Commercial Real Estate;  and  
 Other collateral, if permitted at national discretion, if there exists a liquid market 
for disposal of the collateral in an expeditious and economically efficient manner, 
and if there exists a publicly available market price for the collateral.  In such 
instance banks will need to apply the same standards applicable to commercial 
and residential real estate, and therefore:  
a) the bank must have a first priority security interest;  
b) the documentation must include a detailed description of the collateral 
and the manner and frequency of revaluation;  
c) the bank must have internal credit policies and procedures setting out 
the types of collateral and the appropriate amount of collateral relative to 
the exposure; and  
d) in the case of inventories, periodic revaluation and physical inspection is 
to take place984. 
The position adopted by the CRR is such that under the IRB approach, physical collateral 
other than immovable property and leasing may also be considered as eligible forms of 
collateral subject to detailed eligibility requirements985.  Though Article 199(8) of the 
CRR required the EBA to “disclose a list of types of physical collateral for which institutions 
                                                     
983 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 99; Wood (n 1) 634 – 637.  
984 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 101; Wood (n 1) 644 – 647; Slaughter and May (n 
944) 50 – 51. 
985 Article 199 of the CRR; Allen & Overy (n 947) 5 – 7.  
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can assume that the conditions referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 6 are met”, 
the EBA has since come to the conclusion that “[c]urrently, there are no types of physical 
collateral for which institutions can automatically assume that [such] conditions … can be 
met”986.   
7.2.2.2 Guarantees 
Banks adopting the IRB approach may, for the purposes of guarantees and credit 
derivatives, generally follow the same approach afforded to banks adopting the 
Standardised approach987. 
The range of eligible guarantors under the Foundation IRB approach is the same as that 
for banks adopting the Standardised approach, though entities that are internally rated 
and associated with a Probability of Default equivalent to A- or better may also be 
recognised here988.   
A bank using the Advanced IRB approach may reflect the credit risk mitigation effect of 
guarantees by either adjusting the Probability of Default, or the Loss Given Default 
estimates989.  However the adjusted risk weight must not be less than that of a 
comparable direct exposure to the guarantor990.   Under the Advanced IRB approach 
there are no limits on the range of eligible guarantors (as long as the bank has clearly 
specified criteria as to what type of guarantor it will accept, and provided that the 
guarantee is evidenced in writing, non-cancellable, is in force, and is legally enforceable 
against the guarantor)991. 
7.2.2.3 Specialised Lending 
The IRB approach (under both the Basel Accords and the CRR992) also sets out a regime 
for specialised lending exposures with these having been differentiated from the general 
                                                     
986 European Banking Authority, EBA Publishes List for the Calculation of Capital Requirements for 
Credit Risk (EBA, 2 July 2014) <https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-publishes-lists-for-the-
calculation-of-capital-requirements-for-credit-risk> accessed 30 April 2018.  Article 199(6)(a) 
and (b) of the CRR refer to the requirements of there being liquid markets, evidenced by frequent 
transactions taking into account the asset type, for the disposal of the collateral in an expeditious 
and economically efficient manner; and there being well-established, publicly available market 
prices for the collateral.  
987 Goldman Sachs, Latham & Watkins (n 946) 102. 
988 Wood (n 1) 634 – 637. 
989 ibid. 
990 ibid; Slaughter and May (n 944) 54. 
991 Basel II (n 264) para. 307.    
992 The proposals which are being put forward in the CRR II suggest further amendments to the 
specialised lending regime, whereby loans which fall within this category would benefit from a 
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corporate asset class993.  The specific exposures referred to here are those exposures 
towards an entity which would have been created purposely in order to finance or 
operate physical assets, with the lender typically being given a substantial degree of 
control over the particular assets as well as over the particular income streams which 
would be generated by the said physical assets994.  In the cases falling within this regime, 
one considers that the particular asset which would have been financed would be 
provided as collateral for the benefit of the financing party, and that the same asset 
would be helping in the production of income which would be used to repay the specific 
lending exposure.  Five different types of specialised lending have been identified 
(Project Finance; Object Finance; Commodities Finance; Income Producing Real Estate; 
and High Volatility Commercial Real Estate), with the rules which apply to each type of 
specialised lending being generally similar to each other.   
The introduction of a specialised lending regime sought to overcome the shortcomings 
of the Basel Accords’ treatment of the financing of different assets by differentiating 
between corporate exposures and other forms of lending which merited a special 
approach due to their particular nature.  Different treatment is afforded since the risk 
assessment here does not depend on the corporate risks of a borrower, but depends on 
the income stream generated by the particular assets in relation to which credit is 
                                                                                                                                                        
reduced risk weight, meaning that the capital adequacy regulations would be taking cognisance of 
certain collateral which would be provided here, and the lower risks which a bank would face.  
Though this would be another positive step, the current proposal still does not take into 
consideration the different insolvency laws and types of security interests which exist in different 
jurisdictions.  It is also ambiguous as to why the effects of collateral are taken into consideration 
when considering the risk weighting of assets (rather than give further consideration to this as a 
credit risk mitigation tool).  See:  CRR II (n 93) 402. 
993 Wood (n 1) 643 – 644; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Working Paper on the 
Internal Ratings-Based Approach to Specialised Lending Exposures (October 2001) 8 – 9 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp9.pdf> accessed 8 October 2014.  
994 European Banking Authority, Consultation Paper:  Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on 
Assigning Risk Weights to Specialised Lending Exposures under Article 153(9) of Regulation (EU) No 
575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation – CRR) (EBA/CP/2015/09, 11 May 2009) 4, 6 
<https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1068081/EBA-CP-2015-
09+CP+on+Assigning+RWs+to+Specialised+Lending+Exposures.pdf> accessed 12 May 2015.  
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granted, and the structure of a particular transaction995.  Further, the value of the asset 
being financed acts as a risk mitigant, rather than as a primary source of repayment996.  
The exposures considered in the specialised lending regime have the following 
characteristics:   
(a) the economic purpose of the loan is to acquire or finance an asset;  
(b) the cash flow generated by the purchased asset, and given as collateral to the 
bank, is the borrower’s sole or almost exclusive source of repayment;  
(c) the exposure represents a significant liability in the borrower’s capital structure; 
and  
(d) the primary determinant of credit risk being the variability of the cash flow 
generated by the collateral, rather than the independent capacity of the 
borrower997. 
It has been recognised that in specialised lending particular adjustments need to be 
made since exposures vary from corporate exposures in that both the Probability of 
Default and the Loss Given Default increase simultaneously on there being a loss on the 
value of the collateral (though the mathematical calculations justifying this are beyond 
the scope of this study)998. 
The Basel regime considers loans which have been classified as specialised lending to 
have unique loss distribution and risk characteristics:  these loans are considered to be 
subject to greater risk volatility, with banks possibly being the subject of high default 
rates and high loss rates999.  Furthermore, banks using the IRB approach may use 
different internal risk rating criteria for these loans, and may therefore treat these loans 
separately in other internal risk management processes1000.   
                                                     
995 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (n 993) 1; Wood (n 1) 633 – 634; Thieffry Gilles, The 
Impact of Basel II on Commodity Trade Finance:  a legal perspective (Journal of International 
Banking Law and Finance, Vol. 19, Issue 10, 2004) 3 – 4; Malloy Michael P., International Project 
Finance:  Risk Analysis and Regulatory Concerns (Transnational Lawyer, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2004) 89 
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996 Thieffry (n 995) 3 – 4.    
997 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (n 993) 1 – 2; Malloy (n 995) 99 – 100.  
998 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (n 993) 10. 




The BCBS, established three approaches which may be used by banks adopting an IRB 
approach when dealing with specialised lending, being the “supervisory slotting criteria 
approach” (originally referred to as the “basic approach”), the “foundation” approach, 
and the “advanced” approach1001. 
The “supervisory slotting criteria approach” is characterised by there being supervisory 
estimates being available in light of the fact that a bank would not meet the requirement 
for the internal estimation of the Probability of Default under the corporate foundation 
approach.  Banks will therefore map their internal rating grades into five supervisory 
rating categories (classified into “strong”, “good”, “satisfactory”, “weak” and “default”), 
with this mapping taking place in accordance with defined criteria on the following 
items: “Financial Strength”, “Political and Legal Environment”, “Transaction 
Characteristics”, “Operating Risk”, “Asset Characterisation”, “Strength of Sponsor”, and 
“Security Package”1002.  Other than for high-volatility commercial real estate, banks will 
apply a risk weight of 70% to those items classified as “strong”, 90% to those classified 
as “good”, 115% to those classified as “satisfactory”, 250% to those classified as “weak” 
and 0% for those classified as “default”, whilst at national discretion supervisors may 
allow 50% for “strong”, and 70% for “good” if the exposure matures in less than two and 
a half years, or if the supervisor determines that underwriting or other risk 
characteristics are substantially stronger1003.    
Under the “foundation approach”, banks that meet the requirements for the estimation of 
the Probability of Default may use the foundation approach for corporate exposures to 
derive risk weights here (other than for some differences with regard to high volatility 
commercial real estate)1004. 
On the other hand in the “advanced approach”, banks able to meet rigorous standards 
would be able to calculate the Probability of Default, the Loss Given Default and the 
Exposure at Default, in the same way as these are applied for corporate exposures1005.  
Those banks which receive approval from their regulators to use this advanced 
                                                     
1001 ibid 6 – 8; See also:  Basel II (n 264) para. 249 – 251.   
1002 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (n 993) 6 – 8, 18 – 27; Thieffry (n 995) 3 – 4; See 
also:  Cornford Andrew, Basel 2 and the Availability and Terms of Trade Finance (Global 
Commodities Forum, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 22 – 23 March 2010) 
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1004 See also:  Basel II (n 264) para. 250. 
1005 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (n 993) 6 – 8; Wood (n 1) 633 – 634.  
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approach gain considerable advantages over other banks:  given that these banks could 
use historical portfolio data, they will effectively be required to hold substantially less 
capital than other banks, putting the banks subject to the “advanced approach” at an 
advantage1006. 
The effect of assets being held as collateral under the “advanced approach” (in the 
specialised lending regime) is therefore such that since the particular asset is used as 
security which can be sold or which can help in exposures being recouped on default, 
this helps in reducing the Loss Given Default of a bank on there being any such default 
(and which therefore means that whilst the Probability of Default and Exposure at 
Default remain the same, the collateral provided reduces the exposures/ losses of the 
bank upon there having been a default)1007.    
7.3 The Effect of the Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques adopted by 
the Basel Accords 
It has been argued that the Basel Accords are not generally concerned with ordinary 
commercial bank secured lending (other than for the specific consideration given under 
the specialised lending regime used by banks adopting the IRB approach), and that the 
only types of collateral which attract special reduced risk weights are those types of 
collateral used in financial markets and which have near cash status1008.     
The type of collateral considered as “eligible collateral” for the purposes of credit risk 
mitigation measures has long been considered as being too restrictive, and continues to 
be viewed as such notwithstanding the rules applicable to specialised lending 
exposures1009.  There is limited recognition of security interests on various assets 
(particularly those assets which are given as collateral when long term financing is 
required), and no distinction is made as to where the collateral is placed and which 
jurisdiction one would seek to enforce a security interest in (and the ease of 
enforceability of such collateral, particularly in an insolvency scenario).   
In light of the restrictive classification as to what can be considered as a credit risk 
mitigation technique for the purposes of the Basel Accords, it comes as no surprise that 
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<http://www.corporatejetinvestor.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CJI-2012-Basel-III-and-
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1007 See also:  CorporateJetInvestor (n 1006) 8. 
1008 Wood (n 1) 637 – 638.  
1009 Lloyds TSB plc (n 572) 7. 
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recent statistics published in the EU show that well over 90% of credit is considered to 
be “uncollateralised” for the purposes of the CRR1010.  
The Basel Accords seem to have adopted this restrictive position due to the current 
“eligible collateral” being easy to value on a daily basis1011.  Another reason for Basel’s 
restricted choice of “eligible collateral” may also be due to the assumption that in most of 
the advanced jurisdictions there is special legislation which gives effect to the contract 
terms of a financial market security interest (regardless of insolvency freezes, priority or 
unsecured preferential creditors, restrictions on sale without a court order, and other 
matters which affect security interests)1012.    
The effect of non-financial collateral in the IRB approach is very limited, and in Wood’s 
words, this “shows that the Basel Committee did not have a very high view of the use of 
collateral risk reduction”, particularly since the cost saving made here will be very 
limited1013.  The reason Wood attributes to this is that most secured transactions do not 
provide for topping up the collateral should this fall in value, with other reasons being 
that governing security interests in many countries are very poor, with there also 
increasingly being freezes on organisations, together with the inability of banks to check 
that the collateral was being monitored1014.  Those assets which are not considered to be 
“eligible” therefore give rise to higher capital requirements, placing bank financing at a 
disadvantage as against non-bank institutions which are not subject to the Basel 
regime1015.  
Though under the IRB approach the Basel Accords extend the range of eligible financial 
collateral further than under the Standardised approach, this still remains very limited 
and subject to national discretion.  Furthermore, in areas where eligible financial 
collateral has been extended further (such as in relation to residential and commercial 
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real estate1016) the differences in the underlying laws still fail to be considered and are 
ignored by the regulations, meaning that a mortgage which can very easily be enforced 
in a pro-creditor jurisdiction is being given the same value and effect as a first priority 
hypothec in a pro-debtor jurisdiction where it might take years for actual realisation of 
that collateral to take place for the benefit of the secured party. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the Advanced IRB approach is conditional on the 
availability of data held by the bank going back five years in order to calculate the 
Probability of Default, and seven years of data for Loss Given Default and Exposure at 
Default – however the obtainment of this data has proved problematic for banks to 
obtain (particularly in light of the fact that data would take seven years to obtain, during 
which time the said bank would need to satisfy higher capital requirements in light of 
the impossibility of adopting an Advanced IRB approach)1017.    
A further criticism was aimed at the eligibility of collateral focused on the absence of 
recognition of certain “imperfectly secured” transactions, also classified as “quasi-security 
interests”:  though quasi-security interests can provide a good alternative to security 
interests and provide sufficient leverage over goods which would have been financed, 
they are not recognised as eligible collateral for the purposes of the Basel Accords1018. 
Though the establishment of the specialised lending regime is a step in the right 
direction, this remains undeveloped.  Notwithstanding that the use of specialised lending 
criteria allows for proper consideration of collateral where assets are financed by using 
the Advanced IRB approach, this remains limited to very few banks in that only those 
banks which do have experience in the field can make use of historical portfolio data.  
Furthermore, the use of the specialised lending regime remains dependent upon risks 
which are analysed by banks and without there being a deeper consideration as to what 
security a bank actually does have, and what inhibitions and limitations it may face in 
seeing to make use of that security, particularly on insolvency.  It has also been stated 
that in practice, notwithstanding the provisions of specialised lending on adopting the 
IRB approach, great emphasis is still placed on the counterparty, rather than on the 
product or performance risk of an asset being financed, and to any credit risk mitigating 
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pressures particularly in the U.S.; See:  Thomas Cottier, John H. Jackson, Rosa M. Lastra, 
International Law in Financial Regulation and Monetary Affairs (OUP, 2012) 225.  
1017 Cornford (n 1002). 
1018 Thieffry (n 995) 4 – 5.  
227 
 
effects which might be in place1019.  Consequently, the specialised lending criteria is still 
treated with skepticism1020.    
The criteria used by the Basel Accords in relation to the supervisory slotting approach 
also demonstrates the lack of depth which the Basel Accords enters into upon 
considering security interests and the rights of creditors on the insolvency of a debtor.  
On establishing the criteria for each of the specialised lending sectors, banks need to 
determine the existence of a number of requirements (with these varying from one 
category of specialised lending to another), such as:  a “favourable and stable regulatory 
environment over the long term”; “enforceability of contracts, collateral and security”; the 
possibility of there being assignment of contracts and accounts; there being a “first 
perfected security interest”; there being a “strong” covenant package; there being a 
“perfected first lien”; “assignment of rents”; determining that the “jurisdiction is 
favourable to repossession and enforcement of contracts”; and the lender having effective 
control (such as through there being a “first perfected security interest”) 1021.  These 
generic terms however ignore the vast differences which exist between different states, 
the pro-debtor or pro-creditor bias jurisdictions may have, and how these 
considerations affect lenders.  Consequently it is here argued that notwithstanding the 
adoption of similar laws across different jurisdictions, the risks which different banks 
face will still vary depending on whether they operate in pro-creditor or in pro-debtor 
jurisdictions. 
The above also shows that there are marked differences in the risk management 
techniques adopted by the industry (on a microeconomic, transactional level, when 
taking collateral from their borrower) and in the risk management techniques imposed 
on banks and financing parties by the Basel Accords (and which adopt a macroeconomic 
risk management approach, and which are primarily based on capital ratios and with 
very limited recognition of risk management techniques adopted on a transactional level 
by financing entities).  These different risk management techniques invariably give rise 
to a mismatch in that certain transactions which might be considered as low risk for a 
financing entity when advancing credit, might be considered to be very high risk for the 
purposes of the Basel Accords (particularly if the collateral provided is not considered to 
be “eligible financial collateral”).  This mismatch however continues to encourage the 
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industry to resort to regulatory arbitrage in order to avoid the restrictions which arise 
from the Basel Accords. 
7.3.1  Long-Term Financing 
A brief comment on long-term financing is also warranted in light of the effects of the 
Basel Accords, which is seemingly leading to a shift in long-term financing to nonbank 
entities.   
Long-term financing is generally required for major projects, and is considered to be one 
of the main elements of banking, whereby banks borrow from the public for the short-
term (through deposits from the public), and lend out money for the medium-term or 
longer-term projects at higher interest rates.  The Basel Accords however treat long-
term financing with skepticism1022.  Banks active in long-term financing face liquidity 
issues since banks cannot rely on those of its assets which it has given out as loans for 
long-term financing purposes – particularly since recalling loans is bound to affect the 
public’s confidence in the bank.  Furthermore banks are negatively affected by the lack of 
proper consideration of the collateral which they hold given that long-term financing is 
typically secured by the particular project or asset being financed as explained above. 
Though banks have historically been the main providers of long-term investment, they 
have scaled back their involvement here, particularly in light of Basel III, the EBA rules, 
and the rising cost of funding, resulting in a situation where there are very few banks 
which still finance long-term projects1023.  The new stability ratios introduced by Basel 
III, particularly, do not favour long term investment1024.  This is surprising, however, 
given that most long-term projects, such as major infrastructure projects, certain 
concession agreements, or even power purchase agreements, tend to result in lengthy 
and stable revenue streams1025. 
Long-term financing is thus placed at a disadvantage over short-term financing.  Though 
a report which has been prepared for the European Commission and which sought to 
assess the impact of the CRR on the access to finance for business and long-term 
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investments1026, has sought to downplay the effects of the CRR by arguing that in the 
long-term the reduction in bank financing will be minimal, it is pertinent to note that the 
said report has also highlighted that bank financing only provided for 65.9% of 
infrastructure deals in 2014 (i.e. down from 82.7% in 2007) due to a shift towards non-
bank investors1027.  The said report also noted how banks have specifically noted that the 
CRR has led them to focus on projects having a shorter tenor1028.  It has here also been 
reported that “[m]ost banks feel that the CRR has unnecessarily penalized the long-term 
risk at the core of infrastructure lending”, such that banks “are being required to place 
more capital toward projects in a sector which has not been prone to particular risky 
lending or frequent default” (with banks also reporting that this has led them to focus 
also on projects offering higher returns, which therefore presumably means that there 
has also been a shift in focus towards financing riskier projects)1029. 
7.3.2  Basel IV – Taking One Step Back  
In June 2016 the BCBS issued a consultative document1030 which sought to limit the use 
of the IRB approach.  The proposals which have been put forward by this consultation 
document and the consequent standards which have been promulgated by the BCBS1031 
have been informally termed as “Basel IV” by the industry.  This consultation document 
proposed to limit the use of the IRB approach given that it argued that “[o]ne of the 
lessons from the financial crisis is that not all credit risk exposures are capable of being 
modelled sufficiently reliably or consistently for use in determining capital requirements”, 
and that there has been “significant unwarranted variability in RWA [risk weighted assets] 
calculated under the IRB approaches”1032.    
Though the BCBS proposal was criticized by major players, such as by the European 
Parliament which sought to argue that the use of internal models is of particular 
importance for European banks and sought to emphasize that “the right to use internal 
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models should be preserved”1033, the standards promulgated by the BCBS (which are to be 
implemented by 1st January 2022) established that the Advanced IRB approach would no 
longer be applicable for exposures to equities, to banks and other financial institutions, 
and to large and mid-sized corporates (which have consolidated revenues above €500 
million).  Consequently banks will only be able to use the Standardised approach, or the 
Foundation IRB approach (but not in relation to equities) in order to apply credit risk 
mitigation measures1034. 
This thesis argues that this is a step backwards since this would further enhance the use 
of a Standardised approach which does not distinguish between the risks which are 
actually faced on financing a particular counterparty.  Limiting the use of IRB approaches 
means that banks cannot apply capital requirements according to case-specific risks.  
This also limits the possibility of catering for domestic embeddedness through the use of 
bank models.  Limiting the use of IRB approaches will mean that capital requirements 
will continue to be even more standardised, without there being any analysis 
whatsoever taking place as to what actual risks a bank faces, and what capital is to be 
retained in relation to specific risks.  The severe consequences which this may give rise 
to (including increased regulatory arbitrage and shifts to non-regulated entities) can 
also be seen from papers which have been produced by industry-specific entities1035. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Part IV of this thesis has shown how, though the Basel Accords seek to provide a 
transnational regulatory law to reduce systemic risks, these international standards 
ignore the main risk mitigating factors which the same subjects of the Basel Accords 
adopt on a transactional basis.  Whilst on entering into a transaction banks and financing 
entities seek to limit their risks by ensuring that proper collateral is in place, the “eligible 
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financial collateral” which is accepted by the Basel Accords is only limited to very 
specific liquid assets.  Furthermore, Basel IV will be further restricting the use of the IRB 
approach, which to-date provides much needed flexibility in order to address the 
concerns which have been raised in this Part IV. 
Moreover, though the Basel Accords seek to provide a transnational framework in order 
to reduce systemic risks, the Basel Accords also discount the underlying national laws 
within which the Basel Accords operate.  As highlighted in Chapter 6, though there are 
vast differences between pro-debtor and pro-creditor jurisdictions, these considerations 
are not given any importance in the Basel Accords, which assume that all financing 
entities (irrespective of the jurisdiction within which they operate) start off from the 
same level of risk and that consequently the Basel Accords will have the same effects 
across all jurisdictions. 
It has also been shown how there have only been few harmonization initiatives in 
relation to both the laws of insolvency and the laws which regulate security interests, 
such that even in regional groupings such as the EU, national laws continue to vary 
substantially. 
In Chapter 9 it will therefore be argued that the Basel Accords could provide the 
appropriate mechanism for laws on insolvency and security interests across different 
jurisdictions to be drawn closer together by providing for lower capital requirements for 
those financing entities which operate in pro-creditor jurisdictions (in light of the lower 
risks to which they are subject).  This will provide an incentive for states to update their 
laws to pre-defined standards or specific model laws.  It will be argued that the style 
adopted by the CTC, as reviewed in Chapter 8 of this thesis, could therefore be used as a 
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Chapter 8:  The Cape Town Convention as a Model for the 
Basel Accords 
8.1 Introduction 
The CTC has been considered as one of the most successful transnational law 
instruments, with this being attributed to the continuous focus on economic analysis by 
its proponents.  Wool, on arguing that further importance needs to be given to law and 
economics in harmonisation of private law, has stated that the economic benefits which 
were envisaged to be obtained through the CTC is the reason why the CTC and the 
Aircraft Protocol “have obtained such broad support”1036.   
The CTC was promulgated with the involvement of each of the international community, 
the relevant regulators, as well as industry participants, and the CTC’s promoters did not 
ignore fundamental questions on which there is no harmonisation (such as laws on 
insolvency and security interests) but instead sought to create international instruments 
which are recognised across borders and which prevail over national laws.  The 
economic analysis adopted has therefore meant that each of the parties which are 
affected by the CTC have incentives to see that the instrument adopted by the 
international community works.   
Furthermore, the CTC was adopted through an instrument which is considered as 
“binding” and which gives rise to international rights and obligations between states, 
rather than relying on soft-laws which are dependent on individual states for their 
adoption and enforcement.  The CTC also managed to bring about harmonisation of laws 
related to insolvency and security interests in a specific field of law, with this being done 
in light of each of the international community, the relevant regulators and the industry 
being involved in the promulgation of the CTC.   
States also have incentives to update their laws on insolvency and security interests, 
since entities situate therein benefit from “Cape Town Discounts” when seeking finance 
from export credit agencies (“ECAs”), for high value mobile equipment which they would 
be acquiring (as will be discussed throughout this Chapter).  These Cape Town Discounts 
are provided in light of the reduction in capital adequacy requirements which ECAs are 
required to maintain as a result of the lower risks faced due to the implementation of 
pro-creditor model laws on insolvency and security interests as proposed by the CTC. 
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This thesis therefore argues that the model adopted by the CTC can provide a framework 
through which different underlying laws on insolvency and security interests in different 
jurisdictions can be approximated through a transnational law.  This would also allow 
financing entities to give proper consideration to the credit risks they face, and with this 
being properly reflected in the capital retained by such entities. 
For this purpose this Chapter seeks to explore the main elements of the CTC and how it 
sets out to reach its goals, in order for this to be contrasted with the main elements of 
the Basel Accords which have been considered throughout this thesis. 
8.2 Main Elements of the Cape Town Convention 
8.2.1 Background to the CTC  
The CTC1037 and its associated Aircraft Protocol1038 were concluded in November 2001, 
at a Diplomatic Conference held at Cape Town, under the auspices of UNIDROIT, which 
had been the prime mover for the Convention, together with the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (“ICAO”)1039.  The CTC and the Aircraft Protocol have been very 
successful and currently have 77 and 73 contracting states respectively (apart from the 
EU which has signed the CTC and the Aircraft Protocol as a regional economic 
integration organisation)1040.  One can therefore note, from the outset, that the CTC and 
the Aircraft Protocol did not rely on a soft-law mechanism, but rather sought to make 
use of a Treaty which would have binding obligations upon the signatories to this Treaty 
(and its relative Protocols). 
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It has therefore been stated that the “highest priority” for the Aviation Working Group 
(which represented the industry in the drafting process of the CTC), was1041:  
to ensure that contracting states would be offered rules that embraced the 
‘fundamental principle’ that ‘in exchange for a reduced interest or rental rate, a 
secured party/ lessor will have the ability upon default to promptly take possession 
of the subject equipment and, in the case of asset-based debt financing, to convert 
the equipment into proceeds’, including in insolvency. 
The CTC thus sought to deal with the problem that though manufacturers, lessors and 
lenders may take security over an aircraft (and with their valuations being based on the 
predicted future values of that aircraft), a secured party would still be faced with 
problems in recouping moneys due to it on enforcement if the aircraft were to be situate 
in a jurisdiction which limits the secured party’s right to enforce, if third party creditors 
are given priority, or if repossession of the aircraft is delayed due to pro-debtor 
processes1042.  Therefore, the CTC was driven by the need to achieve one main goal, 
which was that of positively impacting on the cost and availability of finance for high-
value mobile equipment, particularly since the early drafters of the CTC were convinced 
that “the absence of an international legal regimen” deterred the provision and 
availability of asset-based finance, and that this could be remedied by a Convention 
which would govern the validity and enforceability of security interests1043.  The 
attainment of economic benefit particularly through increasing the availability and 
reducing the cost of aviation credit was the central and driving objective of the CTC, with 
this being the reason as to why the CTC was drafted as a commercially-oriented 
treaty1044.  It has therefore been stated that the “principal objective of the Convention is to 
facilitate the efficient financing and leasing of mobile equipment”1045. 
Though originally the main focus was solely on security interests, and though the initial 
drafters had promised that the CTC would “in no way seek to displace national 
bankruptcy rules”, it soon became clear that insolvency provisions were essential in 
order to reach the Convention’s objectives1046.  The 1998 economic impact assessment 
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on the CTC and on the Aircraft Protocol, which set out the necessary conditions for the 
CTC to achieve economic benefit, therefore also envisaged that the CTC and the Aircraft 
Protocol would increase the availability of external finance where it would otherwise not 
have been available, and reduce its cost where available1047.  This economic impact 
assessment considered the insolvency provisions of the CTC and the Aircraft Protocol as 
being the “litmus test of an asset-based financing”1048. 
The CTC sought to address the problem that high unit value equipment regulated by the 
Convention transcends national borders and is subject to varying legal regimes, making 
the legal regime regulating them unstable1049.  Furthermore, aircraft as well as space 
assets do not operate “on the ground” or even on earth, leading different jurisdictions to 
adopt different approaches to regulating these assets (if regulated at all)1050.  The main 
problem faced by financiers therefore was that a security interest taken in one 
jurisdiction was not recognised in others, and though a security interest might have been 
taken in a pro-creditor jurisdiction, the particular asset could find itself operating in a 
pro-debtor jurisdiction which may be relatively hostile to security interests and the 
exercise of self-help default remedies1051.   
In 1989 Cuming recommended a “hands-off” approach to insolvency, and proposed the 
establishment of a Convention that would deal with rules of priority and provide for 
basic default remedies (of seizure and sale) through the use of conflict of law rules, but 
which would not have dealt with default remedies on insolvency, and which would 
therefore have remained subject to the specific national insolvency laws1052.  Though 
respondents to a survey following the Cuming Report supported the “inclusion of one 
substantive rule that would require security interests recognised as created under the 
proposed convention to be treated as security interests in insolvency proceedings”, the 
general view remained that “[w]hile bankruptcy law cannot be ignored, it is completely 
unrealistic to attempt to influence national bankruptcy law in any significant way through 
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a Convention (or rules) dealing with the international recognition of security interests in 
mobile equipment”1053. 
It was however quickly recognised that what was needed was “clear and effective rules 
governing the creation, perfection and priority of security interests”, and in light of the 
varying national laws this necessitated the creation of an entirely new security interest 
in mobile equipment “possessing the characteristics given by the Convention itself and 
publicised by registration within an international registration system” (which would 
hence start being referred to as the “international registry”)1054.  This became 
particularly relevant in light of the fact that it had been recognised that the problems 
caused by the legal framework that governed the treatment of security interests in 
movables had negatively affected the availability of finance for high-value mobile 
equipment1055. 
8.2.2 Main Objectives and Principles of the CTC  
The Official Commentary to the CTC listed five key objectives which the CTC and the 
Protocols sought to achieve, consisting of1056:  the facilitation of acquisition and financing 
of mobile equipment by establishing international interests which are recognised in all 
contracting states;  the establishment of a range of basic default and insolvency-related 
remedies for the benefit of creditors, whilst providing also means of obtaining speedy-
relief pending final determination of claims on the merits once there would have been 
evidence of default;  the establishment of an electronic international registry in which 
international interests are registered, thereby giving notice to third parties whilst 
allowing creditors to preserve their priority against subsequently registered interests 
and against unregistered interests and creditors on the insolvency of the debtor;  
ensuring that the relevant Protocol and the particular industry needs are met; and as a 
result of these objectives, to give creditors greater confidence in taking decisions to 
grant credit, whilst enhancing the credit rating of equipment receivables and reducing 
borrowing costs and credit insurance premiums to the advantage of all interested 
parties.  Therefore as legal certainty is provided through the CTC, financiers’ risks are 
reduced, leading to lower borrowing costs1057.   
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It has been stated that the “overriding objective” of the CTC has been “to provide an 
international legal regime which will give proper protection to the interests of secured 
creditors and thereby increase predictability, reduce risk and lower financing costs, to the 
benefit of all interested parties”1058.  Furthermore, the Aircraft Protocol was adopted not 
simply to elaborate on the CTC, but, rather, to adapt the CTC to the specific peculiarities 
of the aviation sector1059.  This contrasts starkly with the position taken in the Basel 
Accords, and in other transnational laws and transnational regulatory laws generally, 
whereby there has been little harmonisation of laws on insolvency and security 
interests, resulting in the Basel Accords refusing to take cognisance of the underlying 
insolvency laws and laws on security interests which exist in different jurisdictions and 
the implications which this may have on financing entities. 
It has also been stated by Goode in the Official Commentary to the CTC that the “five 
underlying principles” of the CTC and the Protocols are those of practicality (in reflecting 
asset-based financing and leasing transactions); party autonomy and contractual 
freedom; predictability; transparency (by having registration of international interests); 
and sensitivity to different national legal cultures1060.   
The CTC and the Aircraft Protocol allow states to make declarations in order to suit their 
specific needs with this providing signatory states with flexibility in order to be able to 
cater for certain peculiarities which different states may need to provide for1061.  The 
CTC however only permits there to be reservations made by states where this is 
expressly provided for in the text of the CTC, with this restriction being included in order 
to seek to have greater uniformity amongst states which adopt the CTC1062.  This 
complements the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states that a state 
may exclude or modify the legal effect of a specific provision of a Treaty through the 
deposit of a unilateral reservation on ratifying a particular Treaty1063.  Given that the CTC 
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and Protocols are instruments of international law, governed by the Law of Treaties, 
these are subject to the principle of autonomous interpretation and therefore one should 
only interpret the CTC and the Protocols in accordance with their specific terms, subject 
to any declarations which different jurisdictions may have made.  Consequently, one 
cannot apply principles of domestic law when interpreting the said instruments1064. 
8.2.3 Security Interests and International Interests  
The success of the CTC may also be attributed to its flexibility – when it was being 
drafted it had been proposed for the CTC to refer solely to “security interests” in mobile 
equipment (including sales under reservation of title and finance leases), which would 
have adopted a “functional approach to security” similar to that found in Article 9 of the 
UCC1065.  It however became clear that European members were not enthusiastic about 
this approach in light of the freedom of parties to make use of different interests in most 
European states, with different legal effects, even if serving the same economic 
function1066.  Therefore lawyers from continental Europe did not accept that the 
distinction between security and title reservation was “formal rather than functional” 
and they felt that there were advantages in having different instruments governed by 
different rules leading to different outcomes1067.  Furthermore lawyers from continental 
Europe felt that a functional approach may lead to recharacterisation for tax purposes 
and this was therefore also a concern which they faced1068.  The solution which was 
resorted to was to have the characterisation of the particular agreement being dealt with 
under the applicable domestic law (and being subject to rules of private international 
law in the particular jurisdictions)1069. 
In order for the CTC to apply, the agreement must be a “security agreement”, a “title 
reservation agreement”, or a “leasing agreement”1070.  The characterisation of an 
agreement in one of these three categories is important as the CTC distinguishes 
between them in that the provisions on security interests are more detailed than the 
provisions governing title reservation agreements and lease agreements – given that in 
the latter two categories the secured party is the owner, who should therefore have 
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rights, on default, to terminate the title reservation agreement or the lease agreement, 
and repossess the asset1071.   
A unique feature of the CTC is that it establishes “international interests”, which give rise 
to a security interest which has priority over domestic security interests and which 
applies and takes effect in all contracting states1072.  The characterisation of international 
interests in domestic law would however be governed by the specific applicable national 
law (and therefore a right under a security agreement, a title reservation agreement, or a 
lease, created through domestic law can be registered as an international interest and be 
subject to the terms of the CTC regulating international interests)1073.  The 
characterisation at national law means that remedies may vary between jurisdictions, 
depending on the characterisation which national law provides, such that Goode 
recognised that “a conditional sale agreement would be treated by a French court as a title 
reservation agreement but by a New York court as also constituting a security agreement, 
so that only the Convention provisions governing security agreements apply to it”1074. 
The creation of an “international interest” however presents a marked difference from 
having recognition of security interests which would have been created under national 
law1075.  The international interest created by the CTC goes further than other 
Conventions since it creates an interest which “sits above domestic law” and which has 
priority over national security interests1076.  Therefore rather than harmonising security 
interests across borders, the CTC, through the creation of the “international interest” 
concept, created an international right which prevails over national law, being 
enforceable on its own specific terms, whilst also giving rise to specific enforceability 
possibilities.   
The “international interest” is described in Article 2(2) of the CTC as follows1077: 
(a) granted by the chargor under a security agreement; 
(b) vested in a person who is the conditional seller under a title reservation 
agreement; or 
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(c) vested in a person who is the lessor under a leasing agreement. 
Furthermore the CTC caters for a very wide definition of a “security agreement”, as 
follows1078:  
“security agreement” means an agreement by which a chargor grants or agrees to 
grant to a chargee an interest (including an ownership interest) in or over an 
object to secure his performance of any existing or future obligation of the chargor 
or a third person .... 
International interests are registrable and searchable in a centralised international 
registry accessible over the internet, with registration securing priority1079.  Registration 
in the international registry does not create an international interest or provide proof 
thereof, but what it does is that it gives public notice of interests which would have been 
created and thereby it ensures priority against subsequent registered interests and over 
unregistered interests1080.  Furthermore, other than the creation of a cross-border 
international interest concept, the CTC also established rules of priority across borders, 
a basket of remedies on enforcement (which include self-help remedies), as well as 
provisions in order to regulate the insolvency of a debtor (and particularly in order to 
ensure the priority, rights and interests of the holder of an international interest)1081. 
The rules on priority are straightforward – an international interest ranks in priority to 
all other interests that are not registered, whilst between interests which would have 
been registered the rule is that ranking will be dependent upon the time of registration – 
with those registrations registered first ranking above those which are registered 
later1082.  The CTC does not exclude the creation of security interests under national law, 
but it subordinates them to registered international interests1083.  All international 
interests registered before the opening of insolvency proceedings are to be effective on 
insolvency1084. 
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8.2.4 Remedies Given by the CTC and by the Aircraft Protocol  
The main remedies granted by the CTC start to apply on there being a default by a debtor 
– which will thus prejudice a creditor or an owner.  The CTC lets the debtor and creditor 
define contractually what they would consider to be a default and what instances would 
thus allow the creditor to benefit from the remedies granted by the CTC1085.  Article 11 of 
the CTC states that the “debtor and the creditor may at any time agree in writing as to the 
events that constitute a default or otherwise give rise to the remedies specified in Articles 8 
to 10 and 13”1086.  Article 11 then further states that where “the debtor and the creditor 
have not so agreed, “default”…means a default which substantially deprives the creditor of 
what it is entitled to expect under the agreement”1087. 
The CTC also specifically provides for remedies, which differ depending on the type of 
international interest granted (depending on whether remedies are granted due to there 
being a conditional sale or leasing agreement, or whether remedies are granted due to 
there being a default under a security agreement)1088.  The CTC also provides a set of 
default remedies as interim relief (pending final determination of a creditor’s claim) to 
which a creditor (which is defined as referring to each of a chargee under a security 
agreement, a conditional seller under a title reservation agreement, and a lessor under a 
leasing agreement1089) is entitled to, upon providing evidence of there being a default1090.  
Furthermore, additional remedies permitted by national law may also be exercised as 
long as these do not contradict the mandatory remedies provided for in the 
Convention1091.  
As explained above, the CTC has been modified and supplemented by the Aircraft 
Protocol1092.  The Aircraft Protocol extended the CTC to apply also to outright sales, 
which are not registrable under the CTC 1093.  Furthermore the Aircraft Protocol also 
provides default remedies of “de-registration and export of the aircraft” on there being a 
default by a debtor, with the process of de-registration and export taking place 
automatically without there being any discretion granted to national authorities in 
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administering the process (subject to any applicable safety laws and regulations)1094.  
De-registration and export authorisation is granted through an Irrevocable De-
Registration and Export Request Authorisation (“IDERA”), and the person in whose 
favour the said IDERA would have been granted by the debtor (or his certified designee) 
becomes the sole person entitled to procure the de-registration and export of the said 
aircraft (though any such rights cannot be exercised unless prior ranking creditors 
would have provided their consent thereto)1095.  The rationale of the provision of these 
remedies is in order to remove the aircraft further away from the control of the debtor 
and for the transfer of such control to the creditor1096. 
Another main feature of the CTC is that it contains specific provisions regulating the 
insolvency of a debtor, with this having been considered as an essential element for the 
CTC to have adopted an economic approach 1097.  Though under the CTC the priority of an 
international interest does not escape the application of local insolvency laws relating to 
the avoidance of a transaction as a preference or as a transfer in fraud of creditors, the 
Aircraft Protocol1098 allows a state to make one of two declarations relating to insolvency 
(referred to as “Alternative A” (which is the preferred, pro-creditor system, also referred 
to as the “hard” alternative) or “Alternative B” (also referred to as the “soft” 
alternative))1099.  Contracting states making one of these declarations may only make 
such a declaration in its entirety1100.  The core insolvency provisions found in the 
Aircraft Protocol have been described as the “‘single most significant provision 
economically’ of the entire UNIDROIT project”1101.  As will be seen in Section 8.3, having a 
debtor-creditor relationship being subject to the Alternative A rules may also result in 
cheaper financing possibilities due to the lower risks faced by the creditor. 
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Alternative A, which is largely based on s.1110 of the US Bankruptcy Code is “specifically 
designed to meet the requirements of advanced structured financing, including 
international capital market financing structures”1102.  This offers the highest protection 
to financiers against local and other unsecured creditors as it obliges the insolvency 
administrator to cure all defaults (and agree to fully perform in future) within a declared 
“waiting period” (with most states prescribing a thirty or a sixty day period as being the 
said “waiting period”), or alternatively to give up possession of the aircraft (whilst also 
granting rights of repossession to the creditor) to the holder of an international 
interest1103.  When Alternative A applies there is no scope for application of local 
insolvency provisions relating to claw-back or voidable transaction provisions1104.  No 
discretion is given to Court either in relation to the Alternative A remedies and this in 
order to ensure that financiers and lessors benefit from a clear and unqualified rule1105.   
In Alternative B, a creditor which holds a registered Convention interest, is given the 
opportunity to make a “request” to the insolvency administrator, and upon receipt of 
such a request, the insolvency administrator is given a prescribed period (determined by 
the contracting state) to give notice that it will either cure all defaults (and agree to 
perform all future obligations under the agreement giving rise to the Convention 
interest), or alternatively give the creditor the opportunity to take possession “in 
accordance with applicable law”1106.  It is therefore assumed that repossession under 
Alternative B will involve some application by the creditor to a Court, and that the 
applicable law itself may “require the taking of any additional step or the provision of any 
additional guarantee”1107.  In the event that an administrator fails to respond to a 
creditor’s request or if it fails to afford the creditor opportunity to take possession of the 
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aircraft, then a Court “may” permit the creditor to take possession of the equipment (but 
subject to any condition which the said Court may impose)1108.  
8.3 The Aircraft Sector Understanding and Cape Town Discounts 
The Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft (“ASU”) is an arrangement 
between certain Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) 
participants, and is found as Annex III to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export 
Credits set out by the OECD1109.  The importance of the ASU has arisen over the past 
years as export credit financing gained importance, particularly since the financial crisis, 
as credit from commercial banks and capital markets became more difficult to obtain1110. 
The importance of this is that it creates a system which provides incentives for 
jurisdictions to adopt the Alternative A to insolvency, referred to in Section 8.2.  
Jurisdictions which would have signed up to the Aircraft Protocol to the CTC are 
required to adopt one of two systems of laws, with clear incentives being given to the 
adoption of the said Alternative A.  This system has encouraged jurisdictions to adopt 
and implement laws which stand above their local laws on insolvency and security 
interests, resulting in the harmonisation of laws across jurisdictions.  These incentives 
are provided through the recognition that the adoption of pro-creditor laws will lower 
the risks of financing parties, and consequently allowing financing to be cheaper.  This 
thesis envisages that similarly the Basel Accords can adopt systems whereby the 
adoption of pro-creditor laws by jurisdictions would allow the adoption of lower capital 
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requirements in light of financing entities operating in such jurisdictions being subject to 
lower credit risks. 
The ASU has been described as a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” amongst its participants 
(though a breach thereof would allow a member to file a claim under the World Trade 
Organisation’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Understanding) and seeks to “provide a 
framework for the predictable, consistent and transparent use of officially supported 
export credits” for the sale or lease of aircraft and other aircraft related equipment1111.  
The ASU seeks to “foster a level playing field for such export credits, in order to encourage 
competition among exporters based on quality and price of goods and services exported 
rather than on the most favourable officially supported financial terms and conditions”1112. 
The ASU establishes “the most favourable terms” on which officially supported export 
credits and favourable financing terms may be provided, and therefore seeks to establish 
a framework between its participating states, through which these states compete fairly, 
and thereby seeks to avoid distortion of competition through incentives which such 
states may grant1113.  
As will be seen in Chapter 9 to this thesis, one of the proposals which will be made will 
be that the Basel Accords can be used as an incentive towards harmonisation of laws on 
security interests and insolvency.  The operation of the ASU already adopts this 
approach (through the use of Cape Town Discounts which are referred to below), and a 
similar system may be put in place by the Basel Accords to this effect. 
The initial agreement between the US and the UK, Germany, France and Spain (being the 
European countries involved in the manufacturing of Airbus aircraft) was referred to as 
the “Large Aircraft Sector Understanding”, and sought to create a uniform standard for 
ECA financing1114.  Though there was no definition of what “official support” could be 
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provided, it was understood that this included “government-backed support for an ECA 
and could take the form of direct credits/financings, interest-rate support, ECA insurance, 
and guarantees”1115. 
In July 2007 certain OECD countries entered into a new ASU (the “2007 ASU”) which 
replaced the previous ASU which had been agreed to in 19861116.  The main reason for 
having the 2007 ASU was that industry participants had long required the 1986 Large 
Aircraft Sector Understanding to be extended to cover also regional jet-producing 
countries and therefore be applicable for all civil aircraft (particularly as the distinction 
between large aircraft and regional jets became increasingly blurred)1117.  Furthermore, 
it had been felt that the 1986 Large Aircraft Sector Understanding did not have adequate 
exchange of information possibilities amongst ECAs in place and did not produce reliable 
data regarding the financing of exports1118. 
The 2007 ASU was further revised in September 2011 and replaced by a new Aircraft 
Sector Understanding (the “2011 ASU”1119) particularly in light of a number of disputes 
which had arisen as to the role ECAs should play (particularly in light of the increased 
used thereof following the global financial crisis)1120.  The 2011 ASU therefore sought to 
bring ECA financing in line with market conditions, and minimise the support of ECAs as 
a factor in the choice by buyers (which would be obtaining finance from ECAs) among 
competing aircraft1121.  In light of the problems faced by the 2007 ASU, the 2011 ASU did 
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not distinguish between different aircraft categories and the types of financing which 
would be applicable to such categories1122.  
The 2011 ASU instead placed further emphasis on the risk profile of borrowers and 
requires them to be classified into one of eight criteria depending on their senior 
unsecured credit ratings1123.  Limits were placed on the amount of financing which will 
be made available to the highest rated borrowers, as the 2011 ASU sought to make ECA 
financing less desirable for those borrowers which can more readily access the 
commercial markets for financing1124.  Furthermore, depending on the risk associated 
with a borrower, ECAs will be required to include risk mitigants (i.e. the greater number 
of risk mitigants being required for the riskier borrowers)1125.  The 2011 ASU also set 
out that ECA financings are to be structured as eligible asset-backed transactions, 
outlining the specific components which such financings are to have, with restrictions 
also being set out on the maximum repayment terms1126.  
The novelty of the 2007 ASU was that it sought to crystallize incentives which had 
started being offered by the U.S. Export-Import Bank in relation to the CTC and the 
Aircraft Protocol1127.  The U.S. Export-Import Bank had announced that foreign buyers of 
large aircraft which were situate in a country that signed, ratified and implemented the 
CTC and the Aircraft Protocol, and provided that a set of declarations were made by that 
state, would qualify for a one third discount in fees for credit insurance on financings of 
US manufactured commercial aircraft1128. 
Therefore, in recognition of the reduction of risk available as a result of the CTC and the 
Aircraft Protocol, the 2007 ASU put in place a discount (the “CTC Discounts” or the 
“Cape Town Discounts”) from the “base premium” offered by the ECA, if the operator of 
an aircraft is based in a contracting state to the CTC and Aircraft Protocol1129.  The CTC 
Discounts available under the 2007 ASU varied depending on the categorisation of the 
particular aircraft1130. 
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Similarly, the 2011 ASU requires that ECAs charge borrowers a “minimum premium rate” 
(“MPR”) which is calculated as a percentage of the amount of official support provided 
by the ECA, and which is either paid upfront or alternatively over the life of the financing 
provided (on a 12-year repayment term)1131.  This MPR varies depending on the risk 
associated with the borrower through the use of an equation which takes into 
consideration:  the minimum risk-based rates, set annually using a four-year moving 
average of the annual Moody’s “Loss Given Default”; and a market reflective surcharge 
which reflects the market conditions and which is based on Moody’s “Median Credit 
Spreads”1132.  This equation therefore seeks to balance ECA pricing with commercial 
market pricing1133.   
The Cape Town Discounts are applicable on the MPR and allow for up to a ten percent 
(10%) reduction in the MPR if the following conditions are complied with1134: 
(1) the financing provided relates to an “aircraft object” as defined in the CTC; 
(2) the operator of the aircraft is situate in a jurisdiction that has been reviewed by 
the OECD and which therefore appears on a list of states for which a reduction in 
the MPR is permitted; 
(3) the financing provided relates to an aircraft object that has been registered on 
the CTC International Registry. 
These discounts are therefore only available if the contracting state would have made a 
number of declarations (the “qualifying declarations”) which are found in Annex I to 
Appendix II to the 2011 ASU (particularly in relation to insolvency and to the de-
registration and export of aircraft) and if that particular contracting state would have 
been reviewed by the OECD (following the completion of a questionnaire set out in 
Annex 2 to Appendix II to the 2011 ASU which reviews the way in which the CTC would 
have been implemented in the said contracting state)1135.  The OECD review is necessary 
in order to ensure that the contracting state has adopted the pro-creditor Alternative A 
                                                     
1131 Gerber (n 1110) 16; 2011 ASU (n 1109) 8; Goode (n 1045) 167; 2015 Export Credits 
Arrangement (n 1109) 54.  
1132 Gerber (n 1110) 16; 2011 ASU (n 1109) 8, 22 – 36; 2015 Export Credits Arrangement (n 
1109) 69 – 83.    
1133 Gerber (n 1110) 16. 
1134 ibid; van Zwieten (n 1041) 72; Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell (n 1059) 9; Wool 2012 (n 5) 
648; 2015 Export Credits Arrangement (n 1109) 77.  
1135 Chan (n 1109) 512; Lippé (n 1063) 87; 2011 ASU (n 1109) 35 – 38; Gerber (n 1110) 16; van 
Zwieten (n 1041) 72; Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell (n 1059) 9; Wool 2012 (n 5) 645; 2015 
Export Credits Arrangement (n 1109) 82 – 85.   
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put forward by the CTC and its Aircraft Protocol (and as a result of which such state 
would be listed on a list of states to which the CTC Discounts would apply)1136.  
Therefore the CTC Discounts are available “if, and only if, the qualifying declarations are 
made”, and this in light of the fact that “[c]ertain declarations result in risk reduction, and 
others do not”1137.  As a result, markets view the qualifying declarations as a condition in 
order for there to be the most efficient forms of financing available1138. 
The qualifying declarations to qualify for the CTC Discounts require a contracting state 
to have opted for the Alternative A option for remedies on insolvency (or alternatively 
have introduced legislation which precisely follows the Alternative A wording), as this 
gives the greatest protection to creditors1139.  Other declarations required in order to 
qualify for CTC Discounts include that of allowing for the de-registration of aircraft in 
accordance with Article XIII of the Aircraft Protocol, as well as a declaration to ensure 
timely remedies1140.  Contracting states also need to have not made other restrictive 
declarations in order for the CTC Discounts to apply1141.  
8.4 Impact of the CTC on Capital Market Transactions 
Other than the Cape Town Discounts referred to above, the CTC and the Aircraft Protocol 
have also been given due consideration in the rating of debt securities supported by 
aircraft equipment collateral1142.  On rating equipment trust certificates and enhanced 
equipment trust certificates (which are primarily used for the financing of railroad and 
of airline equipment), consideration is also given, by rating agencies, to the impact of the 
CTC1143.   
Therefore, though the Fitch rating methodology for enhanced equipment trust 
certificates in aircraft finance focuses primarily on US-issued certificates, it suggests that 
non-US issues would be evaluated on a “case-by-case basis, focusing in particular on the 
relative strength of the legal framework in the country of issue”, and that the US-issue 
rating methodology could be applied where the said issue jurisdiction has “an insolvency 
                                                     
1136 Chan (n 1109) 512; Lippé (n 1063) 87; 2011 ASU (n 1109) 35 – 38; Gerber (n 1110) 16; van 
Zwieten (n 1041) 72; Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell (n 1059) 9; 2015 Export Credits 
Arrangement (n 1109) 82 – 85.   
1137 Wool 2012 (n 5) 645. 
1138 ibid. 
1139 Goode (n 1039) 193. 
1140 2011 ASU (n 1109) 35 – 36; Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell (n 1059) 9; 2015 Export Credits 
Arrangement (n 1109) 82 – 83.    
1141 2011 ASU (n 1109) 35 – 36; 2015 Export Credits Arrangement (n 1109) 82 – 83.     
1142 van Zwieten (n 1041) 73. 
1143 ibid; Reddy, Vairo and Hewitt (n 1102) 237; Goode (n 1045) 167. 
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regime similar to Section 11101144 which allows creditors to repossess aircraft in a timely 
fashion”1145.  It continues by stating that the CTC could supply such a legal framework if 
this is adopted in the appropriate form (by having adopted the Alternative A to 
insolvency seen above, and which is the equivalent to the said Section 1110 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code), and if the CTC would have been properly implemented1146. 
Similarly Moody’s ratings of equipment trust certificates and of enhanced equipment 
trust certificates  in aircraft and railroad finance provides for ratings to be uplifted by up 
to two notches where the home country of a debtor is a contracting state to the CTC and 
to the Aircraft Protocol1147.  However both Fitch and Moody’s have in the past noted that 
the lack of case-law in different jurisdictions may lead to these rating agencies only 
partially adopting these measures or applying them only subjectively1148. 
The economic effect should thus be that market pricing should be cheaper for securities 
rated by credit rating agencies, as a result of the adoption of the CTC and the Aircraft 
Protocol. 
8.5 Impact of the CTC on the provision of debt by banks 
It has been stated that the presence of the CTC, coupled with the qualifying declarations 
and proper implementation, has led at least one major financial regulator to permit a 
“reduction in the amount of risk capital held by a regulated lender”1149.  Though details of 
this are not available, this reduction has taken place in light of the particular bank’s 
overall risk assessment model (i.e. through the adoption of the Advanced IRB method 
under the Basel Accords)1150.   The possible positive effects on the provision of debt by 
banks, has also been recognised by the Official Commentary to the CTC which stated 
that1151:  
[a]doption of the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol, by reducing risk 
and enhancing the value of aircraft objects and receivables provided as collateral, 
may also enable creditor banks to reduce the amount of capital required to be 
                                                     
1144 11 USC S 1110 (US Bankruptcy Code).  
1145 van Zwieten (n 1041) 73. 
1146 ibid. 
1147 ibid; Wool 2012 (n 5) 648 – 649.  
1148 van Zwieten (n 1041) 73. 
1149 Wool 2012 (n 5) 649. 
1150 ibid. 
1151 Goode (n 1045) 167. 
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maintained under Basel III because of the enhanced value of aircraft receivables 
collateral. 
The same principles are also adopted in the criteria established by the Basel Accords 
(and currently being under consideration by the EBA, following its consultation 
paper1152) when establishing the criteria for the “supervisory slotting criteria 
approach”1153.  On establishing the said supervisory slotting approach criteria reference 
is made, as criteria to be considered amongst various other matters (in object finance) to 
both1154:   
- legal and regulatory risks (particularly whether a jurisdiction is favourable to 
repossession and enforcement of contracts); and  
- whether legal documentation provides the lender effective control (i.e. a first 
perfected security interest, or a leasing structure including such security) on the 
asset, or on the company owning it. 
8.6 Other impacts of the CTC 
It  has also been recognised that certain lessors require the availability of the CTC (in the 
country of operation of the lessee or where the aircraft will be habitually situate) as a 
pre-condition to the leasing of aircraft (or of leasing aircraft in larger volumes)1155.  The 
CTC is also viewed favourably by credit committees generally, given that it works 
towards directly reducing transaction risk1156. 
It is therefore acknowledged that the adoption of the CTC has given certainty to 
creditors and lessors by ensuring them that the aircraft will be subject pro-creditor laws, 
thereby giving them certainty that harmonised concepts relating to insolvency and 
international interests apply for their benefit. 
8.7 The CTC as a Model for the Basel Accords 
As seen throughout this Chapter, the drafters of the Basel Accords and the drafters of the 
CTC and the Aircraft Protocol were faced with a number of similar questions and 
problems.  It is here argued that the adoption of a law and economics approach by the 
drafters of the CTC, the use of a Treaty which creates binding obligations between states, 
                                                     
1152 European Banking Authority (n 994). 
1153 See:  Basel II (n 264) Annex 6.   
1154 Basel II (n 264) Annex 6, 291 – 294.  




and the ability to deal with varying underlying national laws on insolvency and security 
interests, represent fundamental differences in the approach taken by the drafters of the 
Basel Accords, and the drafters of the CTC and the Aircraft Protocol respectively. 
Consequently it is argued that the issues raised by this thesis in relation to the Basel 
Accords could be overcome by adopting positions which reflect the positions taken by 
the drafters of the CTC and the Aircraft Protocol throughout the years.  It is for this 
reason that it is contended that the latter approach should be used as a model by the 






Chapter 9:  Proposals and Concluding Remarks 
9.1  Problems Outlined by the Thesis 
This thesis has argued that the main factor which has impeded the Basel Accords from 
reaching its objectives, is that the promoters of the Basel Accords have failed to consider 
the separate interests which each of the international community, the individual nation 
states, and the industry have.  Each of these players give strong considerations to their 
own self-interest on negotiating, implementing, and enforcing the Basel Accords. 
This thesis has also highlighted the lack of regulatory consistency in the Basel Accords, 
as a result of a lack of harmonisation or effective cooperation amongst states in order to 
determine the entities to which the Basel Accords should apply.  This has enabled the 
industry to resort to regulatory arbitrage, by making use of entities which fall outside of 
the scope of the Basel Accords, as well as by having those same entities operating 
through more favourable jurisdictions as a result of the varying approaches which 
different states have adopted on implementing the Basel Accords.   
The Basel Accords further fail to consider the domestic embeddedness within which the 
implementing laws in different jurisdictions are meant to operate, with this thesis 
making particular mention of the varying laws on security interests and insolvency in 
different jurisdictions.  Though the Basel Accords seek to regulate the risk of 
internationally-active banks, the Basel Accords fail to consider that the risks arising in 
one jurisdiction are not equivalent to the risks arising in another jurisdiction 
notwithstanding that similar transnational regulatory laws apply.  Furthermore, it is also 
argued that in light of the lack of proper consideration of risk mitigating factors (such as 
collateral provided on a transactional basis), certain transactions which may be 
considered to be “low risk” transactions to banks (in light of the collateral provided), 
may be considered to be very risky by the Basel Accords (in light of the limitations in 
what is considered to be “eligible collateral” under the Basel Accords), with this resulting 
in a mismatch between the risk management techniques adopted by the Basel Accords 
on a macroeconomic level, and by those adopted by banks on a microeconomic 
(transactional) level. 
Reference has been made to the CTC in Chapter 8 since this transnational law 
instrument has been able to deal with each of the problems which the Basel Accords 
faces, as discussed above.  It is therefore here argued that the same methodology 
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adopted in the CTC should similarly be adopted in transnational regulatory instruments 
such as the Basel Accords. 
This thesis argues that in order to be able to increase the effectiveness of the Basel 
Accords it is desirable to move away from having only a “soft-law” approach as has been 
adopted by the Basel Accords, whilst allowing for further flexibility in the 
implementation of the Basel Accords, notwithstanding that this may give rise to further 
regulatory competition amongst jurisdictions.  It is thus also argued that the Basel 
Accords can be used as a tool through which to achieve further harmonisation in the 
laws of insolvency and security interests by adopting the same approach which has been 
adopted by the CTC. 
9.2  Recommendations 
9.2.1  Introducing Binding Principles to the Basel Accords 
As abovementioned, the Basel Accords have made use of transnational regulatory laws 
which are “soft-laws” in nature, and this thesis has also described various problems 
which have arisen as a consequence of this.  It is therefore here being proposed to move 
away from a “soft-law” approach towards the use of a Treaty (based on a transnational 
law, rather than on a transnational regulatory law), which will create binding rights and 
obligations between its signatories.  This will ensure that states comply with established 
principles and achieve uniformity on those same principles.   
Brummer (though advocating the use of soft-law) notes that though theorists generally 
assume that hard law coordination is more difficult, this is “ultimately more durable” 
given that having “legalization is seen as imposing reputational harms that soft law 
cannot”, particularly since defections from hard laws are considered to be violations of 
international law1157. 
Given that it would be improbable for there to be full harmonisation across borders, it is 
here proposed that a Treaty establishing the main principles on which the Basel Accords 
are based, to which entities they should apply, and possible incentives to states to work 
towards harmonising their laws on security interests and insolvency should be dealt 
with at Treaty level, whilst allowing the detailed rules which are currently regulated by 
the current texts of the Basel Accords to continue to be dealt with through soft-law 
methods in the same way as they are today.  This thesis therefore proposes that the 
                                                     
1157 Brummer (n 100) 305. 
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binding text at Treaty level will only seek to achieve harmonisation on the main 
principles on which the Basel Accords are based. 
One of the main items which should be considered in such a Treaty would be to 
specifically define which entities are meant to be regulated by the provisions of the Basel 
Accords.  As seen throughout this thesis the identification of “internationally-active 
banks” as being the subjects of the Basel Accords is not sufficient.  A proper definition 
needs to look beyond the regulatory boundary and ensure that the same principles apply 
in different jurisdictions.  This Treaty should also be wary that the industry has 
historically aimed to shift its activities to other entities which do not fall within the scope 
of regulation (such as through a shift in activity towards shadow banks).   
Whether such a definition will be wide in scope in order to capture entities which are 
not just “internationally-active”, or even “systemically-important”, will depend on what 
role the Basel Accords are meant to play in the years to come.  As seen throughout this 
thesis the Basel Accords originally set out to regulate cross-border activities of banks 
only.  The implementing laws throughout various jurisdictions (including the EU), have 
however, extended the Basel Accords in order for these to provide a standard for all 
banks (and also other entities such as investment firms).  Therefore, whether an 
international Treaty would extend to regulate all banks or just banks which are 
considered to be systemically important will depend on a decision as to what role the 
BCBS considers that the Basel Accords should fulfil going forward.  This thesis has 
however shown how the Basel Accords are already considered to be a global standard 
across jurisdictions (despite being subject to many variances) and, therefore, binding 
principles which would have much less detail than what is in place today, and which 
would be used to regulate all banks (and possibly other entities), should not be an 
impossible task. 
The approach of having an international Treaty has also been put forward by Helleiner 
who stated that the “idea of creating an international treaty-based organization with 
considerable powers to enforce international hard law” continues to be “off the official 
agenda”, a number of analysts think that this “is a shame” as this may be the only way to 
ensure concordance1158.  
Furthermore, whilst states should adhere to the main principles on which the Basel 
Accords are based (and which are being proposed to be included in a Treaty of a binding 
                                                     
1158 Helleiner (n 259) 252 – 253.  
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nature), it is below argued that regulatory competition should be encouraged in relation 
to the soft-laws which are meant to be implemented by the different states.  This will 
allow states to seek economically efficient systems of regulation, and allow states to be 
flexible and pro-active in regulating those entities which are regulated within their 
jurisdictions. 
The approach of having only frameworks agreed to by all states and relying on different 
national laws also finds resonance with suggestions which had been put forward at an 
earlier stage in EU integration, whereby it had been argued1159: 
The integration solution will not, however, be reached easily if – as was the case 
until recently – the unanimous consent of all national governments is required 
before the Community instrument can be issued.  Each government will be tempted 
to hold out for a form of regulation which will minimize any loss to its electorate, 
perhaps by creating escape clauses and loopholes under which some discretion on 
the implementation of the regulation is retained.  An alternative, and less 
ambitious, bargaining compromise is possible.  If governments wish to preserve the 
political advantages of domestic regulation and yet also pursue the gains to be 
made from intra-Community trade, they may be able to agree on what we shall 
refer to as ‘co-ordination’.  This solution takes the form of framework regulation at 
Community level which does nothing more than state broad policy goals.  A 
Member State may retain its own regulatory packages to implement those goals, 
but, for the purposes of intra-Community trade, it must recognise that compliance 
with the regulatory requirements of another Member State will also suffice. 
9.2.2  Regulatory Competition as an Alternative to Regulatory Cooperation 
It has been argued that the establishment of transnational regulatory standards by the 
Basel Accords inhibits regulatory competition, thus hindering efficient regulation1160.  
Harmonization through international standards renders regulation inflexible and results 
in a situation where regulation cannot be responsive to market changes1161. This 
particularly arises in light of peer pressure which states may be subject to, whereby the 
international community seeks to ensure that all states adhere to the agreed texts of the 
Basel Accords.  On the other hand, states which exert peer pressure on others may also 
willingly departing from the agreed texts of the Basel Accords where this suits them. 
                                                     
1159 Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation:  Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart Publishing, 2004) 101 – 
102.   




The main problem with transnational regulatory laws such as the Basel Accords is that 
there is no binding rule which creates obligations on states to implement and enforce 
the particular transnational regulatory law (as soft-law) and states have incentives to 
depart from the agreed texts of the Basel Accords on acting out of self-interest.  It is here 
argued that in light of the different requirements of each state, adopting a system which 
relies more heavily on regulatory competition is desirable.  This can be achieved if main 
principles are set out as a transnational law with binding effect (through the use of a 
Treaty), rather than as a transnational regulatory law, as described in Section 9.2.1.   
It is thus argued that though regulatory competition in relation to soft-laws would be 
desirable, certain fundamental principles should be agreed to in the Treaty which would 
set out the limits to regulatory competition, thereby avoiding a race to the bottom.   
Though having different states adopt different rules through a regulatory competitive 
process may result in the use of regulatory arbitrage, it is here argued that one cannot 
discard regulatory competition solely due to this reason.  Regulatory arbitrage is already 
a major problem in relation to the Basel Accords, both due to differences in the laws of 
different jurisdictions, as well as due to the different financing entities and financial 
instruments which are made use of.  It is furthermore also argued that regulatory 
arbitrage is not necessarily a negative consideration if this is adopted in order to avoid 
unnecessary social costs and if it encourages shifts to more efficient or more desirable 
systems. 
The main benefit of this approach is that domestic regulatory authorities would be 
required to observe the broad principles which could be established internationally 
(through a Treaty), but be able to adjust and improve on the regulatory principles 
according to the particular needs of a state, the nature of the firms found in that 
particular state, and according to the particular laws of that state. 
9.2.3  Using the Basel Accords to Prompt Harmonisation of Laws on Security 
Interests and Insolvency 
Another proposal put forward by this thesis is that transnational regulatory laws such as 
the Basel Accords (and the adoption of binding transnational law instruments as 
described above) can be used as a means to prompt harmonisation of insolvency laws 
and laws on security interests.  This will ensure that financing entities established and 
operating in different jurisdictions are subject to the same risks.  This will be beneficial 
since any approximation of laws on security interests and insolvency will allow texts 
such as the Basel Accords to have the same effects wherever they are implemented, 
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rather than having one transnational regulatory law which may give rise to different 
effects depending on the underlying laws of each individual jurisdiction (particularly 
depending on whether a jurisdiction adopts a pro-creditor or a pro-debtor approach to 
laws). 
It is therefore here proposed to use a system which would be applied in a similar way to 
that adopted by the CTC.  The CTC and its Aircraft Protocol set out two model laws for 
states ratifying the said Convention (and the Aircraft Protocol) to adopt, with one 
alternative being a pro-creditor model law, and the second alternative being a pro-
debtor model law.  Entities operating in jurisdictions which adopt the pro-creditor 
model law are put at an advantage over entities operating in other jurisdictions, as ECAs 
give “discounts” to these entities when financing assets acquired by the said entities (in 
light of the lower legal risks which the ECAs providing finance will be subject).  
It is here argued that it is desirable for there to be further harmonisation in the laws on 
security interests and on insolvency of different jurisdictions, as this will mean that 
entities operating in different jurisdictions will start being subject to similar legal risks, 
and with this therefore allowing easier harmonisation of financial regulation and 
transnational regulatory laws (such as the Basel Accords), whilst allowing these laws to 
have similar effects across different jurisdictions. 
The Basel Accords should therefore be supplemented by model pro-creditor insolvency 
laws and laws on security interest and should give incentives to jurisdictions to adopt 
these model laws.  Having pro-creditor laws being adopted would mean that financing 
entities which the Basel Accords seek to regulate will be subject to less risks in light of 
having better rights of repossession and enforcement of collateral which would have 
been provided in their favour.  Incentives can be provided by having financing entities 
being entitled to hold less capital in relation to assets being financed, when such assets 
would be located in jurisdictions which would have adopted the pro-creditor model laws 
on insolvency and security interests.   
This will mean that the Basel Accords will start distinguishing between those 
jurisdictions which would have adopted a pro-creditor model law and those which 
would not have done so.  The end result will be that banks and financing entities which 
are subject to less risks (in light of the pro-creditor laws within which they operate), will 
be required to hold less regulatory capital.  This will also mean that once financing 
entities operate in jurisdictions which are subject to higher risks, then higher levels of 
capital would need to be maintained. 
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9.3  Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has highlighted a number of problems in the way the Basel Accords has been 
drafted, and in the way this is implemented and enforced.  Most of these problems 
arising due to a lack of consideration of the different interests which the various actors 
have in its promulgation, and due to there being a lack of proper legal analysis of the 
different laws within which the Basel Accords are meant to operate.  It is here argued 
that these problems have primarily arisen due to the Basel Accords being used for a 
much wider purpose than was originally envisaged, such that whilst the Basel Accords 
only contemplate the regulation of “internationally-active banks”, the Basel Accords have 
become the regulatory standard through which most banking and financing entities are 
regulated around the world.  
This concluding Chapter has therefore sought to put forward three different proposals 
through which, it is argued, the main problems highlighted throughout this thesis can be 
rectified.  These proposals are further supported by the successful adoption of the CTC 
which was intended to deal with similar problems to those which the Basel Accords are 
subject. 
Notwithstanding that the proposals which have been put forward seek to solve the 
problems which have been raised by this thesis, one needs to keep in mind that these 
proposals will also need to be analysed from an economic perspective as well as from a 
banking and finance perspective.  Further, empirical research may be helpful in order to 
show more accurately that the proposed solutions will, in practice, give rise to net 
positive outcomes.   
It is also appreciated that the reforms which have been proposed would give rise to 
fundamental changes to the system of banking regulation and that it might therefore be 
challenging to implement these reforms in the short to medium term.  Nevertheless, a 
proper appreciation of the problems which have been highlighted by this thesis should 
make the drafters of the Basel Accords aware of a number of issues which have been 
overlooked for too long and to which they should give proper consideration going 
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